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A PRESCRIPTION FOR CURING U.S. 
EXPORT CONTROLS 
 
GREGORY W. BOWMAN* 
Unlike inbound trade regulation, which is characterized by deep 
multilateralism, the regulation of export trade is characterized by 
significant unilateralism.  Nowhere is this more apparent than with the 
United States’ assertions of prescriptive extraterritorial jurisdiction under 
its export control laws.  Since 1982, the United States has claimed the 
power to regulate the use and reexport of U.S. origin goods, software, and 
technologies located abroad, based primarily on the fact that these items 
are of U.S. origin (or are foreign-origin items with some U.S. content).  
These “item origin-based” jurisdictional claims, which first were made as 
part of a trade dispute with European countries over a proposed natural 
gas pipeline from the Soviet Union, resulted in a flurry of academic 
commentary in the 1980s, with most commentators condemning this U.S. 
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  In the years since, attention to the 
issue has waned, but the United States’ assertion of item origin-based 
export control jurisdiction remains in place and unresolved as a matter of 
international law. 
This Article asserts that the United States’ longstanding claim of 
extraterritorial export control jurisdiction is an underappreciated but 
vitally important issue that needs to be readdressed.  International trade 
has grown exponentially since 1982, and the result is that the United 
States’ asserted jurisdictional reach has grown vastly broader.  This 
Article explains the nature and mechanics of the United States’ item 
origin-based jurisdictional claim, provides a summary of the 1982 Soviet 
gas pipeline trade dispute, reconsiders the justifiability of the United 
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States’ jurisdictional claim under the prescriptive jurisdictional principles 
of international law, and finds the current approach legally awkward and 
strategically insufficient.  It then considers the issue through the lens of 
more recent scholarship on transnational networks, mutual recognition 
arrangements, and unilateral trade actions, and concludes by 
recommending a multilateral approach that offers greater promise of both 
policy effectiveness and legality under international law. 
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“Few questions of international law are more complex than those 
posed by extraterritoriality.”1 
—Report by A.L.C. de Mestral & T. Gruchalla-Wesierski to 
Canadian Council on International Law, 1990 
 
“By acting unilaterally on the basis of dubious concepts of 
jurisdiction, the United States wastes political capital and jeopardizes 
its influence . . . .”2 
—Dorinda G. Dallmeyer, Council on Foreign Relations, in Export 
Controls in Transition (1992) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Export controls are a troubled area of international trade regulation.  
In contrast to inbound trade matters such as customs (import) laws and 
trade remedy laws, for which there is significant multilateral cooperation 
and enforcement through the World Trade Organization (WTO),3 
relatively little WTO attention is devoted to export control matters.4  To 
the extent that outbound trade issues do garner attention within the 
WTO, the focus usually is on trade-prohibiting sanctions or embargoes,5 
 
1. A.L.C. DE MESTRAL & T. GRUCHALLA-WESIERSKI, EXTRATERRITORIAL 
APPLICATION OF EXPORT CONTROL LEGISLATION: CANADA AND THE U.S.A. 3 (1990). 
2. Dorinda G. Dallmeyer, The Problem of Extraterritoriality in U.S. Export Control 
Policy, in EXPORT CONTROLS IN TRANSITION: PERSPECTIVES, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS 
148, 163 (Gary K. Bertsch & Steven Elliott-Gower eds., 1992). 
3. See GREGORY W. BOWMAN, NICK COVELLI, DAVID A. GANTZ & IHN HO UHM, 
TRADE REMEDIES IN NORTH AMERICA 1–2 (2010); ROBERT HOWSE, THE WTO SYSTEM: 
LAW, POLITICS & LEGITIMACY 10–12 (2007); Valentina Delich, Developing Countries and 
the WTO Dispute Settlement System, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO 71, 71 
(Bernard Hoekman et al. eds., 2002); Bernard Hoekman, The WTO: Functions and Basic 
Principles, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO, supra, at 41, 41–42. 
4. See DE MESTRAL & GRUCHALLA-WESIERSKI, supra note 1, at 5, 44–48 (1990); see 
also HOWSE, supra note 3, at 185–92 (describing John Jackson’s proposal to incorporate 
GATT into the WTO); Kenneth W. Abbott, Linking Trade to Political Goals: Foreign Policy 
Export Controls in the 1970s and 1980s, 65 MINN. L. REV. 739, 849–57 (1981). 
5. See, e.g., Klinton W. Alexander, The Helms-Burton Act and the WTO Challenge: 
Making a Case for the United States Under the GATT National Security Exception, 11 FLA. J. 
INT’L L. 559, 560 (1997); Sarah H. Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions and International 
Trade: A Theory of Compatibility, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 133, 133 (2002); Peter L. Fitzgerald, 
Massachusetts, Burma, and the World Trade Organization: A Commentary on Blacklisting, 
Federalism, and Internet Advocacy in the Global Trading Era, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 3 
(2001); Joaquín Roy, Lawyers Meet the Law: Critical U.S. Voices of Helms-Burton, 6 U. 
MIAMI Y.B. INT’L L. 39, 42 (1997–1998); Matthew Schaefer, Sovereignty, Influence, 
Realpolitik and the World Trade Organization, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 341, 356 
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which (as discussed below) are conceptually distinct from export 
controls.6  The result is that current multilateral cooperation in export 
controls is based largely on consensus,7 and unilateralism is hard to 
restrain.8   
Nowhere is unilateralism in export control measures more apparent 
than in the United States’ longstanding assertions of extraterritoriality 
in U.S. export controls.  Since the early 1980s, the United States has 
claimed the right to assert jurisdiction over foreign transactions, based 
on the fact that those transactions involve goods, software, or 
technologies that are of U.S. origin or contain U.S. content.9  This “item 
origin-based” jurisdictional approach is quite different from 
traditionally accepted forms of prescriptive extraterritorial jurisdiction 
under international law, such as territorial jurisdiction or jurisdiction 
based on the nationality of persons.10  The United States’ novel 
approach has infringed on the trade regulation efforts of the United 
States’ trading partners, and by preventing deeper multilateral 
consensus in export control matters, it has impaired the collective 
effectiveness of multilateral export controls through various 
international organizations and agreements.11  By the same token, this 
 
(2002); John A. Spanogle, Jr., Can Helms-Burton Be Challenged Under WTO?, 27 STETSON 
L. REV. 1313, 1313–14 (1998). 
6. See infra Part II.A. 
7. See infra Part II.G. 
8. In fact, multilateral export control cooperation has moved backward since the end of 
the Cold War.  The now-defunct Coordinating Committee (COCOM) system of the Cold 
War era had meaningful enforcement mechanisms to promote national compliance with its 
multilateral export control scheme.  However, its successor, the current Wassenaar 
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and 
Technologies, relies on consensus for compliance, with no meaningful enforcement 
mechanisms for noncompliance.  For further discussion of COCOM and the Wassenaar 
Arrangement, see infra Part II.G. 
9. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Trade Controls for Political Ends: Four Perspectives, 4 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 355, 358, 362–65 (2003); see also Gregory W. Bowman, E-Mails, Servers, and 
Software: U.S. Export Controls for the Modern Era, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 319, 328, 334–35 
(2004). 
10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 402 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. 
11. See Missile Technology Control Regime, The Missile Technology Control Regime, 
MCTR.INFO, http://www.mtcr.info/english/index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2014); Objectives of 
the Group, AUSTRALIAGROUP.NET, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/objectives.html (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2014); Org. for the Prohibition of Chem. Weapons, Overview of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, OPCW.ORG, http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/abo 
ut-the-convention/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2014); Wassenaar Arrangement on Exp. Controls for 
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Techs., Introduction, WASSENAAR.ORG, 
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U.S. approach to export control jurisdiction also has hindered the 
United States’ own foreign policy and national security objectives in the 
realm of international trade.12  The impact of the item origin-based 
approach is magnified by the fact that the United States has been the 
world’s largest economy for decades and is one of its largest exporters.13 
The nature of U.S. export control jurisdiction thus presents an 
important and perplexing problem.  And yet a threshold question must 
be asked: why address this topic now?  It was considered in detail by 
scholarly commentators in the 1980s, in the wake of a U.S. trade dispute 
with European trading partners over the construction of a natural gas 
pipeline from the Soviet Union.14  If the efforts of those scholars did not 
 
http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2014); What Are the 
Guidelines?, NUCLEARSUPPLIERSGROUP.ORG, http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/
02-guide.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2014). 
12. In general, unilateral approaches to international trade regulation are not successful.  
See William J. Long, Global Security, Democratization, and Economic Development After the 
Cold War: New Goals for U.S. Export Control Policies, in INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
ON NONPROLIFERATION EXPORT CONTROLS 59, 69 (Gary Bertsch et al. eds., 1994) (noting 
that unilateral controls “seldom succeed in inflicting meaningful economic damage on the 
target”). 
13. According to WTO trade figures, U.S. GDP in 2012 was U.S. $15,684,800 million, 
and its exports of goods totaled U.S. $1,545,709 million (f.o.b. value)—which made the 
United States the world’s second-largest exporter by value, behind only China.  See World 
Trade Org., United States Trade Profile, WTO.ORG, http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDB
CountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=US (last visited Jan. 30, 2014); World Trade 
Org., International Trade Statistics 2013, WTO.ORG, www.wto.org/english/res_e/.../its2013_e.p
df. 
14. See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL & WILLIAM M. KNIGHTON, NATIONAL LAWS 
AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE: THE PROBLEM OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY 53–67 
(1982); Cecil Hunt, The Jurisdictional Reach of Export Controls, 26 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 19, 19–20 (1987); see also Kenneth W. Abbott, Collective Goods, Mobile Resources, and 
Extraterritorial Trade Controls, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117, 118, 130 (1987); J.W. 
Bridge, The Law and Politics of United States Foreign Policy Export Controls, 4 LEGAL 
STUD. 2 (1984); Stanley J. Marcuss & D. Steven Mathias, U.S. Foreign Policy Export 
Controls: Do They Pass Muster Under International Law?, 2 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 1, 12 
(1984); Duane D. Morse & Joan S. Powers, U.S. Export Controls and Foreign Entities: The 
Unanswered Questions of Pipeline Diplomacy, 23 VA. J. INT’L L. 537 (1983); Homer E. 
Moyer, Jr. & Linda A. Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The History, 
Legal Issues, and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1 (1983) 
(discussing, inter alia, extraterritorial application of U.S. export control laws); Janet Lunine, 
Note, High Technology Warfare: The Export Administration Act Amendments of 1985 and the 
Problem of Foreign Reexport, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 663, 667–68 (1986); Note, 
Extraterritorial Application of the Export Administration Act of 1979 Under International and 
American Law, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1308 (1983) [hereinafter Extraterritorial Application]; Note, 
Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 1310, 1317–18, 1318 n.42 (1985) [hereinafter Predictability and Comity]. 
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lead to successful resolution of this jurisdictional issue, is it worth re-
opening this vein of inquiry now?  Why not just let sleeping dogs lie? 
This Article contends that the item origin-based extraterritoriality of 
U.S. export controls is a critically important matter that deserves 
immediate reexamination.  There are several reasons why this is so.  
First, the topic is timely.  There is renewed U.S. interest in export 
control reform and modernization for the first time in nearly two 
decades,15 and extending this discussion to jurisdictional matters is a 
natural progression.  Second, there has been a dramatic upsurge in 
global trade in recent decades, which means that these U.S. assertions of 
broadly extraterritorial export control jurisdiction have much larger 
consequences than ever before.16 
Third, the current U.S. national security and foreign policy 
landscape is vastly different from that of the Cold War and the pre-9/11 
era, and that has enormous implications for the jurisdictional reach of 
U.S. export controls.  During the Cold War, the need to regulate an 
exported item depended largely on where it was going, and a central 
purpose of export controls was to prevent (or at least heavily restrict) 
exports and reexports to various communist countries.  In the post-Cold 
War era, however, “destination” cannot be used nearly as readily as a 
proxy for “undesired export” (or reexport).  Some exports or reexports 
to Russia or China (or any other destination) are desirable, and some 
are not, depending on the intended use for the items and the parties 
 
15. The last time serious attention was paid to U.S. export control reform was 
immediately prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks; those legislative efforts were 
abandoned following those attacks.  See Bowman, supra note 9, at 325–26. 
16. This upsurge in global trade is due to a number of reasons.  Tariff rates have 
dropped dramatically for all WTO countries, with the result (predicted by neoclassical 
economics) that trade has grown as this particular transaction cost has been eliminated.  See 
Gregory W. Bowman, Thinking Outside the Border: Homeland Security and the Forward 
Deployment of the U.S. Border, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 189, 196–97 (2007).  Shipping and 
multimodal transportation costs also have dropped significantly, reducing another key 
transaction cost of imports and exports.  Id. at 197–98.  Both production activities and 
research and development (R&D) have become more trans-border in nature, which of course 
necessitates international trade in goods, software, and technology to support these activities.  
See Bowman, supra note 9, at 321.  And the growth of e-commerce and electronic 
communications means that today there are many trans-border transfers of software or 
technology that were not possible two decades ago—transfers that, while non-physical, are 
nonetheless considered exports or reexports by the United States.  Id. at 351–56.  Considered 
together, these changes mean there are exponentially more U.S.-origin goods and 
technologies outside the United States—and that, in turn, means there are exponentially 
more foreign activities over which the United States now claims item origin-based 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
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involved.17  The same is true of exports or reexports to anywhere else.  
As a result, the United States is now far more inclined to assert 
jurisdiction extraterritorially over activities in many different countries, 
and expansive extraterritoriality has become an ever more central and 
indelible feature of U.S. export controls. 
Fourth, none of the U.S. export control reform efforts since 1982 
(when the issue of item origin-based jurisdiction came to the fore) have 
addressed questions of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  A major 
modernization of U.S. export controls was undertaken in 1995–1996, but 
it left the jurisdictional reach of U.S. export controls untouched.18  
Unsuccessful efforts in 2000 and 2001 to enact new U.S. export control 
legislation also ignored jurisdictional matters.19  Current initiatives by 
the Obama Administration to simplify the structure of U.S. export 
controls and double U.S. exports are highly laudable—such streamlining 
and export promotion efforts are badly needed and long overdue—but 
these efforts too are blind to the problematic nature of U.S. export 
control jurisdiction.20  The subject of U.S. export control jurisdiction is, 
therefore, an important one that warrants renewed attention.  A 
solution not only could resolve the long-simmering question of 
jurisdictional reach, but also actually advance the goals of U.S. export 
controls and those of the United States’ major trading partners. 
This Article presents a two-part thesis.  First, it reconsiders whether 
item origin-based export control jurisdiction might be justified under 
 
17. The term of art used for such determinations is “end-user.”  Export Administration 
Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 772.1 (2013) (defining “End-user” as “[t]he person abroad that 
receives and ultimately uses the exported or reexported items.  The end-user is not a 
forwarding agent or intermediary, but may be the purchaser or ultimate consignee.”). 
18. See Export Administration Regulation; Simplification of Export Administration 
Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 12,714 (Mar. 25, 1996) (providing for reform and simplification of 
U.S. Export Administration Regulations). 
19. See Bowman, supra note 9, at 324–26. 
20. See Export Control List Review and Creating a Single Control List, EXPORT.GOV, 
http://export.gov/ecr/eg_main_027617.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (discussing export 
classification reform); Licensing Policy Review and Building a Single Licensing Agency, 
EXPORT.GOV, http://export.gov/ecr/eg_main_027616.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2014)  
(discussing unification of export licensing into a single agency in order to increase licensing 
process transparency and predictability and reduce processing times); A Modern Information 
Technology (IT) System for Export Controls, EXPORT.GOV, http://export.gov/ecr/eg_main_02
7615.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (discussing export control information technology 
modernization); Export Control Enforcement, EXPORT.GOV, http://export.gov/ecr/eg_main_0
27618.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (discussing harmonization of export violation 
investigations and penalties); see also THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
32 (2010) (setting forth the “goal of doubling U.S. exports by 2014”). 
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existing international law principles of prescriptive jurisdiction.  It 
concludes that it remains quite awkward to do so.  Specifically, while it 
is possible today to justify more of the reach of U.S. item origin-based 
export control jurisdiction than in 1982, the full scope of item origin-
based jurisdiction still cannot be justified under these principles.  
Second, and more importantly, the national security and foreign policy 
goals pursued by the United States through its export controls are not 
well-served by item origin-based jurisdiction, and for that reason the 
current approach should be abandoned in favor of an approach that 
better serves those goals. 
In exploring the first part of this thesis, Part II of this Article will 
provide an overview of U.S. export controls and their history, in order 
to explain how the item origin-based approach to jurisdiction developed.  
The subject of export controls is a technical one, so understanding the 
mechanics and history of U.S. export controls is an essential predicate to 
analyzing it.  Part III then will review the United States’ assertions of 
item origin-based extraterritorial jurisdiction through the lens of the 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States and 
earlier scholarship relevant to extraterritorial export control 
jurisdiction.21  In exploring the second part of this thesis, Part IV will 
consider the matter through the lens of more recent scholarship on 
network theory,22 transnational mutual recognition arrangements,23 and 
unilateralism and norm development.24  This discussion will underscore 
how both the jurisdictional principles of international law and the policy 
 
21. The Restatement (Third) is generally considered an accurate rendering of 
international law’s principles of prescriptive jurisdiction.  See, e.g., DE MESTRAL & 
GRUCHALLA-WESIERSKI, supra note 1, at 17 (“Major treatises address the issue of 
extraterritoriality. . . .  What emerges from this body of writing is something close to a 
consensus on the categories of analysis in terms of jurisdiction to prescribe . . . .” (footnote 
omitted)).  It is worth noting that much of the original 1980s scholarship on this topic was 
published before the Restatement (Third) had been finalized, and much of the previous 
analysis was pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States. 
22. See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (arguing 
for the adoption of network theory). 
23. See generally Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual 
Recognition Regimes: Governance Without Global Government, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
263 (2005). 
24. See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic 
Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2001) (discussing unilateral U.S. efforts in the area of 
international human rights as a means to promote multilateral cooperation or norm 
development); Cleveland, supra note 5 (same). 
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goals pursued by the United States through export controls would be 
better satisfied by a new “purpose-based” jurisdictional approach to 
export controls that bases extraterritoriality on generally agreed-upon 
nonproliferation and missile technology-restrictive goals of the U.S. and 
multilateral export control regimes.  It also will make clear that while a 
new jurisdictional approach likely would be more multilateral than the 
current U.S. item origin-based approach, the United States would not 
need to abandon all unilateral or asymmetrically expansive aspects of its 
current approach. 
Part V will draw on this recent scholarship to recommend changes to 
the jurisdictional reach of the U.S. export control regime, and for 
jurisdiction within the multilateral export control system generally.  Part 
VI will offer concluding thoughts, including practical suggestions for 
implementation of such an approach. 
It is worth emphasizing at the outset that this Article deliberately 
focuses on doctrine and doctrinal change—on understanding the extent 
to which U.S. assertions of export jurisdiction fall within the boundaries 
of traditional international law doctrine, and on considering how both 
U.S. practice and international law doctrinal rules might be altered to 
bring U.S. activities within the permissible scope of international law 
prescriptive jurisdiction.  The analysis, therefore, proceeds from the 
traditional premise that international law is indeed law.25  Regardless of 
one’s view of international law and its limits,26 the hope is that doctrinal 
consideration of this topic will help clarify and resolve, both legally and 
policywise, a long-festering and increasingly important problem of 
international trade regulation.27  Revisiting this topic also will prove 
 
25. See Anthony D’Amato, Is International Law Really “Law”?, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1293 
(1984–1985); see also Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. 
INT’L L. J. 121, 134–35 (2007) (discussing state adherence to, versus refusal to follow, 
universal jurisdiction as customary international law). 
26. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2005) (asserting that international law rests not on opinio juris but rather on interest 
maximization, that international law is less robust than domestic law, and that states have no 
normative, moral obligation to comply with the rules of international law); D’Amato, supra 
note 25, at 1314 (discussing differences and similarities between domestic and international 
law, and concluding that “[t]he ‘serious students of law’ who claim that international law isn’t 
really ‘law’ make the same mistake that some political scientists make in ignoring norms in 
order to be ‘scientific’ in their ‘descriptions’”). 
27. The question of whether the doctrinal rules of prescriptive international jurisdiction 
should be altered is also a question worthy of consideration, but that is outside the scope this 
Article. 
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useful in light of current efforts by the American Law Institute to 
prepare a Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States.28 
II. BACKGROUND: U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS AND THEIR 
JURISDICTIONAL BASIS 
The details of U.S. export controls have been discussed at length 
elsewhere,29 and it is not the goal of this Article simply to retread that 
same ground.  Yet because export controls are complex, an 
understanding of their history and structure is necessary to appreciate 
fully the problems presented by extraterritorial reach.  This Part 
accordingly provides an overview of U.S. export controls, their 
evolution, and their intended purposes.  First, however, it is important 
to clarify the under-appreciated distinction between export controls and 
trade sanctions (or embargoes). 
A. The Distinction Between Export Controls and Trade Sanctions 
Modern scholars and policymakers, as well as the Restatement 
(Third), typically do not make a clear distinction between export 
controls and trade sanctions, but rather treat them as two sides of the 
same coin.30  This is understandable because export controls and trade 
sanctions both are used to prevent unwanted transactions, and because 
current U.S. export controls originated as a post-World War II trade-
restrictive regime (as discussed below).31  Yet in the modern context, the 
strong trade-promotion focus of U.S. export controls32 stands in clear 
 
28. The Am. Law Inst., Publications Catalog, ALI.ORG, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fus 
eaction=%20publications.ppage&node_id=33 (last visited Jan. 14, 2014). 
29. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 9, at 328–49 (discussing the origins of modern U.S. 
export controls for civilian and dual use goods and the current technical structure of these 
controls); Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 357–60 (discussing post-World War II origins and 
development of U.S. export controls for civilian and dual use goods).  For detailed technical 
analyses of U.S. export control laws and regulations, see ERIC L. HIRSCHHORN, THE EXPORT 
CONTROL AND EMBARGO HANDBOOK (3d ed. 2010); WILLIAM A. ROOT, JOHN R. 
LIEBMAN & ROSZEL C. THOMSEN II, UNITED STATES EXPORT CONTROLS (5th ed. 2010). 
30. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 4, at 756–57; Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 361–68 
(discussing the Soviet Pipeline export control dispute and the Cuban embargo); Moyer & 
Mabry, supra note 14, at 2–3.  For an article making a clear distinction between U.S. export 
controls and trade sanctions, see Fitzgerald, supra note 5.  
31. See infra Part II.C.2. 
32. See Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. § 2401 (2006) (noting the 
importance of export promotion to the economic well-being of the United States). 
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contrast to the trade-restrictive nature of U.S. trade sanctions.33  That is, 
while export controls can be used as a tool for implementing particular 
trade sanctions programs,34 a core purpose of U.S. export controls is to 
promote trade.35  The governing presumptions are thus poles apart: 
trade sanctions presumptively prohibit trade, and export controls 
presumptively permit trade, within certain limits.  These presumptions 
can be overcome, but they set the regulatory tone and focus for each 
type of program. 
The differences between export controls and trade sanctions also 
play out jurisdictionally: export control jurisdiction is based on the 
origin of the items regulated, whereas trade sanction jurisdiction 
generally is based on the parties and countries regulated.36  Trade 
sanctions also often restrict imports and financial transactions, which are 
activities outside the scope of export controls.37  The difference in 
jurisdictional scope has enormous ramifications in terms of 
extraterritoriality: in response to foreign objections,38 the United States 
 
33. See U.S. Dep’t of State: Directorate of Def. Trade Controls, Country Policies and 
Embargoes, STATE.GOV (Oct. 4, 2013), http://pmddtc.state.gov/embargoed_countries/index.ht
ml (noting the list of countries that the United States currently has embargoed). 
34. The U.S. Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 730–774 (2013), provide 
an “assist” to U.S. trade sanctions programs by applying complementary export prohibitions 
to those countries, but these provisions are expressly intended as carve-outs to the generally 
permissive scheme of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).  See id. §§ 736.2(b)(6), 
746 (“Export or reexport to embargoed destinations” and “Embargoes and Other Special 
Controls”).  
35. See infra Part II.C. 
36. See, e.g., Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 538.205, 538.315 (2013) 
(regarding jurisdiction over “United States person” and defining same); Iranian Transactions 
and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 560.204, 560.314 (2013) (regarding jurisdiction over 
“United States person” and defining same). 
37. Compare BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 598 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “embargo” as the 
“collective restrictions on the import or export of goods, materials, capital, or services into or 
from a specific country or group of countries for political or security reasons”), with U.S. 
Dep’t of State: Directorate of Def. Trade Controls, Overview of U.S. Export Control System, 
STATE.GOV, http://www.state.gov/strategictrade/overview/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2014) (noting 
one of the essential elements of an effective export control is a broad international scope 
rather than a targeting of specific, offensive countries). 
38. An exception to this is the “trafficking” restriction contained in the Cuban Liberty 
and Democratic Solidarity Act.  22 U.S.C. § 6023 (2012).  Commonly known as the Helms-
Burton Act after its congressional sponsors, Article III of the Act contained provisions to 
enable U.S. nationals who held claims in expropriated Cuban property to file suit in U.S. 
federal court for damages against foreign nationals who “trafficked” in that property.  See id. 
§§ 6023(13), 6081–6091.  While this provision does not per se represent a shift away from 
person-based jurisdiction, it does use a property-based approach to expand the scope of 
prohibited activity.  In any event, this provision has never come into force: it has been 
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actually reduced the extraterritorial reach of its trade sanctions 
programs by adopting a more restrictive definition of “U.S. Persons” 
(individuals and companies) who are subject to those programs under 
nationality jurisdiction.39  By contrast, item origin-based jurisdiction 
under U.S. export controls was expanded in the 1980s and has remained 
expansive ever since. 
B. Jurisdictional Validity Under U.S. Law 
While the extraterritoriality of U.S. export controls is of 
questionable legality under international law, it must be noted that this 
extraterritorial reach appears valid for U.S. law purposes.  Congress 
intended the primary export control statute, the Export Administration 
Act of 1979 (EAA of 1979),40 to apply extraterritorially, at least with 
respect to jurisdiction over U.S. persons and companies located 
abroad41—which means that the general U.S. law presumption against 
 
suspended by every president since President Clinton, pursuant to presidential discretion as 
provided for in the Act.  See Delegation of Authority to Suspend the Provisions of Title III of 
the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 78 Fed. Reg. 9573 
(Feb. 8, 2013); Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Letter from the 
President Regarding the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 
1996 (Jan. 13, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/13/letter-
president-regarding-cuban-liberty-and-democratic-solidarity-liber (“Consistent with section 
306(c)(2) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Public 
Law 104-114) (the “Act”), I hereby determine and report to the Congress that suspension, for 
6 months beyond February 1, 2012, of the right to bring an action under title III of the Act is 
necessary to the national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to 
democracy in Cuba.”); Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Presidential 
Memorandum—Delegation of Authority to Suspend the Provisions of Title III of the Cuban 
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Jan. 31, 2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/31/presidential-memorandum-delegation-
authority-suspend-provisions-title-ii. 
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, at pt. IV, ch. 1, subch. A, intro. note. 
40. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503–536 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401–20 (2006)).  The EAA of 1979 actually expired in 1994, 
with one brief respite from 2000 to 2001, and the export control regulations promulgated 
under this statute were kept in force (with minor modifications) during this period of expiry 
pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–07; see 
also Bowman, supra note 9, at 331–32.  Permanent export control enforcement authority 
under the EAA of 1979 was finally reestablished in 2010 pursuant to the Comprehensive Iran 
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-195, § 305, 124 Stat. 
1312, 1349–50 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 8544 (2012)). 
41. See 125 Cong. Rec. 8259–62 (1979); see also Extraterritorial Application, supra note 
14, at 1312–13.  Specifically, the EAA of 1979 amended Section 4(b) of the EAA of 1969 to 
expand the jurisdictional reach of U.S. export controls by deleting language that 
unambiguously limited the jurisdictional reach of the act to exports from the United States, its 
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extraterritoriality is overcome as regards person-based (nationality) 
jurisdiction.42  The statute does not contain express language regarding 
item origin-based extraterritoriality, but the U.S. Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR)43 promulgated pursuant to that statute do.  The U.S. 
Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, which 
administers the EAR, has not explained the international law 
jurisdictional bases for item origin-based export control jurisdiction 
(perhaps because it is hard to justify legally),44 and recent governmental 
practice has been simply to ignore it.45  Still, the Bureau of Industry and 
Security almost certainly would be given a significant degree of 
deference regarding its interpretation (through the EAR) of the statute 
and its purpose—either pursuant to the Chevron doctrine46 (under 
 
territories, and possessions.  Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 5(a), 93 
Stat. 503, 506 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404 (2006)); Export Administration 
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 4(b), 83 Stat. 841, 842 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 
app. § 2404 (2006)).  The resulting language was as follows: 
To effectuate the policies set forth in section 3 of this Act, the President may 
prohibit or curtail the exportation from the United States, its territories and 
possessions, of any articles, materials, or supplies including technical data or any 
other information, except under such rules and regulations as he shall prescribe, of 
any articles, materials or supplies, including technical data or any other information, 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or exported by any person subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States. 
(deleted text is struck through; added text is italicized). 
42. As David Koplow has pointed out, from the perspective of international law, the 
general U.S. presumption against extraterritoriality establishes a default presumption in favor 
of using subjective territoriality (jurisdiction over acts within U.S. borders) as the basis for 
U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction.  David A. Koplow, Long Arms and Chemical Arms: 
Extraterritoriality and the Draft Chemical Weapons Convention, 15 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 41–42 
(1990). 
43. Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 730–74 (2013). 
44. See id. § 772.1 (definitions of “Export,” “Reexport,” and “Item”); Marcuss & 
Mathias, supra note 14, at 19. 
45. See Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1979) 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401–20 (2006)); H.R. REP. NO. 95-459, at 21–22 
(1977); see also S. REP. NO. 96-169, at 2–3 (1979); David H. Small, Managing Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Problems: The United States Government Approach, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 283, 285 n.15 (1987).  Cf. Extraterritorial Application, supra note 14, at 1308; Foley 
Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285, 292 (1949) (applying a U.S. labor statute to Panama Canal 
contractors in the “foreign territory” of the Canal Zone, notwithstanding “the canon of 
construction which teaches [us] that [the] legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent 
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” 
because the law was “within the usual scope of Congressional concern” (citing Blackmer v. 
United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932))). 
46. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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Chevron Step Two, as a reasonable interpretation of an unclear statute 
by the administering agency), or on the basis of deference under 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.47 (because of significant agency knowledge and 
expertise).  Export controls are the quintessence of a technical and 
policy-driven area of the law, and the agency is in a far better position 
than generalist courts to be attuned to the export control desires of 
Congress.  It is thus nearly certain that the current extraterritorial scope 
of the statute, as applied through the EAR,48 would withstand any 
domestic law challenge.  In any event, such a legal challenge is unlikely49: 
most U.S. case law regarding extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction 
concerns criminal law and antitrust law matters.50  The question, then, is 
 
47. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).  Jerry Mashaw summarizes the 
different approaches under Chevron and Skidmore nicely: 
Chevron relies on constitutional structure, Congress’s legitimate authority to 
delegate lawmaking power to administrative agencies, and the political 
accountability of those agencies to the President and to Congress.  Skidmore sounds 
in “capacity” or “expertise” the potential for accurate understanding by agencies 
immersed in both the politics of congressional enactment and the day-to-day 
administration of statutory texts. 
Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into 
Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 505 (2005).  Skidmore deference has 
had a resurgence of sorts in recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.  See United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Patrick McKinley Brennan, Delivering the Goods: Herein of 
Mead, Delegations, and Authority, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 307, 327 (2009) (“[The Mead 
Court] held that Skidmore deference was alive and well as a possible congressionally-
mandated judicial response to agency outputs . . . .”). 
48. See 15 C.F.R. § 736.2 (2013) (defining the scope of EAR export prohibitions—and, 
by implication, permissible exports—in terms of “exports” and “reexports”); id. § 734.2(b)(1), 
(4) (defining “export” to mean “an actual shipment or transmission of items subject to the 
EAR out of the United States, or release of technology or software subject to the EAR to a 
foreign national in the United States,” and “reexport” to mean “an actual shipment or 
transmission of items subject to the EAR from one foreign country to another foreign 
country; or release of technology or software subject to the EAR to a foreign national outside 
the United States”).  The term “release” in the definition refers to the conveyance of software 
or technology to foreign nationals (either in the United States or elsewhere), which are 
deemed to be nonphysical “exports or reexports” of such software or technology to the 
foreign nationals’ home country.  See id. § 734.2(b)(3), (5). 
49. See ROSENTHAL & KNIGHTON, supra note 14, at 70 (“More than nine out of ten law 
suits are settled or dismissed well before trial.”).  The exceptions often have to do with the 
proper scope of federal versus state power.  See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 
U.S. 363, 373–74 (2000); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 
(1936); Gregory W. Bowman, U.S. and Canadian Federalism: Implications for International 
Trade Regulation, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 1007, 1026–27 (2012). 
50. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (antitrust); United 
States v. Dawn, 129 F.3d 878, 882 (7th Cir. 1997) (criminal law); United States v. Morton, 314 
F. Supp. 2d 509, 512–13 (D. Md. 2004) (criminal law); Alcar Grp., Inc. v. Corporate 
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the legality of the item origin-based approach under international law.  
To address that question, however, requires an appreciation of the 
historical origins and evolution of U.S. export controls. 
C. The Historical Context: A Generally Permissive Regime 
1. Origins 
In light of the explosive growth in U.S. international trade over the 
past several decades,51 it is tempting to think of the modern U.S. focus 
on export promotion as a sea change in American attitudes toward 
exports.  However, the current focus on export promotion is consistent 
with a longstanding U.S. preference for permitting exports, not 
preventing them.  That is, historically the United States has imposed 
relatively few export controls or trade sanctions.  Indeed, for much of 
the nineteenth century the United States adopted the principle of “free 
ships, free goods” in international trade, meaning that neutral ships not 
carrying “contraband”—prohibited or unlawful articles—were to be 
given free passage and be permitted to trade.52  A preference for export 
promotion is also built into the U.S. Constitution, which permits the 
taxation of imports but expressly prohibits the taxation of exports.53  
Export controls are thus part of an historical U.S. tradition of 
facilitating, not restricting, trade. 
 
Performance Sys., Ltd., 109 F. Supp. 2d 948, 950 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (antitrust). 
51. See Bowman, supra note 9, at 321–23. 
52. RICHARD T. CUPITT, RELUCTANT CHAMPIONS: U.S. PRESIDENTIAL POLICY AND 
STRATEGIC EXPORT CONTROLS 35 (2000). 
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 (“No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from 
any State.”).  The Export Clause was included at the insistence of export-dependent southern 
states, and it stands in direct contrast to duties on imports, which are constitutionally 
permissible.  Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the 
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1186 n.324 (2003) (citing United 
States v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 859–60 (1996)); see also Claire R. Kelly & 
Daniela Amzel, Does the Commerce Clause Eclipse the Export Clause?: Making Sense of 
United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 84 MINN. L. REV. 129, 146 (1999) (discussing 
Southern desire to avoid taxation of exports as a reason for the Export Clause).  While the 
U.S. Constitution’s preferential treatment of exports is perhaps an embodiment of a late-
eighteenth century mercantilistic view of facilitating exports (by prohibiting export taxation) 
and impeding imports (partly for protective purposes and partly for revenue generation via 
tariffs), the promotion of exports remains valid economic policy under modern (and less 
mercantilistic) views of international trade. 
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2. Impact of the Cold War 
The restrictive U.S. export control system that developed during the 
early Cold War era is thus a significant historical deviation.  Yet even 
the post-war system itself did not start out as a trade-restrictive export 
regime.  Rather, the initial, twofold purpose under the original 
comprehensive U.S. export control statute, the Export Control Act of 
1949 (ECA of 1949),54 was (a) to ease U.S. domestic shortages of 
strategically and economically important goods (in the wake of years of 
war rationing) and (b) to channel exports toward the reconstruction of 
Europe.55  It was, in other words, initially a re-directional regime, not a 
restrictive regime.  Moreover, while the system evolved in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s into a comprehensive anticommunist system of controls 
intended to prevent exports to the Soviet bloc and China56—in effect, an 
anticommunist trade embargo57—trade facilitation concerns quickly 
regained ascendant status.  Successor statutes to the ECA of 1949—the 
Export Administration Act of 1969 (EAA of 1969)58 and the EAA of 
197959—placed U.S. anticommunist trade restrictions within an overall 
framework of export controls that were expressly intended to promote 
U.S. economic growth through the facilitation and promotion of exports, 
including exports to communist countries.60  This structure remains in 
 
54. Export Control Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-11, 63 Stat. 7 (1949) (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021–32 (1952)). 
55. See CUPITT, supra note 52, at 64–71.  This was undertaken pursuant to broad 
presidential authority granted by that Act.  See Export Control Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-
11, 63 Stat. 7 (1949) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021–32 (1952)) (granting the 
President broad authority to “prohibit or curtail the exportation from the United States” of 
articles subject to the Act, “except under such rules [authorizing exports] as he shall 
prescribe”); see also Harold J. Berman & John R. Garson, U.S. Export Controls—Past, 
Present and Future, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 794–95 (1967) (discussing the restrictive nature 
of the Export Control Act of 1949); Paul H. Silverstone, The Export Control Act of 1949: 
Extraterritorial Enforcement, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 332–33 (1959) (same). 
56. CUPITT, supra note 52, at 70–76.  See generally Lowenfeld, supra note 9; Silverstone, 
supra note 55, at 343–44. 
57. For additional discussion of the distinction between export controls and trade 
sanctions, see supra notes 30–39. 
58. Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (1969) (codified 
as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 2404 (2006)). 
59. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 2404 (2006)). 
60. See Donald H. Caldwell, Jr., Note, The Export Administration Amendments Act of 
1985: A Reassessment and Proposals for Further Reform, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 811, 
819 (1986) (“The EAA of 1969 reflected the view that trade should be encouraged with 
communist nations as well as with the market economies of Western Europe, Canada, Latin 
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place to this day: the EAA of 1979 expressly states that exports should 
be restricted “only after full consideration of the impact on the economy 
of the United States and only to the extent necessary” to achieve the 
statute’s goals of protecting national security and furthering U.S. foreign 
policy.61 
A defining feature of modern U.S. export controls, therefore, is the 
tension between a strong desire to promote exports (consistent with the 
United States’ historical preference for trade) and the desire to prevent 
or oversee problematic transactions.62  This tension holds particular 
importance for the jurisdictional reach of U.S. export controls, because 
efforts to promote exports (and reduce export licensing requirements) 
have led to there being more items located outside the United States 
over which the United States asserts jurisdiction (usually because these 
items are of U.S. origin or contain U.S. content).63  In this way, the 
potential for disagreement and conflicts between the United States and 
its trading partners is increased.64 
3. Recent U.S. Developments 
Efforts by the Obama Administration to double U.S. exports over 
five years (2009 to 2014)65 and to simplify the licensing structure for U.S. 
 
America and Asia.”). 
61. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2).  For a discussion of the background leading up to the 
enactment of the EAA of 1979 and its conflicting goals of promoting trade and using trade as 
a foreign policy tool, see Abbott, supra note 4, at 741–45.  It is worth pointing out that the 
EAA of 1979 lists other policy goals as well—namely, preventing the export of items 
identified as being in short domestic supply and preventing the export of items in support of 
terrorism—but these goals can be viewed as more specific subsets of the broader national 
security and foreign policy goals of the statute.  Indeed, it has been observed that even the 
statute’s national security and foreign policy goals are largely interchangeable for practical 
purposes.  See ROOT, LIEBMAN & THOMSEN, supra note 29, § 4.1.1; Abbott, supra note 4, at 
744–47. 
62. For further discussion of the difficult balance between export promotion and 
prevention of problematic export transactions, see generally Bowman, supra note 9, at 325.  
63. For a detailed discussion of the EAR’s jurisdictional origin requirements, see infra 
text accompanying notes 71–78. 
64. The Obama Administration’s current efforts at export promotion also ignore (as 
have previous efforts at export control reform) central structural deficiencies in the U.S. 
system of regulating exports.  For discussion of those structural problems and suggested 
solutions, see Bowman, supra note 9, at 319; Gregory W. Bowman, The U.S. Export Control 
Reforms of 2009–2014: Good Answers to Incomplete Questions, available at 
http://ssrn.com/author=400520. 
65. TRADE PROMOTION COORDINATING COMM., 2011 NATIONAL EXPORT 
STRATEGY: POWERING THE NATIONAL EXPORT INITIATIVE 3 (2011), available at 
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export controls66 further illustrate the American preference for 
facilitating outbound trade.  The licensing simplification efforts 
underway are badly needed: the broad consensus within the U.S. 
government and the private sector is that U.S. export controls are too 
complex,67 too riddled with inconsistencies caused by incremental 
modifications,68 too restrictive of exports of items with military origins 
but widespread commercial applications,69 and too balkanized in terms 
 
http://trade.gov/publications/pdfs/nes2011FINAL.pdf (“So tonight, we set a new goal: We will 
double our exports over the next five years . . . .” (quoting Barack Obama, President of the 
United States, State of the Union Address (January 27, 2010))). 
66. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet on the 
President’s Export Control Reform Initiative (Apr. 20, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheet-presidents-export-control-reform-initia 
tive (outlining a streamlined licensing process, clearer export classification scheme, and more 
clear-cut demarcations of interagency jurisdiction). 
67. See id.  Specifically, the White House’s press release stated as follows:  
The assessment found that the current U.S. export control system does not 
sufficiently reduce national security risk based on the fact that its structure is overly 
complicated, contains too many redundancies, and tries to protect too much. 
 The current system is based on two different control lists administered by two 
different departments, three different primary licensing agencies (none of whom 
sees the others licenses), a multitude of enforcement agencies with overlapping and 
duplicative authorities, and a number of separate information technology systems 
(none of which are accessible to or easily compatible with the other), or agencies 
with no IT system at all that issue licenses.  The fragmented system, combined with 
the extensive list of controlled items which resulted in almost 130,000 licenses last 
year, dilutes our ability to adequately control and protect those key items and 
technologies that must be protected for our national security. 
Id.; see also Ronald J. Sievert, Urgent Message to Congress—The Case for Immediate Reform 
of Our Outdated, Ineffective, and Self-Defeating Export Control System, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 89, 
92–93 (2002); Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama 
Announces First Steps Toward Implementation of New U.S. Export Control System (Dec. 9, 
2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/09/president-obama-
announces-first-steps-toward-implementation-new-us-expor (“Rebuilding the two U.S. export 
control lists—which currently have completely different structures, take different approaches 
to defining controlled products, and are administered by two different departments—is the 
cornerstone of the reform effort because all other aspects of our system are contingent upon 
what we control.”); Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, White House 
Chief of Staff Daley Highlights Priority for the President’s Export Control Reform Initiative 
(Jul. 19, 2011) [hereinafter Press Release, Chief of Staff Daley], available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/19/white-house-chief-staff-daley-highlight 
s-priority-presidents-export-cont (same); About Export Control Reform, EXPORT.GOV (Oct. 
22, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://export.gov/ecr/eg_main_047329.asp (same). 
68. Sievert, supra note 67, at 93.  
69. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Release of 
National Security Report on Revising U.S. Export Controls on Satellites (Apr. 18, 2012), 
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of which U.S. agencies have jurisdiction over what export activities.70  
Because of its focus on export promotion, this reform effort further 
underscores the importance of trying to resolve the issues raised by the 
extraterritorial scope of U.S. export control laws. 
D. The Structure of U.S. Export Controls: Licensing and Jurisdiction 
The topic of prescriptive jurisdiction of U.S. export control laws is 
inextricably intertwined with that of U.S. export licensing, because the 
United States only takes export control enforcement action against 
activities over which it claims jurisdiction.  A brief summary of the 
licensing and penalty schemes of U.S. export controls is therefore 
necessary in order to fully appreciate the impact of the United States’ 
expansive export control jurisdictional claims. 
1. U.S. Export Control Licensing Structure and Penalties 
A key structural characteristic of U.S. export controls under the 
EAA of 1979 and EAR is that the primary focus is on the identity and 
origin of the goods, software, and technologies (again, collectively 
referred to as “items”)71 being exported.  The EAR apply to the export 
of civilian and “dual use” items—commercial items that can be used for 
 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/18/fact-sheet-release-
national-security-report-revising-us-export-controls (“Over the past 15 years, a substantial 
number of commercial satellite systems, subsystems, components, and related technologies 
have become less critical to national security due to the transition from military to 
predominantly civilian uses . . . .  As a result, U.S. export controls over these items should 
reflect their decreased sensitivity while still ensuring that they cannot be used to significantly 
improve the military capabilities of another country.”); see also Sievert, supra note 67, at 93; 
Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Lays the 
Foundation for a New Export Control System to Strengthen National Security and the 
Competitiveness of Key U.S. Manufacturing and Technology Sectors (Aug. 30, 2010) 
[hereinafter Press Release, Obama Lays the Foundation], available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/30/president-obama-lays-foundation-a-ne 
w-export-control-system-strengthen-n (listing different prospective tiers for items that have 
dual military and commercial uses). 
70. See Press Release, Obama Lays the Foundation, supra note 69 (outlining the 
splintering of agencies, control lists, and IT systems involved in the current U.S. export 
control system); see also Sievert, supra note 67, at 95–96; Press Release, Chief of Staff Daley, 
supra note 67 (“[T]he current export control system is overly complicated and 
fragmented . . . .”). 
71. The term “item” is in fact a defined technical term in the EAR.  See Export 
Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 772.1 (2013) (defining “Item” to mean 
“commodities, software, and technology”). 
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civilian uses or sensitive military uses.72  These items comprise the vast 
majority of U.S. and global trade activity.73  The EAR’s classification 
and licensing scheme is generally harmonized (by consensus) with those 
of the forty other countries that currently participate in the Wassenaar 
Arrangement.74  The result is that while particular licensing decisions 
will differ to an extent among these countries, this approach to export 
classification and licensing is broadly shared.75  This partially 
harmonized approach holds important implications for the 
recommendations made later in this Article. 
In terms of licensing mechanics, the EAR contain a classification 
scheme called the “Commerce Control List,” which identifies various 
“commodities, software, and technology” that may be of concern for 
U.S. export control purposes.76  Depending on how a particular item is 
classified on this list, what its country of ultimate destination is, and 
what countries the item may pass through on its way to that destination, 
the item may or may not require an export license.77  Items not listed on 
 
72. Id. (defining “Dual Use” to mean “[i]tems that have both commercial and military or 
proliferation applications”). 
73. See id. § 734.3 (listing “[i]tems [s]ubject to the EAR”); BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., 
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, KNOW THE FACTS BEFORE YOU SHIP: A GUIDE TO EXPORT 
LICENSING REQUIREMENTS 2 (2013), available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-
documents/doc_view/286-licensing-faq (noting that “[t]he EAR regulate the export and 
reexport of most commercial items”). 
74. Wassenaar Arrangement on Exp. Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use 
Goods and Techs., Participating States, WASSENAAR.ORG, http://www.wassenaar.org/particip
ants/index.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
75. Wassenaar Arrangement on Exp. Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use 
Goods and Techs., supra note 11. 
76. 15 C.F.R. § 772.1.  Under current U.S. export control regulations, commodities, 
software, and technology are commonly referred to collectively as “items.”  Id.; see also 
Bowman, supra note 9, at 334.  Software did not exist as a commercial article of commerce in 
1949 when the ECA of 1949 was enacted, and in fact neither the EAA of 1969 nor the EAA 
of 1979 mentioned “software” as an article of commerce to be controlled.  Rather, these 
statutes spoke only in terms of “goods” and “technology.”  The EAA of 1979’s language is 
broad and generalized enough, however, to cover software as either a “good” or 
“technology.”  In any event, the current U.S. Export Administration Regulations do expressly 
cover “software.”  See § 772.1 (defining “Software”).  For a more detailed discussion, see 
Bowman, supra note 9, at 334–35. 
77. See 15 C.F.R. § 732.1; see also Bowman, supra note 9, at 332–33.  The EAR quite 
literally use a chart to clarify when an export license is required based on an item’s 
classification and its destination, with countries of destination listed as rows, and items’ 
reasons for control (foreign policy, national security, antiterrorism) listed as columns.  An 
“X” at the intersection of a country’s row and an item’s reasons for control means that a 
license is required.  See 15 C.F.R. § 738, Supp. 1 (2013). 
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the EAR’s Commerce Control List do not require U.S. export licenses 
unless they are (a) exported to destinations subject to U.S. trade 
sanctions or (b) exported to “end-users” or for “end-uses” identified as 
problematic under the EAR—that is, to prohibited parties or in support 
of activities identified as undesirable in the EAR, including 
nonproliferation activities and missile technology-related activities that 
pose serious foreign policy or national security concerns.78 
Both civil and criminal penalties are possible for violations of U.S. 
export control laws and regulations,79 but criminal investigations and 
criminal penalties are rare.80  Fines are common when the party is a U.S. 
national or party in the United States, but the most common penalty 
imposed against parties outside the United States is the denial of export 
privileges and the adding of the party to the EAR’s “Denied Persons 
List,” which lists parties who are not permitted to engage in transactions 
subject to the EAR.81  This denial of export privileges has important 
implications for the topic of export control jurisdiction: per section 
431(1) of the Restatement (Third), which concerns enforcement 
jurisdiction, states may use “nonjudicial measures to induce or compel 
compliance, or punish noncompliance with its laws or regulations”—
provided, of course, that prescriptive jurisdiction is lawful.82  The key 
question, therefore, is not about the penalty itself—it is about the 
 
78. Id. § 732.1; see also id. § 744.1.  Until 1995, the presumption was listed the other way 
around, although broad “general licenses” allowed a good number of exports without further 
clearance or approval from the U.S. Department of Commerce.  This structure was largely 
driven by the export-restriction focus of the ECA of 1949 and regulations promulgated 
thereunder.  However, “general licenses” had rendered so many exports permissible within 
this scheme that it was decided to reverse the presumption.  See Export Administration 
Regulation: Simplification of Export Administration Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 12,714 (Mar. 
25, 1996) (providing for reform and simplification of U.S. Export Administration 
Regulations).  In one sense this was a semantic change that had little immediate effect—but 
in another important sense it was a tacit admission of how far export controls had shifted 
from presumptively restrictive to presumptively permissive. 
79. See 15 C.F.R. § 764.3 (setting forth civil and criminal penalties for violations of these 
regulations). 
80. See BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ANNUAL REPORT TO 
THE CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 9 (2011) (only 39 criminal convictions in 2011). 
81. The Denied Persons List, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, 
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/the-denied-persons-list (last visited May 9, 2014); see also 
The Denied Persons List Standard Order, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND 
SECURITY, http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/component/content/article/12-policy-guidance/li 
st-parties-of-concern/321-the-denied-persons-list-standard-order (last visited Feb. 5, 2014) 
(setting forth standard terms of denial orders). 
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 431(1). 
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legality of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. export controls.  The entire 
analysis boils down to a question of jurisdictional propriety. 
2. The Diminished Importance of the Export Control Licensing 
Structure 
Three primary aspects of this licensing structure are centrally 
relevant to the expansive jurisdictional reach of U.S. export controls. 
x First, item classification remains a central, structural aspect of U.S. 
export controls, as well as of its trading partners (because of 
harmonization and coordination through the Wassenaar Arrangement), 
but it has become harder to categorize items as clearly problematic or 
nonproblematic based on their export classification. 
 Many items have been “decontrolled” in order to promote exports,83 
and in fact the vast majority of items subject to the EAR are not 
expressly listed on the EAR’s Commerce Control List.84  Similar 
decontrols have been implemented by other countries that participate in 
the Wassenaar Arrangement.85  In addition, the increasing sophistication 
of commercial articles means that quite ordinary items, such as 
computers, can be used for problematic purposes.86  In short, even 
though the entire licensing system is built on export classification, 
export classification is in fact no longer terribly important to the system 
overall.87 
x Second, since the end of the Cold War, it has become harder to 
categorize export destinations as clearly problematic or non-problematic. 
 
83. Id. 
84. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-197R, ANALYSIS OF DATA FOR 
EXPORTS REGULATED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 6 (2006) [hereinafter GAO 
EXPORT DATA ANALYSIS].  One observer noted dryly that “[i]f only $1 billion of the $625 
billion worth of regulated exports [in 2005] received an ECCN [Export Control Classification 
Number] while the vast majority receive EAR99 classification, the catchall provision is the 
standard, and the classification scheme is the exception.”  Jordan Collins, Same Laws, 
Different Century: The Bureau of Industry & Security’s Role in Global Trade & National 
Security, 15 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 108, 120 (2006). 
85. See BUREAU FOR INDUS. & SEC., JUNE 2010 AMENDMENTS TO THE ENCRYPTION 
PROVISIONS OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS 2 (2010). 
86. See Bowman, supra note 9, at 320–28. 
87. See Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 738.2, 774.1 (2013) (listing the 
control status of personal computers to various destinations, and demonstrating that export 
licenses are not required to most destinations). 
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 Exports to the Soviet Union during the Cold War were by definition 
problematic (although sometimes approved); exports to Russia today 
are not.  In like fashion, the export of a personal computer to India (a 
country generally on good terms with the United States) may or may not 
be problematic—and the same is true for the export of that computer to 
Egypt, or the United Kingdom, or almost anywhere else.88  Destination 
is no longer a useful proxy for deciding whether an export transaction is 
problematic. 
x Third—and following directly from the previous two points—the 
formal structure of item classification and destination has been largely 
superseded by a focus on end-use and end-user concerns. 
 In the 1990s, the United States implemented the “Enhanced 
Proliferation Control Initiative” (EPCI), which imposed licensing 
requirements on all exports (regardless of item classification or 
destination) that raised concerns about the end-use of the items 
involved or the foreign end-users of these items.89  This end-use/end-user 
focus carries enormous implications for the jurisdictional reach of U.S. 
export controls, because the effectiveness of end-use/end-user controls 
is directly related to the breadth of jurisdictional reach.  It is also 
important because unlike the mechanics of U.S. extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, nonproliferation is a goal generally shared among trading 
nations.90 
To summarize, the modern U.S. export control licensing system 
consists of end-use and end-user controls that have been grafted onto a 
preexisting system of export licensing.  Through the harmonization 
efforts of the Wassenaar Arrangement, this licensing system is quite 
similar in structure to the export licensing systems of other U.S. trading 
partners.91  The overall effect is that export compliance determinations 
(both in the United States and other countries) now largely depend not 
 
88. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
89. Christopher F. Corr, The Wall Still Stands! Complying with Export Controls on 
Technology Transfers in the Post-Cold War, Post-9/11 Era, 25 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 441, 492 
(2003); Daniel H. Joyner, The Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative: National Security 
Necessity or Unconstitutionally Vague?, 32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 107, 109–11 (2004).  The 
EPCI provisions are currently located in §§ 744.1–.6 of the EAR. 
90. See e.g., The Wassenaar Arrangement on Exp. Controls for Conventional Arms and 
Dual-Use Goods and Tech., The Wassenaar Arrangement, WASSENAAR.ORG, 
http://www.wassenaar.org/publicdocuments/whatis.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2014). 
91. Id. 
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on the identity (classification) of an item or on its destination, but rather 
on ad hoc “end-use” and “end-user” assessments that focus on the 
purpose of the export.92  And the United States claims jurisdiction over 
activities abroad based on the U.S. origin or U.S. content of the items 
involved93—a basis that has little to do with the underlying concerns at 
hand. 
Moreover, this U.S. export licensing approach, combined with the 
United States’ broad jurisdictional reach, makes it far more likely that 
exports (or reexports) can be undertaken without a U.S. license, only to 
discover, at some later point in time, that concerns exist about the 
purpose (end-use or end-user) of the export—and that a U.S. license is 
therefore required for further activity, or should have been obtained for 
previous activity.  Stated differently, it makes it far more likely that 
activities abroad could be subject to U.S. export control jurisdiction and 
enforcement on the basis that the items involved in those activities are—
and always have been—subject to U.S. export control jurisdiction. 
This is a rather astonishing state of affairs—but as the following 
discussion clearly illustrates, modern U.S. export controls did not start 
out with such broad extraterritorial reach.  Instead, extraterritoriality 
became more important as the effectiveness of U.S. export controls 
diminished in the decades after World War II.  The rise of 
extraterritoriality in U.S. export controls, and the reasons therefor, offer 
useful insights into the current jurisdictional approach and the 
possibilities for new approaches. 
3. The Expanded Importance of Export Jurisdiction 
a. U.S. Export Jurisdiction Immediately Following World War II 
At the end of World War II, the United States emerged as the 
world’s leading economic power and leading provider of technological 
and commercial innovation.94  Europe’s infrastructure had been largely 
decimated during the war, and the Soviet Union and Japan had suffered 
enormous losses as well.  In addition, China’s global economic clout had 
not yet developed.95  While the United States was not the sole source of 
 
92. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
93. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
94. See CUPITT, supra note 52, at 47 (discussing the United States’ concern with 
maintaining its technological superiority in following years). 
95. JUSTIN YIFU LIN ET AL., THE CHINA MIRACLE: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND 
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items of strategic concern, it was certainly the largest by far96—and that 
meant that if the United States wanted to prevent the flow of certain 
sensitive goods and technologies to the Soviet Union or China, it largely 
could do so by refusing to approve exports of these items from the 
United States to those destinations.97  It was thus feasible for the United 
States to implement its national security and foreign policy goals 
through an export control regime that was characterized by relatively 
little extraterritoriality. 
The effectiveness of these direct restrictions on exports to the Sino-
Soviet bloc was enhanced by additional U.S. legislation intended to 
encourage U.S. trading partners to implement similar export 
restrictions,98 as well as by the formation of the seven-member 
Consultative Group (which included, as a sub-entity, the better-known 
Coordinating Committee, or COCOM).99  The Coordinating Committee 
coordinated anticommunist export controls among the United States, 
Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom—with the United States setting much of the tone and policy.100  
 
ECONOMIC REFORM 25 (2003) (discussing the rapid economic development in China that 
began in the late 1970s); Marion Chyun-Yang Wang, Greater China: Powerhouse of East 
Asian Regional Cooperation, 21 E. ASIA 38, 39 (2004) (discussing China’s economic growth 
since the late 1970s due to highly regulated international trade and investment). 
96. Berman & Garson, supra note 55, at 834–35. 
97. It is worth noting that diversion concerns (exports diverted from the stated 
destination to a covert ultimate destination) were as much a concern during that era as they 
are in modern times, but end-use/end-user controls (which today are used to address 
diversion concerns) were not formalized as separate elements of the U.S. export control 
licensing scheme until the 1990s.  Instead, diversion concerns were addressed within the 
license application process for individual transactions: if such concerns were present, the 
export license application could be denied or issued in a restricted form modified to address 
these concerns. 
98. See Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1611–13(c) 
(repealed 1979).  This act, popularly known as the Battle Act, set forth the U.S. policy “that 
no military, economic, or financial assistance shall be supplied to any nation unless it applies 
an embargo on such shipments to any nation or combination of nations threatening the 
security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all 
countries under its domination.”  Id. § 1611. 
99. Berman & Garson, supra note 55, at 834–35.  The Consultative Group originally 
included two committees charged with coordinating these export policies: The Coordinating 
Committee (COCOM), which focused on the Soviet bloc, and the China Committee, which 
focused on Mainland China and North Korea.  The committees were subsequently merged by 
disbanding the China Committee and folding its functions into COCOM.  Id. 
100. Id.; Silverstone, supra note 55, at 343–46.  COCOM was disbanded after the end of 
the Cold War to be replaced by the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for 
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies.  See HIRSCHHORN, supra note 
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The United States’ economic primacy meant that if it wanted to coerce a 
trading partner to take (or not take) certain actions, it could impose, ex 
ante, stricter export licensing requirements or conditions on certain 
exports to that country, or ease these controls as a reward for 
cooperation.101  Such restrictions could preclude certain uses or 
reexports of the covered items, once they were abroad.  Figure 1 
illustrates this post-war state of affairs. 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29, at xxiii.  For discussions and analyses of the Wassenaar Arrangement, see Gregory Wells 
Bowman, Carol George, Sunwinder Mann & Alison Stafford Powell, International Trade 
Aspects of Information Technology, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
LAW 4023 (Stephen Saxby ed., 2003); Bowman, supra note 9, at 346–47; The Wassenaar 
Arrangement on Exp. Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Techs., 
supra note 11.  Current Wassenaar Arrangement members are Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States.  See The Wassenaar Arrangement 
on Exp. Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Techs., supra note 74. 
101. Bridge, supra note 14, at 3–4 (noting the United States’ policy to place trade 
restrictions, even on its allies, to promote its own political agenda). 
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With the United States as the primary source of supply for many 
sensitive goods and technologies, and with some coordination of export 
controls among key U.S. trading partners, U.S.-led export controls 
essentially exerted a global effect simply by regulating what was 
exported physically from the United States and placing ex ante 
restrictions on the use of exported items.  The jurisdictional reach of 
U.S. export controls did not need to extend much beyond the actual 
borders of the United States.  And for “U.S. persons” located abroad (a 
term of art that includes both natural persons and corporate entities),102 
the United States could impose such restrictions after exportation, using 
the U.S. citizenship of these U.S. persons or entities as justification for 
such jurisdiction.  The effect of nationality jurisdiction on the scope of 
U.S. export control jurisdiction is shown in Figure 2 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
102. The definitional scope of “U.S. persons” or “persons subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States” has been an enormously contentious issue among the United States and its 
trading partners, and was indeed an issue in the Trans-Siberian pipeline controversy discussed 
below.  However, assuming that a definition of “U.S. person” could be agreed upon, there 
was little dispute that the United States could assert nationality jurisdiction over such U.S. 
persons abroad.  In fact, after some definitional disputes between the United States and its 
European trading partners, the United States did adopt a more limited—and thus less 
controversial—definition of “U.S. person” in trade sanctions programs implemented pursuant 
to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–07 (IEEPA), 
beginning with the Libyan trade sanctions in 1986.  This limited definition made it clear that 
foreign-owned or -controlled subsidiaries of U.S. companies were not U.S. persons subject to 
these U.S. laws and regulations.  See Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 
C.F.R. § 560.314 (2013); Libyan Sanctions Regulations 31 C.F.R. § 570.313 (2013). 
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Figure 2 
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In short, the United States could use these approaches to influence and 
regulate exports from the United States, and reexports of those items 
from abroad, in a fairly effective manner.  From a legal perspective, 
these approaches were not controversial, provided that the United 
States did not define “U.S. Persons” too expansively.103  Stated in terms 
of the Restatement (Third), the United States was exercising export 
control jurisdiction over exports from the United States under the 
subjective territorial principle,104 and exercising jurisdiction over the 
activities of U.S. persons abroad pursuant to the nationality principle.105  
 
103. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, at pt. IV, ch. 1, subch. A, intro. note 
(noting that it has long been “accepted that a state had jurisdiction to exercise its authority 
within its territory and with respect to its nationals abroad”). 
104. See id. §§ 402–03. 
105. See id. 
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Additionally, broad effect could be achieved through the consensual (if 
somewhat coerced) cooperation of U.S. trading partners.106 
b. The Declining Effectiveness of Direct U.S. Export Controls: Pandora’s 
Box 
Over the decades following the end of World War II, the 
effectiveness of U.S. export controls fundamentally changed in several 
important respects.  First, U.S. global dominance eroded, as other 
countries began to catch up to the United States in terms of industrial 
production and R&D capability.107  While the United States continued to 
maintain dominance in many cutting-edge industries, more established 
industries such as steel production, automotive production and design, 
and consumer electronics production gradually moved overseas, in 
whole or in part, as the absolute or comparative advantage balance 
among countries shifted.108  This shift of industry overseas meant that 
direct U.S. export controls were less effective at preventing the flow of 
sensitive items to the Soviet bloc or China (or other undesired 
destinations).  Not only were more industries located overseas, but in 
many cases nationality jurisdiction could not readily be extended to 
cover these activities because no U.S. citizens or companies were 
involved.  Yet these foreign activities in many cases raised significant 
U.S. national security or foreign policy concerns.  While these activities 
were outside the traditional subjective territorial or nationality 
jurisdictional scope of U.S. export controls, the United States 
 
106. Some commentators did point out, with concern, that the broad language of the 
ECA of 1949 and regulations promulgated thereunder could lead to overly broad assertions 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the United States.  See Berman & Garson, supra note 55, at 
850–51.  The United States did not expressly make such assertions, however, until 1982.  See 
infra notes 125–29 and accompanying text. 
107. See William H. Branson et al., Trends in the United States International Trade and 
Investment since World War II, in THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN TRANSITION 183, 183, 185–
86 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1980) (describing how the strength of the post-war economies in 
other nations reduced the United States’ share of economic output in the world); see also 
TYLER COWEN & ALEX TABARROK, MODERN PRINCIPLES: MACROECONOMICS 118–19 
(2010) (discussing how Germany and Japan grew faster than the United States and were 
highly productive in the period after World War II). 
108. Industries might be conceptualized as moving along a spectrum.  On the right side, 
new industries would emerge (often through the result of U.S. R&D), and for a time the 
United States would enjoy an absolute or comparative advantage in those industries.  As 
these industries became more established, however, they would move further to the left of the 
spectrum.  Other countries would make headway in those industries, and the United States’ 
absolute or comparative advantages would shift to other, newer industries. 
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nonetheless had a strategic interest in regulating and restricting these 
activities. 
Second, as the digital age dawned in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it 
became harder to draw a clear line between items that could be used 
only for generally benign end-uses and dual use items that also could be 
used for problematic end-uses.109  The quintessential example is the 
personal computer, as discussed above;110 other examples abound, 
including cellular phones and computer operating software.111  The 
blurring of the line between benign items and potentially problematic 
items meant that it became far more difficult to draw a clear distinction 
between desirable export transactions and problematic export 
transactions.  One eventual result was a greater focus on end-use and 
end-user controls, as discussed above; but another result was that as 
restrictions on exports were lowered—because such items were not 
clearly “bad” and because a key goal was to promote exports—the need 
for broader reach to stop unwanted uses of such items once they were 
abroad became greater. 
Thus, the combination of these two factors—multilateralization of 
supply and the growing preeminence of dual use items—meant that 
there were more foreign activities that the United States might want to 
regulate or restrict for national security or foreign policy purposes.  
Moreover, the determination of whether such foreign activities were 
desirable depended far less on the nature (classification) of the items 
involved or the location of the transaction, and far more on the specific 
end-use to which the items would be put, as well as on the end-users 
who would be involved in the transactions. 
These developments might have mattered less if the United States’ 
foreign trading partners were fully willing to coordinate their 
international trade decisions with the strategic concerns of the United 
States.  In the decades that followed World War II, however, the United 
States’ European trading partners grew less willing to follow the United 
States’ lead in matters of foreign policy and national security, especially 
 
109. See Bowman, supra note 9, at 333–34.  The term “dual use” has come to be a 
synonym for civilian items.  Id.; see also Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 772.1 
(2013) (defining “Dual Use” and acknowledging that the term is regularly used, in general 
parlance, to refer to civilian items).  
110. See supra text accompanying notes 83–87. 
111. 15 C.F.R. § 772.1 (defining “Dual use” as “[i]tems that have both commercial and 
military or proliferation applications.  While this term is used informally to describe items 
that are subject to the EAR, purely commercial items are also subject to the EAR.”). 
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when the choice involved forgoing economic benefit.112  That is not to 
say there was no cooperation, for clearly there was strong trans-Atlantic 
coordination of economic controls aimed at communist containment.113  
Yet what might happen when, in a specific export-related transaction, 
European strategic and economic interests were directly contrary to the 
economic and strategic interests of the United States (or at least seen as 
such by European countries)?  And what if the transaction in question 
was one of the many over which the United States could not adequately 
exercise export control jurisdiction under existing international law 
principles of territoriality or nationality?  The result in one case, the 
trans-Siberian pipeline controversy of 1981–1982, led the United States 
to claim unprecedented extraterritoriality over transactions outside the 
United States. 
E. The Trans-Siberian Pipeline Controversy of 1981–1982 
By the early 1980s, the stage was set for a crisis in U.S. export 
controls: either the controls would not work and would have to be 
forgone in favor of other means of achieving U.S. national security or 
foreign policy objectives, or the jurisdictional reach of the controls 
would have to be expanded.  In 1981 and 1982, the latter option was 
chosen by President Ronald Reagan during the trans-Siberian pipeline 
controversy—an event that ranks as one of the great international trade 
disputes of the latter twentieth century.  Because of the event’s 
complexity and its importance to U.S. export control jurisdiction, it is 
discussed here in some detail.114 
As Andreas Lowenfeld has concisely observed, there were two 
primary aspects to the dispute: contracts between Western European 
entities and the Soviet Union for the construction of the pipeline, and a 
 
112. See CUPITT, supra note 52, at 96–109.  For a discussion of early U.S. trade disputes 
with other countries regarding extraterritorial export controls, see Kenneth W. Abbott, 
Defining the Extraterritorial Reach of American Export Controls: Congress as Catalyst, 17 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 79, 90–91 (1984). 
113. This, of course, was a key purpose of COCOM.  See Abbott, supra note 112. 
114. For other expositions of this trade controversy and other trade controversies of the 
1970s and 1980s, see Monroe Leigh, The Long Arm of Uncle Sam—US Controls as Applied to 
Foreign Persons and Transactions, in EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LAWS AND 
RESPONSES THERETO 47 (1984); Moyer & Mabry, supra note 14; Abbott, supra note 112, at 
82–90; Bridge, supra note 14; see also AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 77TH 
ANNUAL MEETING 1, 241–70 (Ved P. Nanda ed., 1983) (providing a transcript of a panel 
discussion on the extraterritorial application of U.S. export controls). 
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crackdown on Solidarity-led reforms in Poland.115  With respect to the 
former aspect, in the early 1980s, European natural gas distribution 
companies signed contracts with the Soviet Union for the construction 
of a natural gas pipeline from Siberia to Germany.116  The pipeline 
project was a way for the Soviet Union to earn much-needed hard 
currency, and also was a way for European countries to reduce 
dependency on Middle Eastern oil and provide employment for 
unemployed European steel workers.117  The total value of the project to 
these West European countries was between U.S. $11 billion and U.S. 
$15 billion.118  The United States, of course, was concerned that the 
pipeline would provide the Soviet Union with hard Western currency 
and that reduced European dependency on Middle Eastern oil would 
mean greater dependency on Soviet natural gas.119 
Some U.S. companies were slated to supply technology or 
equipment in support of this project.120  The United States had recently 
completed its Alaskan pipeline, and U.S. companies involved in that 
project had developed technology and technological know-how that 
would be highly useful on the trans-Siberian pipeline project.121  As a 
result, several European corporations serving as sub-contractors or 
contractors for the trans-Siberian pipeline project had signed 
agreements to purchase equipment and license relevant technology from 
these U.S. companies.122  Some European subsidiaries of U.S. companies 
were also providing support of various types to the trans-Siberian 
 
115. Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 361; see also Moyer & Mabry, supra note 14; Eric S. 
O’Malley, Destabilization Policy: Lessons from Reagan on International Law, Revolutions and 
Dealing with Pariah Nations, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 319, 351–52 (2003). 
116. Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 361. 
117. Id.; see also Linda A. Mabry, Multinational Corporations and U.S. Technology 
Policy: Rethinking the Concept of Corporate Nationality, 87 GEO. L.J. 563, 619 n.227 (1999). 
118. ALAN C. SWAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REGULATION 
OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 819 (2d ed. 1999); Patrizio 
Merciai, The Euro-Siberian Gas Pipeline Dispute—A Compelling Case for the Adoption of 
Jurisdictional Codes of Conduct, 8 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 1, 2 (1984) (“The whole project 
represents a $15 billion investment . . . .”). 
119. Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 361; Morse & Powers, supra note 14, at 538; Moyer & 
Mabry, supra note 14, at 70. 
120. Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 361 (noting that General, Electric, Caterpillar Tractor, 
and other companies had entered into contracts with several European companies that were 
helping to build the pipeline). 
121. Id.  
122. See supra note 117. 
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pipeline project.123  These European subsidiaries of U.S. companies were 
in the possession of relevant U.S. origin pipeline-related technology that 
previously had been lawfully exported from the United States.124 
With respect to the latter aspect of this trade dispute—the Solidarity 
Movement in Poland—in late 1981, martial law was declared in Poland 
as a means to stifle the Solidarity Movement.125  Up to that point, 
Solidarity had enjoyed remarkable success in weakening the Communist 
Party’s grip on government in Poland and achieving some semblance of 
democratic reform.126  Western European countries decried the situation 
in Poland but took little action; in contrast, U.S. President Reagan 
implemented stricter export controls against Poland and the Soviet 
Union (which was believed to be behind the imposition of martial law in 
Poland).127  The restrictions imposed by the United States were 
implemented in two phases—one in December 1981 and one in June 
1982—and they took three general forms: (a) territory-based restrictions 
on exports from the United States, directly or indirectly (i.e., via third 
countries), in support of the pipeline project; (b) nationality-based 
restrictions on “persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States”; 
and (c) ex post restrictions on reexports or use abroad of U.S.-origin or  
-content items previously lawfully exported from the United States.128  
The first two types of restrictions were consistent with prior U.S. 
practice and with international law; the third was newer and 
controversial.129 
 
123. Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 361 (“[A] number of European subsidiaries of 
American companies were engaged in portions of the project.”). 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 361–62. 
126. Id. at 361 (“For sixteen months, freedom in Poland seemed to grow day by day.  
Close to ten million people joined Solidarity, a related movement arose among Poland’s 
farmers, and even the Central Committee of the Communist Party held free elections by 
secret ballot, with the result that only one-tenth of the membership was reelected.”). 
127. Abbott, supra note 112, at 82–84. 
128. Marcuss & Mathias, supra note 14, at 11. 
129. It is important to point out that these U.S. actions were trade-restrictive, and thus 
very much like an embargo.  That is especially the case with the nationality-based restrictions 
imposed on U.S. parties.  This illustrates that, as discussed earlier in this Article, there is 
overlap between export controls and trade sanctions (embargoes)—but the point to bear in 
mind is that item origin-based restrictions were imposed through the EAR, then lifted.  They 
were, in other words, a case of embargo activity being channeled through the EAR, which 
does happen, and not a case of the overall trade-promotion focus of the EAR being 
subverted.  See Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 746 (2013) (Embargoes and 
Other Special Controls); see also supra text accompanying notes 78–81. 
BOWMAN FINAL (7-8-14) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/8/2014  6:30 PM 
2014] U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 633 
1. The December 1981 Restrictions 
The December 1981 phase restrictions contained several elements.  
First, the United States prohibited the export from the United States of 
all items for use on the pipeline project.130  This was done by 
implementing stricter export licensing requirements for the export of oil 
and natural gas transmission and refining equipment and technology to 
the Soviet Union, and by suspending the review and issuance of any 
such licenses.131  Second, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced 
that previously issued licenses for exports to the Soviet Union could be 
reviewed and suspended, and this exerted a strong chilling effect on 
exports under those licenses.132 
Third, the December 1981 phase conditioned all exports (to 
anywhere) of oil and gas transmission technology upon an ex ante 
“written assurance” by the foreign recipient that it would not reexport 
or otherwise provide either this technology or any “direct products” of 
this technology (that is, goods manufactured abroad directly from this 
technology) to the Soviet Union.133  Failure to provide such a written 
assurance would mean an export license would be required for the 
export (which likely would not be granted).134  In essence, this restriction 
was intended to prevent any indirect exports in support of the pipeline 
project, as well as prevent the export of technology that, while not for 
export to the Soviet Union, would be used to produce certain foreign-
origin items that would be used on the pipeline project.135 
Finally, although it is not readily apparent from the language of the 
December 1981 phase restrictions, these controls in fact also restricted 
the reexport from abroad of goods and technology that previously had 
been lawfully exported from the United States.136  This was so because 
the EAR permitted (and in fact still generally permit) reexports from 
abroad of items that would not require a license for export directly from 
 
130. See Abbott, supra note 112, at 82–84; Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 362. 
131. Abbott, supra note 112, at 82–83. 
132. Id. at 83–84. 
133. Id. at 85–86; Leigh, supra note 114, at 50 (“In accordance with this broad policy, the 
Commerce Department in December 1981 announced regulations which barred all exports or 
re-exports to the Soviet Union of US-origin commodities and technical data for transmission 
or refinement of petroleum or natural gas for energy usage.”). 
134. Abbott, supra note 112, at 85–86. 
135. See id. 
136. Id. at 84–85. 
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the United States.137  However, because the December 1981 phase 
restrictions imposed an export license requirement on exports from the 
United States of oil and natural gas transmission and refining equipment 
and technology, that also meant that foreign reexports of these items 
would require an export license, regardless of the fact that originally 
these items had been lawfully exported from the United States.138  This 
was, in other words, an ex post or retroactive restriction on reexports.  
As Stanley Marcuss and Eric Richard have observed, the broad 
statutory language of the EAA of 1979 did not clearly prohibit such 
retroactive application of U.S. export controls, but it was certainly out of 
the ordinary.139  Historically, reexport restrictions under the EAR had 
been applied by the United States on an ex ante, not ex post, basis.140  
Harold Berman and John Garson made the same observation in 1967 
concerning the ECA of 1949 and export controls promulgated 
thereunder.141  The upshot is that prior to the Soviet pipeline 
controversy, application of U.S. export control restrictions to items 
previously exported lawfully from the United States had never been 
attempted, or even envisioned.  Since 1981 and 1982, however, this 
approach has become a permanent and prevalent feature of U.S. export 
controls. 
The December 1981 phase restrictions were generally unpopular 
with the United States’ European trading partners (as well as with 
adversely affected U.S. companies), but they did not lead to an 
international relations crisis between the United States and its Western 
European trading partners.142  Indeed, France and Great Britain 
 
137. Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 736.2 (2013) (defining the scope of 
EAR export prohibitions—and, by implication, permissible exports—in terms of “exports” 
and “reexports”). 
138. Abbott, supra note 112, at 84–85. 
139. Stanley J. Marcuss & Eric L. Richard, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in United States 
Trade Law: The Need for a Consistent Theory, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 439, 475–76 
(1981). 
140. See id. at 439. 
141. See generally Berman & Garson, supra note 55. 
142. See Steven Rattner, Britain Defying U.S. Restriction in Soviet Project, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 3, 1982, at A1 (“The embargo in the terms in which it has been imposed is an attempt to 
interfere with existing contracts and is an unacceptable extension of American extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in a way which is repugnant in international law.” (quoting Lord Cockfield, Trade 
Secretary) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Compressors Leave Le Havre for Soviet, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 27, 1982, at D1 (discussing France’s response). 
BOWMAN FINAL (7-8-14) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/8/2014  6:30 PM 
2014] U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 635 
generally—albeit somewhat reluctantly—supported the restrictions.143  
This phase’s ex ante restrictions on exports, future reexports, and foreign 
use of items exported from the United States were lawful exercises of 
territorial jurisdiction by the United States,144 and the ex post reexport 
restrictions, troubling though they may have been, appear not to have 
had enough impact to lead to a serious escalation in trans-Atlantic trade 
tensions. 
2. The June 1982 Restrictions 
In contrast, the export control restrictions imposed by the United 
States in June 1982 did draw the ire of Western European states.  The 
June 1982 phase restrictions were put in place unilaterally by the United 
States, after the United States’ December 1981 phase restrictions proved 
insufficient, and after U.S. efforts to implement multilateral trade 
restrictions against the Soviet Union failed due to a divergence of U.S. 
and European interests and concerns over the pipeline project.145  The 
June 1982 phase restrictions expanded the December 1981 phase 
restrictions in two important ways. 
x First, the United States prohibited the use on the trans-Siberian 
pipeline project of equipment manufactured by foreign subsidiaries of 
U.S. companies.146 
 This move, while unpopular, was not per se inconsistent with 
international law: depending on how the term “U.S. subsidiary” was 
defined, this was an exercise of nationality jurisdiction.147 
 
143. Abbott, supra note 112, at 87–88. 
144. Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 362. 
145. Abbott, supra note 112, at 86–87. 
146. Id., at 86–87; Moyer & Mabry, supra note 14, at 70; Leigh, supra note 114, at 50–51. 
147. Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 362–63.  Lowenfeld has observed that this: 
[A]ssertion of  jurisdiction . . . was not new; it had been asserted by the United 
States in the past in order to frustrate evasion of U.S. embargoes against China, 
Cuba, and other countries designated under the Trading with the Enemy Act [a U.S. 
trade sanctions statute] and its successor statute, though not under export controls. 
Id. at 363.  Lowenfeld’s observation is that the subject of export control restrictions on foreign 
subsidiaries was “a subject of continuing controversy between the United States and its allies, 
neither clearly supported by nor clearly contrary to international law.”  Id. 
 This particular controversy has been largely resolved in the export control context by the 
United States’ adoption of a definition of “U.S. person” that effectively narrows the scope of 
nationality jurisdiction asserted.  See Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 772.1 
(2013) (defining “U.S. person”).  A similar approach has been taken under U.S. trade 
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x Second, the United States prohibited the use on the pipeline project 
of equipment manufactured abroad by non-U.S. companies or 
subsidiaries using U.S. technology that previously had been licensed 
from U.S. companies.148 
 At the time the June 1982 phase restrictions were implemented, 
several foreign companies (including some foreign subsidiaries of U.S. 
companies) had contracts with the Soviet Union for the manufacture 
and delivery of equipment for the trans-Siberian pipeline project, and 
already had licensed U.S.-origin technology for the production of this 
equipment from U.S. companies.149  The June 1982 phase restrictions, 
therefore, effectively prohibited these foreign companies from 
performing under their supply contracts with the Soviet Union.150  In 
response, Britain and France ordered companies within their borders to 
disregard these U.S. restrictions and continue working on the pipeline 
project.151 
This second restriction may seem at first blush to be problematic but 
ultimately narrow.  In fact, it was a radical expansion of the 
jurisdictional scope of U.S. export controls, and one that has become an 
increasingly central feature of these controls.  At its core, the restriction 
was a retroactive restriction on the use abroad of technology that 
previously had been lawfully exported from the United States and 
 
sanctions programs since the 1980s.  See supra note 102. 
 In the case of U.S. export controls on encryption items (which are considered particularly 
sensitive), the definition is somewhat broader, but still canalized sufficiently to avoid major 
transnational disputes.  This definition also includes foreign subsidiaries in which a U.S. 
person owns a substantial minority stake or over which it exercises effective control via the 
board of directors or a management contract.  § 772.1 (defining “U.S. subsidiary”).  This 
definition is analogous, in a broad sense, to piercing the corporate veil: what matters is not the 
form of ownership or control, but the substance.  While this approach can be difficult in 
application, in principle it is not inconsistent with international law principles of prescriptive 
jurisdiction. 
148. Abbott, supra note 112, at 86; Leigh, supra note 114, at 50–51; Lowenfeld, supra 
note 9, at 362. 
149. Abbott, supra note 112, at 85. 
150. Leigh, supra note 114, at 51; Abbott, supra note 112, at 87, 89.  In fact, several U.S. 
exporters asked the relevant U.S. export authorities, before they exported the technology in 
question, whether any export/reexport control restrictions would apply to these products.  
They were informed that no such restrictions would apply.  See Extraterritorial Application, 
supra note 14, at 1308; see also Compagnie Européene des Pétroles S.A. V. Sensor Nederland 
B.V., No. 82/716 (Dist. Ct. The Hague Sept. 17, 1982). 
151. See INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 834, 851 (1982) (Britain); Rattner, supra 
note 142 (discussing Britain’s response); Compressors Leave Le Havre for Soviet, supra note 
142 (discussing France’s response). 
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licensed for use for a lawful purpose.152  In other words, it imposed end-
use restrictions, even when there was no reexport of the technology.  
That meant this prohibition had broad impact on foreign licensees of the 
U.S. technology in question.153 
3. The Foreign Response to the June 1982 Restrictions 
The foreign reaction to this unprecedented assertion of U.S. 
extraterritoriality was “sharp and hostile.”154  European states, joined by 
Japan, publicly denounced the new restrictions and filed diplomatic 
protests with the United States.155  European governments encouraged 
companies located within their borders to continue performance under 
pipeline project-related contracts, and in certain cases these 
governments actually issued formal orders mandating continued 
performance, thus imposing on affected companies a stark Hobson’s 
choice.156  The United States’ response was to “blacklist” companies that 
defied these U.S. end-use restrictions by placing them on a “temporary 
denial” list.157  This meant that those companies were prohibited from 
participating, in any manner, in any transactions (Soviet-related or 
otherwise) involving U.S.-origin oil and natural gas products and 
technology.158  This blacklisting adversely affected those companies’ 
overall business activities.159  Yet despite the blacklisting, European 
companies involved in the trans-Siberian pipeline project continued to 
perform on their pipeline contracts, both by manufacturing products 
using the licensed U.S.-origin technology in question and by exporting 
those products to the Soviet Union.160 
 
152. See Marcuss & Mathias, supra note 14, at 1.  Marcuss and Mathias note that these 
restrictions in the 1982 Trans-Pipeline controversy were “the first example of retroactivity of 
[U.S.] foreign policy export controls in the foreign-product context.”  Id. at 15. 
153. See supra text accompanying notes 114–29; see also Amendment of Oil and Gas 
Controls to the U.S.S.R., 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250 (June 22, 1982).  In an important sense, then, 
these end-use-focused licensing restrictions presaged the EPCI end-use/end-user controls 
explicitly added to U.S. export regulations in the 1990s.  See supra text accompanying notes 
71–82. 
154. Abbott, supra note 112, at 88. 
155. Id. 
156. Moyer & Mabry, supra note 14, at 71. 
157. Abbott, supra note 112, at 89. 
158. Id.; Leigh, supra note 114, at 51–52 (summarizing in detail the terms of these 
temporary denial orders). 
159. Abbott, supra note 112, at 89. 
160. Moyer & Mabry, supra note 14, at 72. 
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High-profile challenges also ensued in U.S. federal courts, where the 
denials of export (and reexport) privileges were challenged as violations 
of due process.161  Administrative petitions were filed by affected 
companies with the Department of Commerce,162 and legislation was 
introduced in Congress to require rescission of the December 1981 
phase and June 1982 phase export control restrictions.163  These 
legislative efforts were far from mere exercises in rhetoric and political 
grandstanding: one of the bills was defeated in the House of 
Representatives by a mere three-vote margin (206 to 203).164 
Most important of all, perhaps, was the fact that the trans-Siberian 
pipeline controversy caused a rapid deterioration of relations between 
the United States and its European trading partners.165  Instead of being 
a narrow—albeit important—dispute over the trans-Siberian pipeline 
project, the controversy began to affect the United States’ overall 
economic and defense-related relations with major trading partners. 
4. The United States Backs Down 
Because of the adverse foreign reaction, by late 1982 the U.S. 
government was “looking for a graceful way out” of the pipeline 
controversy.166  In November 1982, President Reagan announced that 
because the U.S. and its Western European allies had reached an 
agreement on a cooperative policy approach toward the Soviet Union, 
the United States would lift the December 1981 and June 1982 
restrictions on the trans-Siberian pipeline project.167  Accordingly, the 
U.S. export control restrictions on exports to the Soviet Union of oil and 
natural gas transmission and refining equipment were lifted; the 
suspension on processing export licenses for the Soviet Union was also 
lifted; and the Department of Commerce announced that henceforth 
such license applications would be reviewed under a general policy of 
approval, subject to certain exceptions.168  The United States also lifted 
the temporary denial orders issued against European companies that 
 
161. Id. at 72–73.  Another case was litigated in Europe, see Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 
364. 
162. Moyer & Mabry, supra note 14, at 72–73. 
163. Id. at 73. 
164. Id. 
165. Abbott, supra note 112, at 88. 
166. Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 364. 
167. Id.; Moyer & Mabry, supra note 14, at 83–84. 
168. Moyer & Mabry, supra note 14, at 84 nn.541–42. 
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had continued to supply goods and technology for the pipeline project 
after the retroactive and extraterritorial June 1982 phase restrictions 
were put in place.169 
Despite the United States’ announcement, it is not entirely clear 
what the terms of this agreement were.170  The United States claimed 
that its European trading partners had agreed to jointly conduct, with 
the United States, an “urgent study” of western dependence on Soviet 
oil and natural gas and of possible alternative energy sources, and that 
pending the study’s completion these nations would harmonize and 
further tighten their controls on exports of certain strategic items to the 
Soviet Union, as well as forgo signing new contracts for Soviet natural 
gas.171  European states, however, claimed that the agreement was 
limited only to conducting the study, with no commitments to 
coordinate export control provisions.172  France’s President Mitterrand 
went so far as to state publicly that “la France is not a party to what is 
perhaps not even an agreement.”173   
Regardless of what was or was not agreed to, what is clear (aside 
from Mitterrand’s panache) is that the lifting of these export control 
restrictions “was an awkward withdrawal” by the United States “from a 
misconceived and divisive policy.”174  The United States was trying to 
save face.  Whether it succeeded in doing so is less relevant than the fact 
that, in the face of strong European opposition to the June 1982 phase 
restrictions, the United States rescinded those restrictions and the denial 
orders relating to them. 
F. The Pipeline Dispute’s Legacy: Exponentially Expansive Jurisdiction 
When the export control restrictions imposed by the United States in 
the trans-Siberian pipeline controversy are boiled down to their essence, 
it becomes apparent that European (and Japanese) concerns centered 
largely on the retroactive, ex post restrictions the United States imposed 
 
169. Id. at 84–85; Abbott, supra note 112, at 90; Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 364. 
170. Leigh, supra note 114, at 52. 
171. Moyer & Mabry supra note 14, at 85; Leigh, supra note 114, at 52–53. 
172. See Leigh, supra note 114, at 52 (detailing the lack of information concerning the 
terms of any agreement, France’s refutation of any such agreement, and subsequent U.S. 
admissions consistent with France’s position); Moyer & Mabry, supra note 14, at 85 
(reporting European denials of the agreement’s scope). 
173. Leigh, supra note 114, at 52. 
174. Id. at 53. 
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on the use abroad of technologies already lawfully exported.175  It is also 
clear that these U.S. assertions of jurisdiction were based on the U.S. 
origin of the technologies involved.  To paraphrase the words of two 
observers in 1982, the U.S. position was that the United States could 
restrict or control the technologies’ use at all times after they left the 
United States, solely due to their U.S. origin—that is, that “U.S. law 
[jurisdiction] runs with the [technologies].”176   
What is centrally important to understand is that while the United 
States backed down in the Soviet pipeline controversy—Congress even 
amended the EAA of 1979 to address the retroactivity issue177—this 
does not mean the United States ceased asserting item origin-based 
jurisdiction in its export controls.  Far from it.178  Since 1982, item origin-
based jurisdiction has become a central feature of post-Cold War U.S. 
export controls.179  Thus, instead of controls based on direct exports or 
express ex ante restrictions placed on specific reexports, or the 
regulation of U.S. persons (including U.S. business operations) abroad, 
the jurisdictional reach of U.S. export controls now rests squarely on the 
origin of exported and reexported items—regardless of where such 
items are located, or who is involved, or even how long such items have 
been abroad.180 
This means that while retroactivity (a central feature of the pipeline 
dispute) has become less central, the underlying jurisdictional problem 
remains.  The United States might choose, as a matter of comity or 
commercial prudence, not to undertake an enforcement action regarding 
 
175. The “U.S. person-based restrictions” on foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies was 
also a source of significant friction and dispute, but the definitional boundaries of such claims 
of nationality jurisdiction were later resolved and are thus not focused on here.  See supra 
note 147 and text accompanying notes 120–24. 
176. ROSENTHAL & KNIGHTON, supra note 14, at 54 (“Here the claim seems to be that 
because the goods or technology are of US origin, US law can continue to govern their 
disposal to others, even after they have left the United States, or passed through the hands of 
more than one buyer: i.e., that US law runs with the goods.”). 
177. See Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 
120 (1985); Abbott, supra note 14, at 146. 
178. See Abbott, supra note 14, at 147. 
179. See infra notes 183–85 (discussing the United States’ percentage-based approach to 
determining and asserting jurisdiction over foreign-made items containing U.S. content). 
180. See Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 772.1 (2013) (defining 
“Export” as “an actual shipment or transmission of items out of the United States,” and 
“Reexport” as “an actual shipment or transmission of items subject to the EAR from one 
foreign country to another foreign country”). 
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a particular foreign activity involving U.S.-origin items181—but that is a 
very different thing than acknowledging a lack of jurisdiction, then later 
changing one’s mind.  This means that U.S. trading partners might, at 
any time, find that transactions previously subject to a U.S. policy of 
benign neglect (i.e., “the United States has jurisdiction, but we are not 
going to pursue enforcement actions over your activities because we are 
not concerned about them”) are now being paid attention to (i.e., “the 
United States has jurisdiction, and we are going to use it”)—because all 
along, prescriptive jurisdiction was asserted.  This is, in a very important 
sense, what President Reagan did in 1982: he backed off regarding the 
prohibition of activities, but he did not back off regarding the assertion 
of jurisdiction over those foreign activities in support of the pipeline 
project. 
The broad scope of this jurisdictional reach is now further expanded 
by how the United States determines what items are covered.  In 
addition to U.S.-origin items, the United States also currently uses its 
item origin-based approach to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
foreign-origin items that contain certain levels of U.S. content (for 
example, components or sub-systems), as well as over “foreign-made 
commodities that are ‘bundled’ with controlled U.S.-origin software.”182  
That is, U.S. content can taint foreign-origin items, so as to bring those 
foreign-origin items within the jurisdictional scope of U.S. export 
controls.  The standard U.S. content threshold is 25% by value,183 but for 
certain problematic destinations the threshold is only 10%184—and for a 
few problematic items, the threshold is any percentage greater than 
zero.185  To say that this is an expansive application of item origin-based 
jurisdiction is a supreme understatement: not only is it conceptually 
aggressive,186 but it also poses practical challenges because it can be 
 
181. See Abbott, supra note 14, at 147 (noting that “[t]he Reagan Administration’s 
approach has been to moderate the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, out of comity or 
concern for U.S. commercial interests . . . without yielding any of its jurisdictional claims”). 
182. 15 C.F.R. § 734.3(a)(3) (2013). 
183. Id. § 734.4(d). 
184. Id. § 734.4(c). 
185. Id. § 734.3 (defining “[i]tems subject to the EAR”); id. § 734.4(a) (“Items for which 
there is no de minimis [U.S. content].”).  For a discussion of the historical origins of these de 
minimis rules, see Abbott, supra note 14, at 144–46. 
186. See Peter L. Flanagan & Eric D. Brown, Foreign Trade Controls, in E-COMMERCE 
LAW & BUSINESS 12–39 (Mark E. Plotkin et al. eds., 2003) (noting, with respect to foreign-
origin software, that “[a]s a practical matter, these controls potentially are applicable to many 
export transactions originating outside the United States because of the leading market 
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difficult to determine what a foreign-origin item’s U.S. content 
percentage is—especially when an item is software or technology.187  
Origin determinations, and thus jurisdiction, end up hinging on 
accounting methodologies.188  And because U.S. export controls regulate 
not just trans-border shipments (based on item classification and 
ultimate destination), but also end-uses and in-country transfers to other 
parties (i.e., end-users), the counterintuitive result is that U.S. export 
(and reexport) controls over U.S.-origin and non-de minimis U.S.-
content items apply to transactions and activities overseas that do not 
involve exports or reexports at all.189 
The jurisdictional expansiveness does not end there.  The United 
States also asserts extraterritorial jurisdiction over some wholly non-
U.S. origin items that are the “direct products” of certain U.S.-origin 
technologies subject to “national security” controls under the EAR 
(that is, certain sensitive technologies)190—controls that mirror the June 
1982 restrictions discussed above.191  Defenders of this sort of jurisdiction 
might argue that such jurisdiction only covers a narrow swath of 
products controlled for “national security” reasons under the EAR,192 
but being narrow is not the same thing as being permissible in all cases.  
It certainly was not sufficient to avoid a firestorm of controversy in 1982. 
Moreover, the United States’ assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
does not appear to be premised on a foreign party’s knowledge or on 
notice.  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted the EAA of 
1979 and the EAR as establishing “strict liability” for violations, which 
means that a violation occurs even when a foreign party does not know 
or have reason to know that a particular item is controlled.193  This 
would seem to mean, by logical extension, that lack of knowledge that 
 
position of many U.S. software applications”). 
187. The rules for determining U.S. content of foreign-made software are set forth in a 
supplement to Part 734 of the EAR.  Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 734 
Supp. No. 2(a)(3)(ii) (2013). 
188. See supra notes 183–85 and accompanying text (discussing the percentage-based 
system that the United States uses to exercise jurisdiction over an item). 
189. It is, in fact, possible to violate U.S. export control laws without any export having 
occurred.  See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. §§ 744.1–.4 (end-use and end-user controls). 
190. Id. § 734.3(a)(4) (regarding “[c]ertain foreign-made direct products of U.S. origin 
technology or software”); id. § 736.2(b)(3) (regarding export restrictions on such items). 
191. See supra Part II.E.2. 
192. 15 C.F.R. § 736.2(b)(3)(ii)(A)(2) (regarding “national security controls” 
requirement for such items); § 742.4 (regarding EAR “national security” controls).  
193. Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1257–59 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
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an item is subject to U.S. export controls does not thwart U.S. 
jurisdiction as a matter of U.S. law. 
As the volume of exports has grown in recent years, and as more and 
more multimodal sourcing occurs in foreign manufacturing, there has 
been an exponential increase in the extraterritorial reach of U.S. export 
controls.194  This current state of affairs is illustrated in Figure 3.  It is a 
useful (and sobering) exercise to compare Figure 3’s expansive scope to 
the more limited (and conventional) scope of U.S. export control 
prescriptive jurisdiction in Figure 2, above. 
Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
194. This can lead to inconsistent origin determinations within and among U.S. 
international trade laws.  For example, under U.S. customs law, U.S.-origin components that 
are incorporated into complex equipment abroad can be considered to become foreign-origin, 
even if that equipment is later disassembled.  See U.S. Customs Serv. Ltr. Rul. HQ 559703 
(Aug. 23, 1996), available at http://rulings.cbp.gov/detail.asp?ru=559703&ac=pr (ruling that 
aircraft engine parts produced in various countries but assembled into aircraft engines in 
another country were substantially transformed during engine manufacture and became 
products of the country of engine assembly, and retained that origin even when the engines 
were later disassembled for maintenance and repair).  The same result, of course, is not true 
under U.S. export controls. 
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The combined effect of these jurisdictional assertions is 
extraordinary enough to warrant repeating: the United States claims the 
right to tell (a) wholly non-U.S. parties, (b) who are located outside the 
United States and who possess lawfully obtained U.S. origin items, 
lawfully produced foreign-origin items with non-de minimis U.S. 
content, or certain wholly non-U.S. origin items, (c) not only where and 
to whom they may provide these items, but also (d) what may not be 
done with these items in-country, and (e) to do so in perpetuity.  The 
United States may have conceded defeat in the 1982 battle over the 
trans-Siberian pipeline controversy, but it did not back down from a key 
jurisdictional assertion that was at the very heart of that controversy.195  
Since then, that key jurisdictional assertion has become a cornerstone of 
modern U.S. export controls.  What is more, the United States has 
recast the restrictions imposed in 1982, which were quite obviously 
retroactive, into a system of jurisdiction that is not based on 
retroactivity, but rather on item origin and concerns over item end-uses 
and end-users. 
The reason for this broad jurisdictional reach is clear: the United 
States wants to prevent unwanted transactions and activities, no matter 
where they occur.  With the passage of three decades since 1982, 
however, is such expansive jurisdictional reach more justifiable now 
than it was in the early 1980s?  The next Part addresses that question 
under the prescriptive jurisdictional principles of international law as set 
forth in the Restatement (Third). 
G. Consensual Multilateral Cooperation 
Before addressing the application of the Restatement (Third), 
however, it is important to address current multilateral export control 
efforts and explain why they do not help address or resolve the 
jurisdictional challenges of U.S. export controls.  There are more 
export-related international organizations and agreements in existence 
today than in 1981 and 1982, but the effect of these efforts on 
jurisdictional reach is indirect.196  COCOM was disbanded in 1994 and 
 
195. See supra Part II.E.2; supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text. 
196. See infra notes 197–203 and accompanying text (discussing the Wassenaar 
Arrangement, the Australia Group, the Nuclear Group, and the Missile Technology Control 
Regime); Part II.E.4 (concluding that jurisdictional authority did not change as a result of the 
trans-Siberian pipeline episode). 
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replaced by the Wassenaar Arrangement.197  The Wassenaar 
Arrangement’s forty-one participants work to coordinate their export 
classification schemes and provide notice to one another regarding the 
export of certain sensitive items,198 but the regime is weaker than its 
predecessor, because participating countries cannot veto other 
countries’ exports of sensitive items as they could under COCOM.199  
The Wassenaar Arrangement is, therefore, a less restrictive and more 
consensus-based organization than COCOM. 
Other multilateral export control-related organizations and 
agreements are even more voluntary and consensual, and they also are 
more narrowly limited to specific types of export activities.  The result is 
that unilateral jurisdictional rules are not curtailed.  The Chemical 
Weapons Convention is limited to chemical weapons matters, including 
regulation of exports.200  The Australia Group Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Nonproliferation Control Regime (Australia Group) is an 
“informal forum of countries” that “seeks to ensure that exports do not 
contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons.”201  
The Nuclear Suppliers Group is an informal group of countries that 
seeks to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation through consensual 
guidelines concerning nuclear item exports and reexports.202  The Missile 
Technology Control Regime is an “informal and voluntary association 
of countries [dedicated to] non-proliferation of unmanned delivery 
systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.”203   
These are all worthy organizations or agreements, and the United 
States participates in each, but the point for current purposes is that 
while they address exports from common perspectives—concerns about 
proliferation and missile technology—as currently structured they do 
 
197. See Bowman, supra note 9, at 345–47; The Wassenaar Arrangement on Exp. 
Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Techs., Genesis of the Wassenaar 
Arrangement, WASSENAAR.ORG, http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/origins.html (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2014). 
198. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Exp. Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-
Use Goods and Techs., supra note 90. 
199. See Corr, supra note 89, at 450–58. 
200. See Urs A. Cipolat, The New Chemical Weapons Convention and Export Controls: 
Towards Greater Multilateralism?, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 393, 413–14 (2000). 
201. AUSTRALIAGROUP.NET, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2014). 
202. See NUCLEARSUPPLIERSGROUP.ORG, http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/ 
default.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2014). 
203. Missile Technology Control Regime, supra note 11. 
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not address, much less restrict, extraterritorial jurisdiction.204  Thus, 
while these efforts do help reduce frictions in the areas they address, 
which likely reduces the risk of high-profile jurisdictional disputes in 
those areas, many activities over which the United States claims export 
jurisdiction still fall outside the scope of these organizations and 
agreements.  In fact, the 1982 trans-Siberian pipeline dispute concerned 
none of the areas covered by Chemical Weapons Convention, Australia 
Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group, or Missile Technology Control 
Regime.  These cooperative efforts therefore do not eliminate the 
problem presented by U.S. extraterritorial export control jurisdiction. 
III. ANALYSIS OF U.S. EXTRATERRITORIAL EXPORT CONTROLS 
UNDER THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES 
The prescriptive jurisdiction provisions of the Restatement (Third) 
were revised significantly from the Restatement (Second) of Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States: by the 1980s, changing global trade 
and international relations patterns clearly required a more nuanced 
treatment of prescriptive jurisdiction than the Restatement (Second)’s 
principles of territoriality and nationality allowed.205  The Restatement 
(Third)’s prescriptive jurisdictional principles therefore are 
characterized by deliberate and significant overlaps among the various 
bases for prescriptive jurisdiction,206 and also by overarching 
considerations of “reasonableness and fairness” that are intended to 
limit overly expansive assertions of jurisdiction.207  An interesting 
temporal parallel therefore exists between the Restatement (Third)’s 
move from territorial and nationality jurisdiction and the growing 
extraterritoriality of U.S. export controls.   
This is not a coincidence—updates to restatements are intended to 
reflect changes in the law—but what is particularly interesting to 
consider is whether the full scope of U.S. item origin-based export 
 
204. See supra Part II.E.2 and accompanying text (noting that President Reagan, while 
ultimately backing down during the pipeline dispute, did not disclaim the authority behind 
the actions he took). 
205. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, at pt. IV, ch. 1, subch. A, intro. note.  The 
Restatement (Second)’s provisions regarding territorial and nationality jurisdiction are set 
forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§§ 17–20, 30 (1965). 
206. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402 cmt. b.  
207. Id. § 403 cmt. a. 
BOWMAN FINAL (7-8-14) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/8/2014  6:30 PM 
2014] U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 647 
control jurisdiction can fit, doctrinally speaking, into the Restatement 
(Third)’s expanded and reworked jurisdictional principles.  Originally, 
the scholarly consensus was “No”—and despite changes in international 
trade over the past thirty years, this answer probably has not changed.208  
While it is possible now to justify more of the jurisdictional reach of U.S. 
export controls than it was in 1982, it is still not possible to justify all of 
it.  Moreover, as the following discussion reveals in stark clarity, even 
when the reach of item origin-based extraterritoriality is justifiable 
under international law principles of prescriptive jurisdiction, the item 
origin-based approach is unsatisfyingly, and indeed almost hopelessly, 
awkward. 
A. References (and Omissions) in the Restatement (Third) Concerning 
Extraterritoriality and Export Controls 
The Restatement (Third) does address the modern U.S. penchant for 
extraterritoriality, but it does not specifically address item origin-based 
jurisdiction.209  Instead, the focus is on nationality jurisdiction over 
foreign subsidiaries.210  The Introductory Note to Part IV of the 
Restatement (Third) states as follows: 
Attempts by some states—notably the United States—to apply 
their law on the basis of very broad conceptions of territoriality 
or nationality bred resentment and brought forth conflicting 
assertions of the rules of international law. Relations with 
Canada, and also with several states in Western Europe, have at 
times been strained by efforts of the United States to implement 
economic sanctions—against China, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and 
other states—through restraints on foreign subsidiaries of 
corporations based in the United States.211 
This Introductory Note continues by observing that “[p]artly in 
response to the reactions of other states, the United States has modified 
its assertions of jurisdiction in some areas.”212  However—and of 
particular relevance here—a review of the relevant provisions and 
commentaries of the Restatement (Third) (including the one quoted 
above), as well as of U.S. case law, clearly shows that U.S. self-restraint 
 
208. See supra note 14. 
209. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, at pt. IV, ch. 1, subch. A, intro. note. 
210. Id. 
211. Id.  
212. Id. 
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concerning prescriptive jurisdiction has been in three areas—namely, (a) 
control over foreign subsidiaries in trade sanction matters (that is, 
addressing the question of how broad the definition of “U.S. Person” 
can be for nationality jurisdiction purposes);213 (b) the extraterritorial 
reach of antitrust law;214 and (c) criminal law matters215—and that of 
these, restraint has been greatest concerning U.S. control over foreign 
subsidiaries.216 
 
213. Id. § 402. 
214. Id. § 402 cmt. d.  This Comment states as follows: 
Controversy has arisen as a result of economic regulation by the United States and 
others, particularly through competition laws, on the basis of economic effect in 
their territory, when the conduct was lawful where carried out.  This Restatement 
takes the position that a state may exercise jurisdiction based on effects in the state, 
when the effect or intended effect is substantial and the exercise of jurisdiction is 
reasonable under § 403. 
Id.; see also F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004); United 
Phosphorous Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 961 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Nippon Paper Indust. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1997).  In fact, two areas of U.S. law that are 
consistently cited as examples of extreme U.S. extraterritoriality are antitrust law and export 
controls.  See, e.g., Small, supra note 45, at 284 (“Conflict over [U.S.] extraterritorial 
jurisdiction has occurred in a variety of areas in recent years: antitrust, export controls, and 
law enforcement.”).  For a discussion of the antitrust case law origins of the Restatement 
(Third)’s prescriptive jurisdictional principles, see Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The International 
Trade Laws and the New Protectionism: The Need for a Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C.J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 393, 427–33 (1994). 
215. Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 573 F.3d 835, 842–43 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(refraining from applying U.S. law where defendant was not an American national); United 
States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 195–96, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that 
international law limited extraterritorial reach of jurisdiction because the United States did 
not have exclusive or concurrent extraterritorial jurisdiction over its embassy). 
216. The restrictions on jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries is quite clearly stated in 
most U.S. trade sanction programs, such as the Iranian Transactions Regulations and 
Sudanese Sanctions Regulations.  See Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 
C.F.R. § 560.314 (2013) (excluding foreign-incorporated subsidiaries of U.S. companies from 
the definition of “U.S. Persons” subject to the regulations); Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, 
31 C.F.R. § 538.315 (2013) (same).  By contrast, U.S. federal courts often (but certainly not 
always) apply U.S. criminal and antitrust laws extraterritorially.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922) (applying criminal conspiracy statute to U.S. and British 
citizens on U.S. ship on the high seas, on the basis that there are “criminal statutes which are, 
as a class, not logically dependent on . . . locality for the Government’s jurisdiction, but are 
enacted because of the right of the Government to defend itself”); Minn-Chem, Inc., v. 
Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 858 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying U.S. antitrust law to international 
potash price fixing); United States v. Leija-Sanchez, 602 F.3d 797 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying a 
U.S. racketeering statute to a murder in Mexico in furtherance of organized criminal activity, 
despite all parties being Mexican citizens); United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 
1345 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (applying U.S. conviction statute extraterritorially to foreign citizens 
attempting to bring illegal aliens into the United States); Nippon Paper Indust. Co., 109 F.3d 
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In addition, while Reporters’ Note 3 to section 431 of the 
Restatement (Third) does mention item origin-based jurisdiction in the 
context of enforcement jurisdiction, it does not delve into the distinction 
between control of exports and control of reexports and end-use 
abroad.217  That note simply describes the nature of a principal tool of 
U.S. export control enforcement—namely, the denial of export 
privileges for parties found to have violated U.S. export control 
provisions.218 
In other words, whether by design or omission, the Restatement 
(Third) accurately reflects the fact that, as a matter of U.S. law, the 
United States has not backed down from its assertion of broad, item 
origin-based, prescriptive extraterritorial jurisdiction under U.S. export 
control laws.219  The next question is the extent to which item origin-
 
at 4, 6 (applying Sherman Act to “wholly foreign” criminal antitrust actions with “intended 
and substantial” U.S. effects); Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 
F.2d 909, 921–22 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (applying antitrust laws to IATA’s efforts to target airline 
with predatory pricing). 
217. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 431 rep. note 3 (“The Department of 
Commerce has developed an elaborate system of classification of strategic commodities and 
of countries eligible for exports of these commodities when they are of United States 
origin.”). 
218. Id.  For discussion of these enforcement measures, see supra text accompanying 
notes 157–60. 
219. It is somewhat puzzling to consider that the question of jurisdiction over foreign 
subsidiaries in U.S. trade control law has received more attention than the question of item 
nationality, and that tensions concerning U.S. jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries have even 
achieved a measure of resolution.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, at pt. IV, ch. 1, 
subch. A, intro. note.  This does not seem to be because item origin-based jurisdiction is not 
an important issue.  The lack of consensus concerning item origin-based jurisdiction would 
seem to be important enough to acknowledge in the commentaries or reporters' notes to the 
Restatement (Third)—although this clarity could be (at least in part) a matter of hindsight.  
Still, the onset of U.S. claims of item origin-based jurisdiction occurred early enough (1982) to 
allow discussion of this claim in the Restatement (Third).  Perhaps the silence was intentional.  
Perhaps it was because scholars and policymakers (and thus the Restatement (Third)) often 
treat trade sanctions (which rely on person-based nationality) and export controls (which rely 
on item origin-based nationality) as two sides of the same coin—a view that tends to mask 
some important, fundamental distinctions between the two types of programs.  See, e.g., 
Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 361–68 (discussing the trans-Pipeline export control dispute and 
the Cuban embargo); Moyer & Mabry, supra note 14; see also supra notes 29–30 (discussing 
this distinction).  Perhaps this is because item origin-based assertions of extraterritoriality are 
less intuitively obvious than person-based claims, despite the fact that item origin-based 
claims are ongoing.  Perhaps the matter simply was not considered worthy of being singled 
out for attention.  Or perhaps more than one (or even all) of these factors was in play.  
Abbott surmised, in 1987, that “[t]he lack of a fuller or more definite treatment [of reexport 
controls in the Restatement (Third)] is disappointing, but it probably indicates that the law on 
the subject is too unsettled for restatement . . . .”  Abbott, supra note 14, at 138. 
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based extraterritorial jurisdiction can be justified under the Restatement 
(Third)’s prescriptive jurisdictional principles.  As noted above and 
explained below, the twofold answer is “Not entirely” and 
“Unsatisfactorily.” 
B. Analysis Under the Restatement (Third) and Previous Scholarship 
The Restatement (Third) lists several well-accepted bases of 
jurisdiction, namely traditional (subjective) territorial jurisdiction, 
nationality jurisdiction, objective territorial jurisdiction (including to an 
extent the effects doctrine), protective jurisdiction, passive personality 
jurisdiction, and universal jurisdiction.220  All but universal jurisdiction 
(which itself is quite limited in scope) are limited by a requirement of 
reasonableness, which is set forth in section 403 of the Restatement 
(Third).221 
Because the asserted scope of U.S. export control jurisdiction is so 
broadly extraterritorial, the reasonableness considerations embodied in 
section 403 of the Restatement (Third) are of central importance.  
Section 403 is therefore discussed first below.  The various jurisdictional 
bases set forth in sections 402 and 404 are then discussed, with particular 
emphasis on whether, and to what extent, any of these bases might now, 
three decades after the 1982 Soviet pipeline controversy, justify the 
extreme extraterritorial reach of U.S. export controls.  This Article 
contends that these jurisdictional bases, when considered collectively, 
are sufficient to justify much, but not all, of the extraterritorial reach of 
U.S. controls, but that they do so extremely awkwardly.  The strategic 
(un)desirability of continuing to employ an item origin-based approach 
to extraterritorial jurisdiction is then addressed in Part IV. 
1. Reasonableness 
Section 403 of the Restatement (Third) provides that even when one 
or more of the prescriptive jurisdictional bases of section 402 are present 
(that is, any jurisdictional basis other than universal jurisdiction), “a 
state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a 
 
220. The Restatement (Third) has as a predecessor, the 1935 Harvard Research, which 
spelled out these bases in the criminal law context.  See Edwin D. Dickinson, Draft 
Convention on Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 435 (Supp. 1935) 
[hereinafter Harvard Research on International Law]. 
221. The reasonableness limitation evolved from U.S. antitrust case law.  See Marcuss & 
Mathias, supra note 14, at 17–20. 
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person or activity having connections with another state when the 
exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.”222  Section 403 further 
provides that determinations of reasonableness are to be made on a 
case-by-case basis “by evaluating all relevant factors.”223 
When two states might reasonably exercise prescriptive jurisdiction 
over the same activity (an outcome that sections 402 and 403 recognize 
as likely),224 and it is not possible for the party in question to comply with 
both states’ laws or regulations, section 403 establishes an obligation for 
each state to evaluate its interests in comparison to the interests of the 
other state in question, and to defer if the interests of the other state are 
greater.225  This balancing analysis does not need to be undertaken, 
however, when the party in question can comply with both states’ 
assertions of jurisdiction.226 Other relevant considerations of 
reasonableness include whether the jurisdiction asserted is civil or 
criminal (with criminal jurisdiction held to a much higher standard for 
reasonableness)227 and the governmental level at which the jurisdictional 
assertion is made.228 
A congressional or presidential determination, for example, might 
be accorded greater weight than one by an agency pursuant to broad 
statutory mandate.229  The latter consideration may cut somewhat in 
 
222. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 403(1), cmt. a. 
223. Id. § 403(2).  Such factors include, but are not limited to, the following: the extent to 
which the activity to be regulated takes place in the state’s territory or has “substantial, direct, 
and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory”; “the character of the activity to be regulated” 
and its importance to the regulating state; “the extent to which other states regulate such 
activities” and “the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted”; 
the regulation’s “importance . . . to the international political, legal, or economic system”; 
consistency of the regulation with “traditions of the international system”; whether, and to 
what extent, other states “may have an interest in regulating the activity”; and “the likelihood 
of conflict with regulation by another state.”  Id. 
224. See, e.g., id. § 403 cmt. d. 
225. Id. § 403(3) & cmt. e. 
226. Id.  This language in section 403 is written in the context of two states but would 
apply to conflicts among three or more states as well. 
227. Id. § 403(3) cmt. f. & rep. note 8. 
228. See id. § 403(2) & cmt. c. 
229. See id. § 403(2).  The presumptive reason for this latter consideration is that agency 
decisions are not as fully representative as those made by elected officials—although as a 
matter of U.S. law this closer reasonableness scrutiny seems to be in some tension with 
general principles of deference to agency decisions, such as under the Chevron doctrine.  See 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also Alex O. 
Canizares, Is Charming Betsy Losing Her Charm? Interpreting U.S. Statutes Consistently with 
International Trade Agreements and the Chevron Doctrine, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 591, 
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favor of U.S. export control extraterritoriality: the original measures in 
the trans-Siberian pipeline dispute were imposed by President Reagan, 
and they have continued as part of agency regulations through 
subsequent administrations.230 
Section 403 thus provides a useful framework for analysis that 
recognizes the ambiguous nature of modern extraterritorial jurisdiction 
and allows for changes in the jurisdictional calculus over time.  What 
was not considered reasonable in 1982 might be considered reasonable 
three decades later.  The application of these reasonableness factors is 
considered below in the discussion of each jurisdictional basis. 
2. Subjective (Traditional) Territorial Jurisdiction 
Subjective territorial jurisdiction, the power of a state to prescribe 
laws for its territories, has been aptly described as the “least-
problematic source of prescriptive rules.”231  The Restatement (Third) 
provides that “a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect 
to . . . conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its 
territory.”232  Subjective territorial jurisdiction is presumptively 
considered reasonable.233 
However, subjective territorial jurisdiction is quite clearly 
insufficient to justify the full jurisdictional reach of U.S. export controls 
(see Figure 3).234  While it certainly can be used to justify jurisdiction 
over an export transaction that originates from the United States, or 
jurisdiction over activities in the United States that are in support of 
reexports from abroad (e.g., management support, supplying advice, 
financing, or the like), much of the reexport activity over which the 
United States claims prescriptive jurisdiction would not be covered by 
this basis of prescriptive jurisdiction.  It is probably true, as noted by 
former U.S. Deputy Chief Counsel for Export Administration Cecil 
Hunt,235 that “[t]he jurisdictional core of [U.S.] export controls is in a 
 
593–95 (2006) (attempting to reconcile the Charming Betsy decision with the Chevron 
doctrine, examining how courts have treated the two). 
230. See supra Part II.E.2; supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text. 
231. Koplow, supra note 42, at 37. 
232. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402(1)(a).  
233. See id. § 403(2)(a). 
234. See Figure 3, supra. 
235. Cecil Hunt, WILTSHIREGRANNIS.COM, http://www.wiltshiregrannis.com/sitecontent 
.cfm?pageid=9&itemid=11086 (last visited Feb. 6, 2014). 
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sense territorial,”236 but core jurisdictional coverage is, by definition, not 
full jurisdictional coverage.  The most contentious aspects of U.S. export 
control jurisdiction fall far outside this jurisdictional basis. 
3. Nationality Jurisdiction  
a. Over Persons 
Much of the scholarly discussion of U.S. export control 
extraterritoriality has been focused on nationality jurisdiction.237  Under 
the Restatement (Third), prescriptive jurisdiction may be exercised over 
“the activities, interests, status, or relations of [a state’s] nationals 
outside as well as within its territory.”238 
As a general proposition, a state’s exercise of prescriptive 
jurisdiction over its nationals abroad, both natural persons and juridical 
ones, is not controversial.239  Controversies have arisen when the United 
States has broadly defined the term “nationals” for trade sanction 
purposes to include not just majority-owned foreign subsidiaries, but 
also other foreign entities controlled in other ways, such as through 
ownership of a large minority share of a company, placement of 
members on a foreign company’s board of directors, management 
contracts, and so on.240  Such assertions of jurisdiction have led to 
conflicts with the regulatory regimes of other states and have raised 
concerns about reasonableness.241  Yet for the most part, the United 
States has scaled back such assertions of broad nationality jurisdiction,242 
and the remaining U.S. trade sanction program based on this expansive 
application of nationality jurisdiction, the Cuban sanctions program, is 
best characterized as being in its twilight years.243 
 
236. Hunt, supra note 14, at 23. 
237. See Koplow, supra note 42, at 37–38; Marcuss & Mathias, supra note 14, at 18. 
238. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402(2). 
239. See Koplow, supra note 42, at 37. 
240. See Marcuss & Mathias, supra note 14, at 18. 
241. See Small, supra note 45, at 284–86 (explaining conflicts); David B. Massey, Note, 
How the American Law Institute Influences Customary Law: The Reasonableness Requirement 
of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 419, 428 (1997) (referencing 
international protests that the exercise of jurisdiction was “exorbitant,” leading to a 
reasonableness requirement) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 403 rep. note 
1). 
242. See supra note 147. 
243. Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Actions Needed for Lifting the U.S. Trade Embargo 
Against Cuba, 3 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT’L L. 53, 80 (1995) (noting that conditions required for the 
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More to the point here is the fact that jurisdiction based on the 
nationality of natural and juridical persons is, like subjective territorial 
jurisdiction, simply not sufficient to justify the current expansive 
jurisdictional scope of U.S. export controls, and this has not changed 
since 1982.  In fact, the insufficiency of this jurisdictional basis is what 
led to the assertion of item origin-based jurisdiction in the first place: it 
was when prohibitions leveled against foreign subsidiaries of U.S. 
companies did not quell undesired foreign activity that the United States 
adopted the item origin-based jurisdictional scheme.244  The next 
question, therefore, is whether jurisdiction based on the nationality of 
items—goods, software or technology—is now a sufficient and 
reasonable basis for extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction, when it was 
considered not sufficient or reasonable when first asserted in the early 
1980s. 
b. Over Items 
David Koplow, writing in 1990, aptly characterized the assertion of 
item origin-based nationality jurisdiction as “controversial.”245  Several 
years before that, Stanley Marcuss and D. Stephen Mathias noted that 
“the nationality principle has not traditionally been viewed as applying 
to property.”246  Another writer was less circumspect and bluntly 
described as “preposterous” the U.S. assertion of permanent jurisdiction 
over goods based on their nationality, “regardless of how many times 
they change hands.”247 
Regardless of phrasing, item origin-based nationality jurisdiction 
generally has been rejected by commentators as a basis for prescriptive 
jurisdiction.  While limited exceptions have been recognized for some 
physical items—namely, marine vessels, aircraft, and spacecraft—the 
Restatement (Third) notes that jurisdiction in those cases is more 
appropriately viewed as a sui generis rule.248  Exceptions also have been 
 
U.S. to enact the LIBERTAD Act program to lift the Cuban trade sanctions “have become 
more numerous”). 
244. See supra text accompanying notes 166–74. 
245. Koplow, supra note 44, at 38. 
246. Marcuss & Mathias, supra note 14, at 21 (citing L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW § 145 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955)). 
247. Predictability and Comity, supra note 14, at 1317–18. 
248. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402 cmt. h.  This Comment to 
Restatement (Third) section 402 actually characterizes jurisdiction for marine vessels, aircraft, 
and spacecraft as an extension of territorial jurisdiction, but my point is that these vessels and 
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made for jurisdiction over cultural property: a state might permissibly 
and reasonably exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over property of 
important cultural value, based on the property’s national origin.249  
However, that rule also seems best viewed as a sui generis rule that is 
based on cultural heritage concerns.250   
In other words, in certain very limited situations we might be 
comfortable with item origin-based nationality-based jurisdiction, 
pursuant to which a state’s “law runs with the goods,”251 but these are 
narrow exceptions, not a general rule.  Vessels and other craft can be 
viewed as extensions of territory in a way that ordinary, simple goods 
cannot be—you cannot physically travel on a computer as you can on a 
vessel or aircraft, and the heritage-based justifications for jurisdiction 
over items of cultural value do not apply to ordinary (and often 
fungible) items.  Moreover, a strong basis for nationality jurisdiction is 
the idea of allegiance to the state252—something that requires sentience, 
residence, and territoriality.253  Goods, software, and technology cannot 
 
craft are “items,” as opposed to natural or artificial persons, so it is possible to consider 
jurisdiction over them from a territorial perspective as well.  Marcuss and Mathias 
characterized them as such in 1984, before finalization of the Restatement (Third).  See 
Marcuss & Mathias, supra note 14, at 21. 
249. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402 cmt. c (describing assertion of 
jurisdiction based on an item’s origin); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 415 (6th ed. 2003) (“The recognition and enforcement by a municipal 
court of foreign legislation protecting the cultural heritage of the state concerned raises 
problems of jurisdiction but such legislation may be presumed to be in accordance with the 
public policy of the forum.”); see also Daniel W. Eck & Patty Gerstenblith, Cultural Property, 
38 INT’L LAW. 469, 471 (2004) (explaining country of origin measures to protect cultural 
property under the UNESCO Convention); Marilyn E. Phelan, Cultural Property: Who Owns 
It and What Laws Protect It?, 74 TEX. B.J. 202, 203–04 (2011) (warning that countries where 
cultural property originated can bring suit to recover such illegally exported items). 
250. See Phelan, supra note 249, at 204–05 (acknowledging the common law 
development of international conventions to protect countries’ respective cultural property); 
see also Eck & Gerstenblith, supra note 249, at 469–70 (noting individual countries’ and 
United Nations’ efforts to protect looted material from the National Museum in Baghdad). 
251. ROSENTHAL & KNIGHTON, supra note 14, at 54. 
252. Extraterritorial Application, supra note 14, at 1325 (citing Blackmer v. United 
States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932)) (noting that a U.S. national located abroad and called to 
testify in a lawsuit was bound to obey this summons because he was “a citizen of the United 
States.  He continued to owe allegiance to the United States.  By virtue of the obligations of 
citizenship, the United States retained its authority over him, and he was bound by its laws 
made applicable to him in a foreign country.”); Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 
4, 23 (Apr. 6) (stating that as a matter of international law, “nationality is a legal bond having 
as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and 
sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties”). 
253. Extraterritorial Application, supra note 14, at 1326.  This observation is reinforced 
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owe allegiance, they do not have residence, and (at least for the time 
being) they are not self-aware.254 
Furthermore, nowhere else in U.S. international trade law is there a 
rule that items maintain their nationality permanently.255  In fact, rules 
regarding origin generally run to the contrary.256  Taxation cases, for 
example, have developed a “comes to rest” theory, under which a good 
ceases to be subject to the exporting country’s prescriptive jurisdiction 
once the good falls out of the stream of commerce abroad (such as by 
reaching its ultimate destination).257  Under U.S. customs law, the 
nationality of a good is considered extinguished when it is “substantially 
transformed” into another good of a “different name, character or 
use”—such as by processing (e.g., iron processed into steel) or by 
complex manufacture (e.g., incorporation of components into complex 
machinery).258  It is hard to justify as reasonable a broadly 
 
by the fact that Comment c. to section 402 of the Restatement (Third) discusses item origin-
based jurisdiction in the context of territoriality.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, 
§ 402 cmt. c (noting that “in some circumstances there may be controversy as to 
whether . . . the territorial principle can be satisfied without the physical presence of the 
person or thing being subjected to jurisdiction”) (emphasis added). 
254. It is interesting (and perhaps a bit unnerving) to consider how the emergence of 
sentient machines might alter this calculus. 
255. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402 cmt. c. 
256. Predictability and Comity, supra note 14, at 1317–18.  It also has been rejected by at 
least two foreign courts, one in Hong Kong in 1953, and one in Belgium in 1965.  See 
Extraterritorial Application, supra note 14, at 1324. 
257. See Abbott, supra note 112, at 134–35. 
258. This rule of U.S. customs law is known as the “substantial transformation” rule.  See 
U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., WHAT EVERY MEMBER OF THE TRADE COMMUNITY 
SHOULD KNOW ABOUT: U.S. RULES OF ORIGIN 9 (2004); see also Michael P. Maxwell, 
Formulating Rules of Origin for Imported Merchandise: Transforming the Substantial 
Transformation Test, 23 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 669 (1990); C. Edward Galfand, 
Comment, Heeding the Call for a Predictable Rule of Origin, 11 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 469, 
472–73 (1989); World Trade Org., Technical Information on Rules of Origin, WTO.ORG, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/roi_e/roi_info_e.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2014) 
(describing the substantial transformation test for origin as “universally recognized”). 
 There is a movement to replace the substantial transformation rule with a “tariff-shift” 
rule, pursuant to which an item’s origin changes if its classification for customs purposes 
changes in certain ways.  This is the rule being advanced by the World Customs Organization 
as a new global standard, and it is used, in modified form, in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement and other regional trade agreements.  See North American Free Trade 
Agreement Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301–473 (2012); North American Free Trade 
Agreement, Dec. 8–17, 1992, 32 ILM 289, 299–303; World Customs Org., Comparative Study 
on Preferential Rules of Origin, WCOOMD.ORG, http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/origin/ins
trument-and-tools/comparative-study-on-preferential-rules-of-origin.aspx (last visited Feb. 6, 
2014) (examples of tariff-shift rules); Article 401, NAFTA SECRETARIAT, https://www.nafta-
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extraterritorial rule based on permanent item nationality when the same 
approach is rejected in other international trade-related areas of U.S. 
law.  It also must be noted that this was the case in 1982, when item 
origin-based nationality came to the fore in U.S. export controls, and it 
remains the case today.259 
It is perhaps possible to argue that the lack of strong objection to 
U.S. item origin-based jurisdiction over the past several decades is a 
form of acquiescence by U.S. trading partners that suggests acceptance, 
and is thus an evolution of customary international law with respect to 
extraterritoriality.260  However, the United States’ item origin-based 
jurisdictional approach has not been adopted by other countries in a 
way that would suggest acceptance of this approach.  Moreover, to the 
extent that U.S. trading partners do not object when certain non-U.S. 
nationals abroad are added to the U.S. “Denied Persons List” and thus 
prohibited from dealing in items subject to U.S. export controls, this 
lack of objection just as likely represents (and probably more likely 
represents) a lack of objection to those specific parties being listed as it 
does a lack of objection to the item origin-based jurisdiction being 
asserted.  Stated differently, the fact that U.S. trading partners do not 
object to a particular party being barred from transactions involving 
U.S.-origin and U.S.-content items is not the same thing as acquiescence 
to a broad U.S. claim of jurisdiction over all parties (barred and 
otherwise), wherever located, who deal in items subject to U.S. export 
controls. 
 
sec-alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid=97&ctl=SectionView&mid=1588&sid=feb541cc-bfc2-4240-
829f-b5a7ec26a08a&language=en-US (last visited Feb. 6, 2014) (tariff-shift rules in the North 
American Free Trade Agreement); see also United States–Colombia Trade Promotion 
Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-42, § 201, 125 Stat. 462, 466–67 (2011) 
(approved under 19 U.S.C. § 3805 (2012)).  The tariff-shift approach, however, is largely a 
change in mechanism from a subjective approach to a more objective one: the underlying goal 
of allowing origin changes for significant alterations or processing remains the same as under 
the substantial transformation rule. 
259. See Part II.E.2 (discussing the June 1982 export control restrictions). 
260. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, §§ 101–02; Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993; see also Cleveland, 
supra note 24, at 6–7 (citing Arthur M. Weisburd, The Effect of Treaties and Other Formal 
International Acts on the Customary Law of Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 
100 (1995–1996)).  
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4. Objective Territorial Jurisdiction (and the Effects Doctrine) 
Under the objective territorial principle of jurisdiction, prescriptive 
jurisdiction may be asserted over acts that occur outside the United 
States but have adverse or detrimental “substantial effect within” the 
United States.261  This sort of territorial jurisdiction thus differs 
profoundly from subjective (traditional) territorial jurisdiction, which 
pertains to acts that occur within the territory of a state.262  In U.S. law 
there is also the effects doctrine, which plays a large role in U.S. 
antitrust law, securities regulation, and criminal law.263  There has been 
significant discussion regarding the distinction between objective 
territorial jurisdiction and the effects doctrine,264 but this Article eschews 
that debate and includes the potentially broader view of the effects 
doctrine within this discussion—not because of any latent superiority of 
the effects doctrine, but rather because U.S. item origin-based export 
control jurisdiction is problematic even under that potentially more 
permissive approach. 
Objective territorial jurisdiction is both generally accepted and 
controversial, depending on the context of its application.  It is generally 
 
261. See United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1994); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD), supra note 10, § 402(1)(c) & cmt. d.  The leading international case on objective 
territorial jurisdiction, the Permanent Court of International Justice’s decision in the S.S. 
Lotus case, stated it thusly (and perhaps more narrowly): “[O]ffences, the authors of which at 
the moment of commission are in the territory of another State, are nevertheless to be 
regarded as having been committed in the national territory, if one of the constituent 
elements of the offence, and more especially its effects, have taken place there.”  S. S. 
“Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 23 (Sept. 7). 
262. Because of these large differences, it is sometimes viewed as an entirely separate 
jurisdictional category.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402 cmt. d. 
263. See SPENCER WEBER WALLER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 
§ 22.15 (3d ed. 2001); HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, 2 SECURITIES LAW 
HANDBOOK § 37:2.10 (2013); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 
§ 2.9 (2d ed. 1986); see also Extraterritorial Application, supra note 14, at 1327. 
264. See, e.g., Mika Hayashi, Objective Territorial Principle or Effects Doctrine?  
Jurisdiction and Cyberspace, 6 IN. LAW 284, 288–90 (2006); J. Troy Lavers, Extraterritorial 
Offenses and International Law: The Argument for the Use of Comity in Jurisdictional Claims, 
14 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 1, 6 n.30 (2007) (“The effects doctrine justifies jurisdiction of an 
extraterritorial act based on the effects it produces within the state, which is distinct from the 
objective territorial principle where jurisdiction is based on certain element(s) of the offense 
being completed in the territory.”); Joseph P. Griffin, Foreign Governmental Reactions to U.S. 
Assertions of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 505, 511 (1998) (“Countless 
law journal articles have dealt with the differences between the principle of objective 
territorial jurisdiction described in the Lotus decision and the ‘effects doctrine’ announced in 
the Alcoa [antitrust] decision.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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accepted when the act outside the territory of a state involves a harmful 
action that begins outside the state but ends with direct harm inside the 
state265—classic examples include a cross-border shooting and foreign 
products placed into another state’s stream of commerce.266  Yet analysis 
of jurisdictional claims under this principle can be an exercise in 
navigating a slippery slope.267  The classic examples are clear, and at least 
partial acceptance of the effects doctrine in the antitrust context (within 
the realm of reasonableness) shows that consensus is possible,268 but 
beyond those contexts the analysis quickly devolves into a normative 
exercise based on subjective values.  This can be particularly true in the 
context of extraterritorial export control jurisdiction.269  For example, 
Marcuss and Richard suggested in 1982 that jurisdiction over reexport 
activity under the effects doctrine might be warranted “in cases in which 
the reexport was expected to permit a foreign state to create undesirable 
effects within the territory of the United States.”270  Their observation 
was an aside that they did not further elaborate on, but it is easy to see 
how one’s definition of “undesirable direct effects” (to combine their 
language with the language of sections 402 and 403 of the Restatement 
(Third)) might lead to expansive jurisdictional claims.271  Are such 
 
265. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402 cmt. d. 
266. See id.  In this regard, there is parallelism with the outbound reach of jurisdiction 
under U.S. tax law’s stream of commerce analysis of jurisdiction over items abroad.  See supra 
notes 255–57. 
267. See Extraterritorial Application, supra note 14, at 1327–28. 
268. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402 rep. note 2 (“The effects [doctrine] 
has been a major source of controversy when invoked to support regulation of activities 
abroad by foreign nationals because of the economic impact of those activities in the 
regulating state.  This basis for jurisdiction is increasingly accepted for regulation of 
restrictive business practices . . . .”). 
269. See, e.g., Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L 
L. 145, 154 (1972–1973). 
270. Marcuss & Richard, supra note 139, at 480 n.154.  An interesting side note to this 
claim is that, for reasons that do not entirely hold up to scrutiny, Marcuss and Richard drew a 
distinction between items controlled under U.S. export controls for “foreign policy” reasons 
and items controlled for “national security reasons.”  Id. passim.  This distinction is also made 
by another article co-authored by Marcuss.  See Marcuss & Mathias, supra note 14 passim.  
Yet as discussed in Part II.C.3.b. of this Article, this distinction is largely illusory: U.S. 
regulators generally have discretion to classify an item as subject to stricter national security 
controls or more permissive foreign policy controls as they see fit.  See supra notes 109–11; 
infra text accompanying notes 292–93. 
271. See Marcuss & Richard, supra note 139, at 480 n.154; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), 
supra note 10, § 402(3) (allowing for jurisdiction concerning “certain conduct outside its 
territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the security of the state”); id. 
§ 403(2)(a) (describing a factor of the reasonableness analysis as a consideration of the 
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effects economic?  Security-related?  Foreign policy-related?  How 
direct do they need to be?  How undesirable do they need to be?  The 
slope is slippery indeed. 
The objective territorial principle or effects doctrine thus might be a 
valid basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction in some situations, but they 
fall short as a complete justification for the extraterritorial scope of U.S. 
export controls for at least two reasons.  First, the jurisdictional scope of 
U.S. export controls is based on item nationality, not on effect of the 
transactions on the United States.272  The fact that items are of U.S. 
origin does not mean their further sale abroad will always have any 
effect within or on the United States, economic or otherwise.  If an item 
is reexported from France to Germany for commercial use, this likely 
will have no security impact on the United States, and at most an 
indirect economic impact on the United States.  This is even more true 
for items that have been located abroad for several years or more.  The 
point is that while jurisdiction over some of these transactions might be 
justified, jurisdiction over all of them cannot be.273  As a blanket 
authorization for export control extraterritoriality, the objective 
territorial principle falls short. 
Second, analogizing extraterritorial export control jurisdiction to 
extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction (where the effects doctrine comes 
into direct play in U.S. law) is problematic because these two areas of 
regulatory control differ significantly in their goals and effects.  While 
on one level both export controls and antitrust laws are intended to have 
positive economic effects—a core goal of U.S. export control law is to 
promote exports and prevent unwanted export activity,274 and a core goal 
of antitrust law is to promote beneficial economic activity by preventing 
anticompetitive practices275—they differ in terms of the activities they 
are intended to prohibit.  The justification for antitrust laws is that 
monopoly behavior can have an anticompetitive effect, and that a lack of 
competition results in gains by the few (monopolists) at the greater 
expense of the many (U.S. consumers).276  In other words, there is an 
 
“substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory”). 
272. See supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text. 
273. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402(1)(c) & cmt. d. 
274. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2) (2006). 
275. BRENT A. OLSON & LISA C. THOMPSON, BUSINESS LAW DESKBOOK, ADVANCED 
TOPICS IN BUSINESS LAW § 23:1 (2011–2012 ed. 2011). 
276. LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
TRADEMARKS, & MONOPOLIES § 4:3 (4th ed. 2013). 
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overall economic gain to be achieved by restricting anticompetitive 
monopoly behavior.277  In contrast, restrictions on exports and reexports 
do not have a direct economic benefit.  To the contrary, they may have 
an adverse economic impact on the United States by restricting some 
transactions in order to promote noneconomic national security and 
foreign policy goals of the United States278—goals that do concern the 
state, but do not always have direct and substantial effects on U.S. 
territory.279  As the importance of international trade has grown over the 
past several decades—resulting in increased U.S. export control 
jurisdiction—this difference between antitrust law and export controls is 
stronger than ever.280 
The result, therefore, is that objective territorial jurisdiction might 
be used to justify U.S. jurisdiction over some transactions over which 
the United States claims item origin-based jurisdiction, but, like the 
other bases discussed so far, it cannot be used to justify the full reach of 
jurisdiction asserted by the United States. 
5. Passive Personality Jurisdiction 
Under the passive personality principle, states may apply their law to 
acts committed outside their territory by a nonnational when the victim 
of the act is a national of the country seeking to assert jurisdiction.281  As 
noted in the comments to section 402 of the Restatement (Third), this 
principle is to be narrowly applied: its use has not been generally 
accepted for prosecution of crimes or for actions in tort, but it has been 
accepted as a jurisdictional basis for actions against terrorist attacks on a 
state’s nationals or attacks on a state’s diplomatic personnel.282 
 
277. Id. 
278. Lowenfeld has argued that this is a way to justify U.S. trade sanctions: they may 
restrict economic activity, but unlike restrictive import actions (antidumping, countervailing 
duty, and safeguard actions) trade sanctions also directly harm the United States 
economically.  Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 355. 
279. See Marcuss & Mathias, supra note 14, at 12; Extraterritorial Application, supra 
note 14, at 1328.  But see Lunine, supra note 14, at 668–69 (arguing that the effects doctrine is 
sufficient basis for extraterritorial control over foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms). 
280. Lowenfeld has suggested that this could be used as a basis for justifying U.S. trade 
sanctions, which, unlike inbound trade protective measures (such as quotas and trade remedy 
measures like antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard measures), do not protect or 
support the implementing state’s economic activity.  See Lowenfeld, supra note 9, at 369. 
281. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402(1)(c). 
282. Id. § 402 cmt. g & rep. note 3. 
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For purposes of the extraterritoriality of U.S. export controls, the 
passive personality principle is of little help.  The jurisdictional reach of 
export controls is based on items, and extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
non-U.S. nationals for certain serious harm caused to U.S. nationals 
does not provide a solid jurisdictional base for such claims.  Some acts 
committed by non-U.S. nationals against U.S. nationals that involve 
U.S. items might be covered by passive personality jurisdiction, but the 
scope of covered activities is likely too limited to be of much use in the 
export control context. 
6. Protective Jurisdiction 
Restatement (Third) section 402(3) states that, subject to the 
requirement of reasonableness, prescriptive jurisdiction may be 
permissible over “certain conduct outside [a state’s] territory by persons 
not its nationals that is directed against the security of the state or 
against a limited class of other state interests.”283  Protective jurisdiction 
is often asserted when non-U.S. nationals have committed an act outside 
the United States that is “directed against the security of the state or 
other offenses threatening the integrity of governmental functions that 
are generally recognized as crimes”—acts such as espionage, conspiracy 
to violate immigration or customs laws, and the like.284  The harm being 
avoided must be more than a “potential generalized effect”;285 it must be 
clear and demonstrable.286  Protective jurisdiction thus is intended to 
help shield a state from harm to “fundamental national interests” 
through application of the state’s laws to activities abroad,287 and it has 
its origins in a state’s right to self-defense and self-preservation.288 
Protective jurisdiction does have the potential to serve as a 
justification for much of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. export 
controls, in a way that the other jurisdictional bases discussed above 
 
283. Id. § 402(3); see also United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); United States v. James-
Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340 (S.D. Fla. 1981). 
284. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402(3) & cmt. f. 
285. Extraterritorial Application, supra note 14, at 1330–31. 
286. Id. 
287. Marcuss & Richard, supra note 139, at 446–47; SWAN & MURPHY, supra note 118, 
at 772.  Swan and Murphy’s phraseology improves upon the original exposition of these 
principles in Harvard Research on International Law, supra note 220. 
288. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 247, § 144a.  Protective jurisdiction can be viewed as a 
“special application” of the effects doctrine, although it is generally categorized separately.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402 cmt. f. 
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cannot.  The Cold War era did present the very real threat of destructive 
large-scale warfare, but it also had a stability to it that the current era of 
asymmetrical threats does not.  Indeed, the peace and prosperity of the 
Cold War era was built on the doctrine of “Mutually Assured 
Destruction,”289 which held that balance was the key to peaceful 
coexistence, but the two decades since the end of the Cold War have 
been characterized by global instability.290  If threats are harder to spot, 
and if broad jurisdictional scope is a widely cast net that is suited to 
regulating “certain conduct outside [a state’s] territory by persons not its 
nationals that is directed against the security of the state or against a 
limited class of other state interests,”291 then at least some of the broad 
scope of extraterritorial U.S. export controls might be justified. 
Protective jurisdiction, however, presents the danger of overly 
aggressive application.  Its use could infringe significantly upon 
traditional “notions of territorial integrity” and sovereignty,292 and like 
objective territorial jurisdiction it certainly presents a slippery slope of 
application.  Moreover, protective jurisdiction only justifies jurisdiction 
over items abroad when national security-level interests are at stake.  It 
does not justify blanket item origin-based jurisdiction.  And the fact that 
other states do not assert a similarly extraterritorial reach in their export 
controls suggests that liberal application of this factor would not satisfy 
the reasonable requirements of Restatement (Third) section 403.293 
In addition, there is also the fact that protective jurisdiction is often 
limited to conduct that civilized nations universally consider criminal.294  
 
289. Nuclear Age Peace Found., Mutual Assured Destruction, NUCLEARFILES.ORG, 
http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/cold-war/strategy/strate 
gy-mutual-assured-destruction.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2014). 
290. See id. 
291. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 402(3); see also United States v. Vasquez-
Velasco, 15 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000); United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340 (S.D. Fla. 1981). 
292. Extraterritorial Application, supra note 14, at 1330–31 (“As suggested in the 
preceding discussion of the objective territorial principle, recognition of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction to protect national security interests raises fears that such a doctrine has the 
potential to emasculate notions of territorial integrity.  The breadth of contemporary 
perceptions of threats to national security interests aggravates these apprehensions.”). 
293. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 403(2)(c). 
294. Id. § 404 & cmt. a; Extraterritorial Application, supra note 14, at 1330 n.131 (“It 
would be abusive if a State invoked the protective principle without due regard to the 
importance of the offense.  In all cases, here as elsewhere, the standard is supplied solely by 
international law, i.e., by the general practice of civilized states.” (footnote omitted) (quoting 
F. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 (1973))). 
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Not all activity that might be caught by U.S. export control jurisdiction 
is criminal activity, and as most enforcement actions under U.S. export 
controls are civil295—in part because some of the activity may not be 
criminal (just unwanted for export control reasons), and in part to avoid 
the higher procedural and substantive due process implications of 
criminal proceedings.296  All in all, protective jurisdiction provides 
broader jurisdictional reach for U.S. extraterritorial export controls than 
the other bases discussed above, but it too is not broad enough to 
encompass the whole.297 
 
295. See also supra Part II.D. 
296. See Jordan Stapley, The Art of Export Control and Enforcement, 17 CURRENTS: 
INT’L TRADE L.J. 46, 47–48 (2008).  
297. There is an interesting side note to the application of protective jurisdiction to U.S. 
export controls.  Marcuss and Richard, writing in 1982, drew a sharp distinction between 
items subject to “foreign policy” export/reexport controls under the EAR, and those subject 
to more stringent “national security” export/reexport controls under the EAR.  They 
concluded that while protective jurisdiction could not be justified for items controlled under 
the EAR for “foreign policy” reasons, it might be justified for items covered by the EAR’s 
“national security” controls: 
[N]ot every export, even to a long-time adversary, necessarily has any appreciable 
effect on the security of the United States. . . . 
 . . .  If national security controls are carried out in a cautious spirit respectful of 
the sovereignty of others, they appear to have the potential to comply fully with 
international legal considerations as articulated in the protective principle. 
Marcuss & Richard, supra note 139, at 479. 
 This statement is interesting for two reasons.  First, while it is true that the EAA of 1979 
does list “national security” and “foreign policy” as two separate reasons for control of 
exports, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2404, 2405 (1976), Marcuss and Richard placed inflated importance 
on the distinction between these two bases for control under the EAA of 1979 and the EAR.  
In practice, the two categories are largely interchangeable, despite their intended differences.  
ROOT, LIEBMAN & THOMSEN, supra note 29, § 4.1.1.  Kenneth Abbott noted in 1984 (just 
two years after Marcuss and Richard) that eliminating extraterritoriality for foreign policy-
controlled items but permitting extraterritoriality for national security-controlled items 
simply would lead the president to classify more items as controlled for national security 
purposes—much in the same way that Justice Jackson noted, in his concurrence in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, that in national security matters the founders may well 
have “suspected that emergency [presidential] powers would tend to kindle emergencies.”  
Abbott, supra note 112, at 108–09; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
650 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).  Thus, while the foreign policy/national security 
distinction was fairly prominent in earlier scholarship, it is deemphasized in this Article’s 
analysis because it is, in the end, a distinction without much difference. 
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7. Universal Jurisdiction 
Pursuant to section 404 of the Restatement (Third), a state may 
exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over offenses considered to be of 
“universal concern” to the community of nations, even if that state could 
not exercise prescriptive jurisdiction under one of the other bases 
discussed above.298  Thus, on the one hand, universal jurisdiction offers 
extremely broad reach, and unlike the other bases of prescriptive 
jurisdiction, it is not limited by a requirement of reasonableness.299  As 
Eugene Kontorovich has stated, universal jurisdiction “is not premised 
on notions of sovereignty [and thus on the basis of territoriality or 
nationality] or state consent.  Rather, it is intended to override them.”300  
On the other hand, its scope is quite narrow: it traditionally has been 
limited to “actions such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of 
aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism.”301 
While there is some disagreement as to whether universal 
jurisdiction applies outside the criminal law context,302 universal 
jurisdiction has most commonly been sought in criminal law matters.303  
The recent Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, in fact, 
focused exclusively on universal jurisdiction in the context of 
prosecutions for certain “serious crimes.”304  Even assuming that 
 
298. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 404 & cmt. a. 
299. Id. § 404. 
300. Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow 
Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 184–86 (2004) (warning of universal jurisdiction’s 
“dangerous consequences” in its potential to create conflict among sovereigns). 
301. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 404. 
302. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 761–63 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(acknowledging the possibility of universal jurisdiction in civil actions); Curtis A. Bradley, 
Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323, 347–48 (2001) (arguing 
against universal jurisdiction in civil litigation, on the basis that plaintiffs and courts cannot 
balance the foreign policy concerns present in human rights lawsuits); M. O. Chibundu, 
Making Customary International Law Through Municipal Adjudication: A Structural Inquiry, 
39 VA. J. INT’L L. 1069, 1133 (1999) (arguing against universal jurisdiction in civil cases).  But 
see K. Lee Boyd, Universal Jurisdiction and Structural Reasonableness, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1 
(2004) (asserting that use of universal jurisdiction in certain civil contexts, in particular the 
human rights context, is warranted and not inconsistent with separation of powers). 
303. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 404; Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal 
Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 149, 175 (2006) (“[S]tates’ domestic laws 
facilitating universal jurisdiction flow routinely from the criminalization of the conduct in 
question at the level of international conventional law.”); James J. Friedberg, The Wane in 
Spain (of Universal Jurisdiction): Spain’s Forgetful Democratic Transition and the Prosecution 
of Tyrants, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 825, 866 (2012). 
304. THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 28 (Stephen Macedo 
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universal jurisdiction is proper in the noncriminal context, any civil 
assertions of universal jurisdiction still would need to be over actions 
qualifying as “universal concerns.”305  The result is that any such 
noncriminal proceedings likely would be tort or restitution cases that 
were essentially in lieu of (or in addition to) criminal proceedings.306 
The focus on conduct traditionally viewed as criminal, or on civil 
actions that are in lieu of criminal proceedings, narrows the export 
control relevance of universal jurisdiction considerably.  Some of what 
the end-use controls of U.S. export controls might apply to—actions, for 
example, in support of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons 
proliferation—might qualify as criminal activity under U.S. law, but not 
all of it would be.  Then there is also the fact that most export 
enforcement actions taken by the United States are civil, even when 
they might qualify for criminal treatment.307  In addition, even chemical 
or biological weapons proliferation concerns do not, at the present time, 
qualify as activities of “universal concern” that warrant universal 
jurisdiction.  In short, universal jurisdiction, as currently understood, is 
not a viable basis for extraterritorial prescriptive export control 
jurisdiction. 
8. Consent 
Consent to U.S. extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction by foreign 
parties is not listed as a jurisdictional basis under the Restatement 
(Third), but it has been advanced by several commentators as a 
justification for extraterritorial jurisdiction under U.S. export control 
laws.  Marcuss and Richard argued in favor of it in 1982, asserting that 
parties in foreign countries that deal in items subject to U.S. export 
controls are generally aware of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction claims, 
due to the fact that documents for such transactions include “destination 
control” language that notifies parties that those items are subject to 
 
ed., 2001).  The Princeton Principles list certain “Serious Crimes Under International Law” to 
which universal jurisdiction could be applied, which include “(1) piracy; (2) slavery; (3) war 
crimes; (4) crimes against peace; (5) crimes against humanity; (6) genocide; and (7) torture.”  
Id. at 29. 
305. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 404 cmt. b. 
306. See Boyd, supra note 303, at 3.  For an overview of the general view of universal 
jurisdiction and an alternative (and narrower perspective on universal jurisdiction), see 
Kontorovich, supra note 300, at 183. 
307. See supra text accompanying notes 79–80. 
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U.S. jurisdiction and export licensing requirements,308 and that by 
proceeding with these transactions (instead of abandoning them), the 
parties essentially are agreeing to be bound by and adhere to U.S. 
export control laws.309  Marcuss and Richard also pointed out that the 
United States has the power to completely deny parties the power to 
export—exportation is a privilege, not a right310—and that as a matter of 
logic, this greater power also must include the lesser power to restrict 
exports and reexports.311 
This reasoning certainly has its appeal, but it does not work as well 
in the modern, e-commerce world as it did in decades past.  First, it is 
not entirely clear how often the destination control language 
requirements of U.S. export controls are adhered to.  A transaction is 
still subject to U.S. jurisdiction even when the parties do not receive 
such notice—and per the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Iran Air v. 
Kugelman, even good-faith violators of U.S. export control laws might 
face civil penalties.312  Moreover, U.S. export controls apply not just to 
goods, but to software and technology as well—and not just to 
reexports, but also to in-country uses abroad that raise end-use 
concerns.313  This raises the likelihood that the destination control notice 
statements will not be given in electronic transactions or in-country 
transactions, and that in turn increases the risk of inadvertent (and 
good-faith) violations.  While it may well be true that the United States 
would be less likely to pursue an enforcement action against good-faith 
violators, that is a very different thing than saying that the United States 
does not have jurisdiction to do so. 
A third problem is that publication of these reexport requirements 
and jurisdictional claims in the Federal Register and Code of Federal 
Regulations314 is at least somewhat questionable as a matter of public 
 
308. Marcuss & Richard, supra note 139, at 476–77. 
309. Id. at 478.  For a discussion of consent as a justification for extraterritoriality in a 
different context, see Bowman, supra note 16, at 224–42 (discussing consent as a justification 
for extraterritorial reach of U.S. cargo security programs). 
310. Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 764.3 (2013). 
311. See Abbott, supra note 112, at 103 n.132; Marcuss & Richard, supra note 139, at 
439. 
312. Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also supra text 
accompanying note 193. 
313. See supra text accompanying notes 51, 62–64. 
314. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 734.5 (discussing some of the activities of the United States 
and other nations that are controlled by the EAR); id. § 740.16 (discussing requirements for 
certain permissive reexports). 
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notice.  It is one thing to consider domestic U.S. persons and companies 
(and those that regularly do business with the U.S.) as being given 
public notice in this manner—such parties can be considered to know, or 
have reason to know, to be alert for such notices315—but what about 
parties that are far removed from the United States, or who may not 
speak English, or who have not engaged in any previous transactions 
over which the United States asserts jurisdiction?  One can imagine the 
outcry if a U.S. company were considered by the Spanish Government 
to be subject to Spanish jurisdiction, based on a Spanish-language notice 
published in a Spanish government publication.  Moreover, pursuant to 
the statutory authority for U.S. export control laws, advance notice of 
changes to these rules is not required.316  The latter point is more 
relevant to concerns over retroactivity, which as explained above is not 
really the gist of the concerns being addressed in this Article,317 but it 
does further call into question the efficacy of the consent argument. 
Perhaps an even more fundamental concern with consent as a basis 
for jurisdiction, however, is that consent to not reexport (or transfer to 
impermissible end-uses or end-users) is not necessarily the same thing as 
consent to U.S. jurisdiction.318  Much in the same way that parties cannot 
waive a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in U.S. federal court,319 the 
consent of a party to U.S. extraterritorial export control jurisdiction may 
be a derogation of the foreign state’s sovereignty.320  The nature of 
sovereignty is a complex and nuanced topic; suffice it to say here that, in 
addition to the problems listed above, consent to jurisdiction may be 
problematic from this perspective as well. 
C. Concluding Thoughts Regarding the Restatement (Third) 
Based on the discussion above of the Restatement (Third)’s bases for 
prescriptive jurisdiction, four key themes emerge. 
 
315. See The Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations—A Reappraisal, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 439, 443, 449 (1966).  
316. See Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(f) (2000) (requiring 
only notice of rule changes as they are implemented, not in advance).  
317. See supra text accompanying notes 151–53. 
318. Extraterritorial Application, supra note 14, at 1325–26. 
319. 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 
JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 3522 (3d ed. 2008).  
320. Extraterritorial Application, supra note 14, at 1326. 
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x First, the doctrinal bases of prescriptive jurisdiction under 
international law, as set forth in the Restatement (Third), continue to 
work quite well in addressing areas of jurisdictional conflict and overlap. 
 The provisions of sections 402 through 404 of the Restatement 
(Third) show admirable adaptability to an era characterized by far 
greater international linkages than when they were drafted.  The 
drafters were correct to move away from strict territoriality and 
nationality and toward principles that reflect the overlapping and 
amorphous nature of jurisdictional assertions of lawmaking power. 
x Second, even with such flexible jurisdictional principles, it remains 
difficult, and in fact probably not possible, to justify the full reach of 
current U.S. extraterritorial export controls. 
 Some of the Restatement (Third)’s bases, such as subjective 
territorial jurisdiction and nationality jurisdiction, can be used to justify 
much, but not all, of the reach of U.S. export controls.  Of the 
remainder, objective territoriality (and the effects doctrine), passive 
personality, and especially protective jurisdiction may justify some of 
the reach, and consent might justify even more, but gaps in coverage 
remain.  And looming above all of this is the specter of reasonableness 
as a limiting factor.321 
x Third, item origin-based extraterritorial jurisdiction raises the 
potential for jurisdictional disputes between the United States and its 
trading partners in a world where the potential for dispute, and the 
ramifications of such disputes, are larger than they were in 1982.322   
 Multilateral trade controls work far better in a world (such as 
today’s world) that is characterized by multiple sources of supply for 
goods, software, and technology—and effective multilateralism requires 
agreement of some sort.  Rather than running the risk of future disputes, 
which might or might not be taken to the WTO for dispute settlement, it 
 
321. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 403. 
322. The showdown between the United States and European Union regarding the 
Helms-Burton Act is a more recent example of the potential for high-stakes international 
trade disputes between the United States and some of its major trading partners.  WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings in that dispute were only narrowly avoided.  See Spanogle, 
supra note 5, at 1313–15.  That dispute was a trade sanctions dispute, not an export control 
dispute, but it hinged on a quite aggressive assertion of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
foreign parties. 
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would be preferable to identify a solution now, rather than continue 
with a unilateral approach. 
x Fourth, even if one could successfully justify the full scope of the 
jurisdictional reach asserted by the United States, the item origin-based 
jurisdictional approach is, as the saying goes, “a hell of a way to run a 
railroad.”323 
 The item origin-based approach does not work well, or predictably, 
or cleanly.  When it does work, it does so by forcing the analysis to jump 
awkwardly through an item origin hoop, rather than simply basing the 
analysis on the actual underlying national security and foreign policy 
concerns.324  The approach is cumbersome, misleading, and a vestige of a 
bygone era.  It would be preferable to scrap the approach in favor of 
something based more directly on the underlying concerns. 
IV. NEW CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF EXPORT CONTROL EXTRA-
TERRITORIALITY 
The United States has not backed down in its assertion of the right 
to assert item origin-based extraterritorial export control jurisdiction, 
and instead appears to have relied on enforcement discretion to avoid 
 
323. The origin of this saying (as with many popular catchphrases) is in some dispute.  
One claimed reference, which characterizes the saying as referring to “organized chaos,” is a 
1920 cartoon in Ballyhoo magazine that depicted a signalman commenting on an impending 
collision of trains, instead of trying to do something about it.  ERIC PARTRIDGE, 
DICTIONARY OF CATCH PHRASES: AMERICAN AND BRITISH FROM THE SIXTEENTH 
CENTURY TO THE PRESENT DAY 510 (Paul Beal ed., 2d ed. 1992).  It has also been attributed 
to a 1956 New Yorker cartoon in which a wealthy middle-aged man on a train holds up a 
martini glass to two train conductors and complains, “This is a hell of a way to run a railroad!  
You call that a dry martini?”  March 1, 2013, THIS DAY IN QUOTES, 
http://www.thisdayinquotes.com/2010/03/back-to-old-drawing-board.html (last visited Feb. 7, 
2014) (referring to THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 25, 1956, at 31).  The latter seems a less likely 
original source (although perhaps a funnier cartoon). 
324. By way of analogy, university educators would have serious concerns if universities 
decided to forgo examinations and instead base class grades, and thus student graduation, 
solely on class attendance.  Under this approach, students who attended class more regularly 
would get higher grades than those who missed class for whatever reason.  Certainly class 
attendance is often related to learning outcomes, just as item origin is sometimes (but not 
always) related to U.S. interest in regulating a foreign transaction, but attendance is not the 
real, underlying concern—learning is.  Using class attendance as a direct proxy for actual 
learning would not fully capture and reward important learning outside the classroom; and 
while the system could be made to work somewhat better with certain adjustments and 
exceptions, it is still not the best approach, and it unnecessarily complicates matters.  We 
would want to reform such a system, both to simplify it and make it more effective—and so it 
also should be with export control jurisdiction. 
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the ire of its trading partners.  This is certainly better than 
indiscriminate enforcement efforts, but risk of future crises like the 1982 
pipeline crisis remains.  Just as importantly, the development of clearer 
jurisdictional standards is impaired by the current status quo.  While 
international law is characterized by indeterminacy in many respects, in 
a world characterized by increasing globalization of trade and 
jurisdictional overlaps it would be enormously beneficial to achieve 
greater clarity regarding jurisdictional reach for export controls. 
The discussion thus far starkly illustrates that the current U.S. 
approach to export control jurisdiction is legally problematic and not 
terribly effective from a practical perspective, both in terms of how it is 
administered and how well it supports and advances desired U.S. policy 
goals.  Can a new approach be devised that is superior to the current 
U.S. jurisdictional scheme, both in terms of compliance with 
international law prescriptive jurisdiction principles and in terms of 
furtherance of U.S. national security and foreign policy goals?  That is, 
can a solution be devised that conforms to international law standards 
and is realistically viable as a policy matter?  And from what other 
perspectives can we analyze the longstanding, problematic issue of 
extraterritorial U.S. export control jurisdiction in seeking to answer 
these questions? 
Recent scholarship on central aspects of globalization and 
international trade provides useful lenses through which to view the 
topic of extraterritorial export control laws.  Unlike relevant scholarship 
from the 1980s, this scholarship is not directly focused on the topic of 
extraterritorial export controls.  Rather, the relevance of this newer 
scholarship derives from the fact that each approach, in its own way, 
seeks to grapple with and explain the interconnectedness of modern 
international or transnational trade regulation.  These approaches thus 
help reframe the issue of export control extraterritoriality and point to 
possible, and even realistically viable, solutions for this longstanding 
problem.  Collectively, they point to a need for greater focus on the 
already agreed-upon nonproliferation and missile technology restriction 
purposes of export controls as the basis for prescriptive 
extraterritoriality. 
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A. Network Theory 
Network theory has claimed a dominant position in international 
legal scholarship in the past decade, with Anne-Marie Slaughter’s 
influential book A New World Order perhaps being the highest profile 
example.325  Slaughter asserts that governments, like businesses and 
terrorists, operate through global networks, and her work offers a useful 
perspective from which to analyze export control extraterritoriality.326 
Slaughter’s approach to globalization and transnational government 
interactions rests on the concept of the disaggregated state, as opposed 
to the traditional conception of the unitary state.327  Starting from the 
premise that “national governments are losing their ability to formulate 
and implement national public policy within territorial borders rendered 
increasingly porous by the forces of globalization, immigration, and the 
information revolution”—an observation that jibes nicely with the 
prescriptive jurisdictional principles of the Restatement (Third)—
Slaughter concludes that some transnational cooperation is necessary in 
order to make regulatory efforts effective.328  She taxonomizes 
transnational networks into several categories based on the formality of 
their structure: formal frameworks, such as the WTO or NAFTA;329 
informal frameworks that work on a consensual basis, such as the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC)330 or the G8 (or G20),331 
or like some of the multilateral export control organizations discussed 
earlier;332 and spontaneous networks of communication and cooperation 
between or among bureaucrats in different countries.333  Slaughter 
further categorizes networks by their functions: “information exchange 
networks,” through which information is shared transnationally; 
“harmonization networks,” which work to harmonize national laws in a 
 
325. See generally SLAUGHTER, supra note 22.  
326. Other network scholarship includes, inter alia, Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of 
International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 
43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002); David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight 
Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281 (1998). 
327. SLAUGHTER, supra note 22, at 5–6, 12–15. 
328. Id. at 262–63; accord MEGHAN L. O’SULLIVAN, SHREWD SANCTIONS: 
STATECRAFT AND STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM (2003). 
329. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 22, at 144–48. 
330. See id. at 140–42. 
331. See id. at 144. 
332. See supra Part II.G. 
333. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 22, at 132, 139–40. 
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particular area; and “enforcement networks,” through which 
participants work to coordinate transnational enforcement of laws.334  A 
single network can perform one or more of these functions.335  The result 
is that transnational networks can take a variety of forms, serve different 
functions, and serve more than one function, depending on the desires 
and needs of the participants. 
Network theory is directly relevant to the area of export controls 
and export jurisdiction.  There currently are several trans-governmental 
export control networks in existence, of differing degrees of formality—
namely the Wassenaar Arrangement, Chemical Weapons Convention, 
Australia Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group, and Missile Technology 
Control Regime.336  Much of this multilateral coordination has focused 
on nonproliferation efforts, but these coordinative efforts have not 
addressed jurisdiction.  A more deliberate application of network theory 
to the matter of extraterritorial export controls yields interesting 
insights. 
First, the existing export control organizations discussed above are 
horizontal networks that largely work as transnational harmonization 
networks (to coordinate and harmonize national export control laws, 
with particular focus on harmonization of national export classification 
schemes), and also as information networks (to share information 
among participating states regarding their export control and licensing 
decisions), but their use as enforcement networks has been quite 
limited.  The Wassenaar Arrangement—the most robust and developed 
network of these four networks—currently serves as an enforcement 
network in a limited fashion, but this is largely limited to transnational 
coordination of export licensing and restrictions.337  For example, for 
certain U.S.-origin or -content goods located in certain (but not all) 
foreign countries (depending on the export classification of these items), 
the United States will allow reexports that otherwise would require a 
U.S. license to go forward under the supervision and export control 
authority of that foreign country, on the grounds that the United States 
trusts these foreign governments as regulatory authorities.338  Technically 
 
334. Id. at 131–33. 
335. Id. 
336. See supra Part II.G. 
337. See The Wassenaar Arrangement on Exp. Controls for Conventional Arms and 
Dual-Use Goods and Techs., supra note 11; see also supra Part II.G. 
338. Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 740.16 (2013) (providing 
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speaking, this is not a renunciation of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the 
United States—it is a transfer of licensing authority to the foreign 
government without a waiver of jurisdiction—but a next logical step 
would be waiver of jurisdiction in such circumstances.  The point made 
here is that the existing export control networks, with the Wassenaar 
Arrangement in the lead, could be used more robustly as networks to 
coordinate, harmonize, and facilitate (as well as limit) the 
extraterritorial reach of national export control laws.   
To date, of course, this has not happened.  It is interesting and 
disheartening to realize that for as long as they have existed, all 
multilateral export control organizations have relied on—and in the case 
of the Wassenaar Arrangement (and its predecessor COCOM) actively 
reinforced—the existing and highly problematic item-based 
classification and licensing schemes of national export controls.339  The 
system is built on this very scheme of classifying items as a first step 
toward determining what export licensing requirements might apply—
but it reinforces an approach that is, increasingly, woefully out of date.  
And that, in turn, reinforces the United States’ item origin-based 
jurisdictional scheme and its insistence on problematic jurisdictional 
assertions. 
This sort of blind inertia does not help avert any future jurisdictional 
crises in an increasingly interconnected and transnational world.  A 
deliberate, conscious effort by participating states to harness these 
existing networks to engage in a conversation about export control 
jurisdiction could prove highly beneficial.  These organizations exist 
because of consensus about the need for transnational coordination and 
cooperation on various aspects of export controls.  If we accept (as this 
Article argues) that extraterritoriality is a crisis waiting to happen 
(again), then these already-existing networks can and should be used as 
venues to address and try to resolve this long outstanding problem. 
 
“Additional permissive reexports” (APR) license exception). 
339. See The Wassenaar Arrangement on Exp. Controls for Conventional Arms and 
Dual-Use Goods and Techs., How Does the Wassenaar Arrangement Work?, 
WASSENAAR.ORG http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/howitworks.html (discussing how 
the Wassenaar Arrangement participating countries have “agreed to maintain national export 
controls on listed items”); IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31832, THE 
EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT: EVOLUTION, PROVISIONS, AND DEBATE 10, 22 (2009) 
(discussing the lists controlled by multilateral export controls regimes, and how these groups 
use a “common control list” based on the classifications of items). 
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B. Mutual Recognition Arrangements 
A related but somewhat different approach to examination of 
transnational regulation by governments is the “mutual recognition 
agreement” (MRA).  MRAs have a long history within the European 
Union340 and are most effective where “strong, pre-existing 
supranational institutions” exist,341 but they also can prove valuable in 
areas of governance and regulation that are dominated by multilateral 
concerns and different regulatory standards.342  A key feature of MRAs 
is that they offer a way for governments to jointly manage activity in a 
particular regulatory area by recognizing and giving credence to each 
other’s different approaches, without the need to fully harmonize 
different national regulations.343  Central to this is that each state treats 
the relevant regulations of the other state(s) as equivalent.344  The result 
is a consensual overlapping of jurisdiction (potentially of both 
prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction) in a particular subject area. 
Bilateral or regional MRAs regarding financial markets are prime 
example of MRAs.345  Securities laws and the regulation of financial 
markets are historically territorially bound, and in that regard they have 
grown less suited to regulation of modern transnational business.346  
MRAs may help avoid the difficult technical and political challenges of 
harmonizing different regulatory regimes in the same subject area,347 and 
 
340. Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Mutual Recognition in International Finance, 52 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 55, 56 (2011). 
341. Id. 
342. Nicolaïdis & Shaffer, supra note 23, at 265–66; see also Americo Beviglia Zampetti, 
Mutual Recognition in the Transatlantic Context: Some Reflections on Future Negotiations, in 
REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD 
TRADE LAW 303 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2000) (discussing mutual 
recognition in the context of WTO non-discrimination principles); Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Non-
Discriminatory Mutual Recognition: An Oxymoron in the New WTO Lexicon?, in 
REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD 
TRADE LAW 267 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2000) (same). 
343. Verdier, supra note 340, at 63 (“[M]utual recognition may be defined as an 
understanding among two or more states under which each recognizes the adequacy of the 
other’s regulation or supervision of an activity or institution as a substitute for its own.”). 
344. Id. 
345. Id. at 56; see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Announces Next 
Steps for Implementation of Mutual Recognition Concept (Mar. 24, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-49.htm. 
346. Verdier, supra note 340, at 71–92.  
347. Id. at 62 (“Outside Europe, commentators are increasingly advocating mutual 
recognition agreements as a substitute for substantive harmonization.”). 
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may help avoid disputes about extraterritorial scope, because the 
applicability of a national regime is less dependent on traditional 
notions of territoriality and nationality.348   
The longstanding problem of U.S. export control jurisdiction can 
benefit from analysis through an MRA lens.  There are important 
similarities between the regulation of exports and the regulation of 
financial markets in terms of their extraterritoriality and transnational 
coordination with other regimes.  Both the U.S. export control system 
and U.S. financial regulatory system, for example, are based on early or 
mid-twentieth century statutory schemes and were designed with a far 
less multilateral and interconnected world in mind.349  The effectiveness 
of the U.S. export control and financial market regimes as closed 
regulatory systems—based on territoriality and nationality—has been 
reduced significantly by globalization.  Both areas of regulation also are 
characterized by some measure of transnational cooperation. 
They differ, however, in terms of transnational cooperation 
regarding treatment of extraterritorial reach.  The U.S.-EU Securities 
regulation MRA is a system of “managed ‘joint governance’ of 
extraterritoriality”;350 in contrast, extraterritoriality in the area of export 
controls currently is a system characterized by non-agreement on 
extraterritoriality.351  These areas of transnational importance also differ 
in terms of just how different the national systems of regulation are.  
Interestingly, that difference cuts the other way, with export control 
regimes of the United States and its trading partners (jurisdictional 
considerations excluded) being far more harmonized through the 
Wassenaar Arrangement and other multilateral agreements and 
organizations discussed above than their financial regulatory systems.352 
 
348. See Nicolaïdis & Shaffer, supra note 23. 
349. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text (discussing the change from 
designating items as problematic based on the end-location to designating items as 
problematic based on the end-use of the item from the end of WWII to the present); supra 
note 31 and accompanying text (“[C]urrent U.S. export controls originated as a post-World 
War II trade-restrictive regime.”); supra notes 65–70 (discussing how the current licensing 
simplification reform enacted by President Obama is a necessary change because export 
controls are too prohibitive of dual-use items that have a broad commercial appeal). 
350. Nicolaïdis & Shaffer, supra note 23, at 268. 
351. Bridge, supra note 14, at 2, 4 (discussing how the European community has 
expressed views that they do not agree with the US extraterritoriality in export controls). 
352. Compare The Wassenaar Arrangement on Exp. Controls for Conventional Arms 
and Dual-Use Goods and Techs., Guidelines & Procedures, Including the Initial Elements, 
WASSENAAR.ORG, http://www.wassenaar.org/guidelines/index.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2014), 
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The export control regimes of the United States and its trading 
partners are also driven by common concerns about nonproliferation.  
The nonproliferation controls in particular are products of the post-Cold 
War era that reflect deep multilateral concerns about rogue regimes and 
the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by smaller states.353  The 
difficulty in successfully employing a mutual recognition approach, 
however, is to reach agreement not just on common principles, but also 
on the applicability and acceptability of specific (and often technical) 
rules.  In that sense, export control coordination through mutual 
recognition may actually have an advantage over financial regulation, 
because technical rules regarding item classification are already 
transnationally harmonized among many developed countries through 
the Wassenaar Arrangement. 
It is thus worth exploring whether consensus might be achieved 
about mutual recognition of the jurisdictional reach of the export 
control regimes of the United States and its trading partners.  These 
could be bilateral, as with the United States’ financial regulation MRA 
with Australia,354 but preferably would be multilateral, at least to some 
extent, and perhaps could be implemented under the auspices of 
existing multilateral export control agreements, such as the Wassenaar 
Arrangement.  An MRA that addressed extraterritoriality would be, in 
essence, a negotiated solution, as was proposed by Abbott in 1984.355  
U.S. assertions of jurisdiction could be acknowledged as legitimate by 
other participating states, in return for U.S. reciprocation—either in full 
or in part—that would permit foreign regulation of activities of similar 
concern in the United States.  That is to say, in return for foreign 
acceptance of U.S. extraterritorial export control jurisdiction, the 
United States might allow for some foreign regulation of activity within 
the United States and its territories for the same export control 
purposes of nonproliferation and control of missile technology. 
Of course, mutuality might not result in full symmetry.  U.S. trading 
partners may not be as interested in extraterritorially regulating activity 
as the United States is.  It is also possible (and perhaps likely) that the 
United States might use its economic and political clout to achieve 
 
with Verdier, supra note 340, at 82–88 (discussing implementation of MRA approach with 
Australia). 
353. See supra Part II.C.2. 
354. See Verdier, supra note 340, at 56; see also Press Release, supra note 345. 
355. See Abbott, supra note 112, at 119–20. 
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asymmetry: the United States might work to convince its trading 
partners to accept greater U.S. extraterritorial reach, in return for less 
expansive foreign jurisdictional reach into the United States.  That sort 
of power imbalance permeates international negotiations and the 
development of international law generally, and it is not per se more 
problematic in the area of export controls than it is in any other area of 
international law and international trade regulation.356  If consensus is 
reached and adhered to, that consensus would not be automatically 
rendered invalid by unequal bargaining power of the parties involved.357 
C. Unilateralism and Norm Development 
Sarah Cleveland’s work on the intersection of international human 
rights law and international trade has been deeply influential,358 but 
much of its influence has remained confined to the area of international 
human rights.  Yet her work on unilateral trade sanctions and norm 
development offers useful insights in other areas of international trade 
regulation, including export controls. 
Cleveland has argued that unilateral trade sanctions can be a means 
to spark international dialogue on important subjects, and indeed push 
the development of new international law norms.359  Specifically, she has 
observed that multilateral (and regional) promotion and enforcement of 
international human and labor rights is relatively weak, and that 
national laws are thus more important for promoting these rights.360  
 
356. Paul Schiff Berman asserts that waiving or self-limiting jurisdiction does not raise 
sovereignty concerns.  See Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1155, 1183 (2007) (“[I]t is no threat to sovereignty for a nation-state to decide that its 
sovereign interests are advanced overall by making agreements with other nations that limit 
what it can otherwise do.”). 
357. This can be contrasted to U.S. cargo security efforts developed after the 9/11 
attacks, which presented countries wishing to export products to the United States with a 
difficult choice of either (a) accepting additional U.S. regulation and supervision of foreign 
supply chains or (b) facing greater import processing times into the United States, and in 
some cases even rejection of shipments.  Bowman, supra note 16, at 203–16, 226 (summarizing 
the U.S. cargo security efforts developed after the 9/11 attacks).  Such is not the case here.  It 
is difficult to imagine the United States imposing new, broad import restrictions in order to 
force its trading partners to accept extraterritorial export control jurisdiction—and even if the 
United States decided to do that, it is hard to imagine that it would not be challenged as a 
violation of the United States’ WTO obligations. 
358. See Cleveland, supra note 5, at 133; Cleveland, supra note 24, at 3. 
359. Cleveland, supra note 24, at 7. 
360. Id. at 3. 
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 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) have consolidated an 
international free trade regime, but multilateral efforts to use 
international trade to encourage compliance with labor and 
human rights norms have been consistently rejected by 
developing countries, which criticize such efforts as protectionist 
and imperialist.  Regional trade regimes such as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European 
Union (EU) have proven more receptive to incorporating labor 
and environmental concerns into their trading systems.  With the 
notable exception of the EU, however, enforcement mechanisms 
in regional trade regimes also remain weak. 
 In light of the limited possibilities for multilateral 
enforcement of international norms, domestic law mechanisms 
for this purpose have become [more] important.361 
Cleveland also discusses how the United States uses unilateral trade 
sanctions—both limited sanctions such as investment restrictions and 
full embargoes—“to encourage foreign states to comply with 
international [law] norms.”362  Whereas the traditional discussion of 
trade sanctions focuses on their use to “punish and alter” certain 
behavior by other states, Cleveland considers how unilateral trade 
sanctions can “assist[] in the international definition, promulgation, 
recognition, and domestic internalization of human rights norms.”363  She 
observes that unilateral trade sanctions might be imposed in violation of 
international law, but that the reaction of other states to these trade 
sanctions—that is, the acceptance of these sanctions—might indicate 
evolutionary development of the international law norms at play.364  
Such sanctions also might help define the boundaries of these norms, as 
well as promote these norms by helping to internalize them into the 
domestic legal systems of the states implementing the sanctions.365  
Unilateral sanctions, Cleveland asserts, also can help bring international 
attention to bear on certain human rights and labor rights violations of 
international law, and might lead to the stronger development of 
international law norms by both strengthening multilateral support and 
 
361. Id.  
362. Id. at 4. 
363. Id. at 6. 
364. Id. at 6–7 (citing Weisburd, supra note 272). 
365. Id. at 6 (citing Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 
YALE L.J. 2599, 2646 (1997)). 
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encouraging states to implement domestic law measures to promote 
those international rights.366 
Cleveland’s analysis translates well to an analysis of U.S. export 
control extraterritoriality.  As has been discussed in this Article, the 
United States’ assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in perpetuity, 
based on the U.S. origin or content of items located abroad, is a 
unilateral claim that is unmatched in its scope.  However, there are 
important international norms and values underlying this U.S. assertion 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction—namely nonproliferation and missile 
technology.  A shift from extraterritorial jurisdiction based on item 
origin to extraterritorial jurisdiction based on these reasons for concern 
and control might render broad U.S. assertions of export control 
prescriptive jurisdiction less objectionable to other states, might lead to 
greater discussion of this approach, and even might lead to overt 
acceptance of (and perhaps even adoption of) this jurisdictional 
approach by other countries. 
Such a change would require a subtle, but critically important, shift 
in position by the United States.  The position no longer would be that 
the United States always has prescriptive extraterritorial jurisdiction 
based on item origin but chooses, in its discretion, not to take 
enforcement actions in all cases.  Rather, the position would be that the 
United States has extraterritorial jurisdiction over activities outside the 
United States that raise certain nonproliferation and missile technology 
concerns about which there is general multilateral consensus, but not 
over nonproblematic activities outside the United States.  The 
enforcement focus of the United States would be largely the same—
namely, on these problematic activities—but jurisdiction would not be 
based on an item origin-based approach pursuant to which “U.S. law 
[always] runs with the goods.”367  Instead, assertions of jurisdiction 
would be based on concerns for which there is a great deal of 
commonality among the United States and its trading partners.  Such an 
approach would cut to the heart of the matter, instead of requiring 
assertions of jurisdiction to jump awkwardly through an item origin 
hoop. 
This shift in jurisdictional focus could make a significant difference, 
depending on how aggressively (and unilaterally) or conservatively (and 
 
366. Id. at 7. 
367. ROSENTHAL & KNIGHTON, supra note 14, at 54. 
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consensually) the United States decided to interpret the 
nonproliferation and missile technology concerns in question.  Highly 
aggressive interpretations based solely on U.S. concerns not shared by 
other countries might lead to little real change from the current state of 
affairs, because little or no more consensus about the scope of U.S. 
jurisdiction would be reached.  However, an approach based on shared 
principles could go a long way to rendering much of the 
extraterritoriality of the U.S. export control regime not only less 
objectionable, but also more permissible as a matter of international 
law—either because it fits within the existing jurisdictional bases or 
because international consensus evolves to accept these assertions of 
prescriptive jurisdiction. 
Moreover, to the extent that the United States has strongly held 
concerns that fall under the categories of nonproliferation or missile 
technology, a unilateral assertion of jurisdiction by the United States 
might result, in some cases at least, in greater dialogue about such 
claims, and perhaps even acceptance of such assertions of jurisdiction, 
along the lines that Cleveland addresses in the context of international 
human and labor rights.368  There certainly is no guaranty of that 
happening, and it would be naïve to suggest that it always (or even 
often) will occur.  But if the past thirty years have taught us anything 
about U.S. export control jurisdiction, it is that the current U.S. 
approach to extraterritorial export controls is a dead end in terms of 
international consensus and the development of international law.  It is 
a crisis waiting to happen—or to use Cleveland’s words, the current item 
origin-based approach is not “consistent with broader principles of the 
international community, such as principles of international jurisdiction, 
nonintervention, and free trade.”369  In contrast, basing jurisdiction on 
underlying reasons for control that are more generally accepted would 
offer, at the very least, the possibility that such unilateral assertions of 
U.S. jurisdiction, if reasonably tailored, might actually encourage further 
dialogue, reduce the risk of serious trade disputes, and lead to greater 
jurisdictional consensus regarding outbound trade.  
 
368. See generally Cleveland, supra note 24. 
369. Id. at 7. 
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V. A MODERN APPROACH TO EXPORT CONTROL 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY: THE NEED FOR MULTILATERAL 
JURISDICTIONAL CONSENSUS 
With these insights from network theory, MRA scholarship, and 
unilateral action/norm development scholarship in mind, what changes 
might we recommend for the jurisdictional reach of the U.S. export 
control regime and for jurisdiction within the multilateral export control 
system generally?  This Article posits four main steps and principles: (a) 
U.S. abandonment of item-based export control jurisdiction in favor of a 
purpose-based approach that rests on the existing multilateral consensus 
about the underlying purposes of export controls; (b) greater focus on 
enforcement considerations; (c) a willingness to engage in a “regional” 
approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction, as opposed to a uniform 
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction; and (d) greater tolerance for 
asymmetry. 
A. U.S. Abandonment of Item-Based Export Control Jurisdiction 
This first step is a clear one.  If this Article has accomplished nothing 
else, it should at least compellingly illustrate the fatally flawed nature of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction based on item origin.  In its place, 
jurisdiction—both by the United States and its trading partners—should 
be premised, to the extent possible, on mutually shared policy goals.  
Happily, strong multilateral consensus already exists regarding key 
policy goals of export control regimes—namely, proliferation and 
missile technology concerns, and the U.S. export control regime is 
infused with these goals.370  An expressly renewed focus by the United 
States on these areas of multilateral consensus can help avoid the most 
extreme assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction, while at the same time 
maintaining rigorous attention on core concerns that have driven these 
broad assertions of jurisdiction in the first place. 
To be sure, there would be cases in which the United States (and 
other countries) would be tempted to assert jurisdiction over external 
activities that do not fall within the scope of nonproliferation or missile 
technology concerns.  “National security” is largely a self-defined 
concept.  And it is true, in fact, that the 1982 Soviet pipeline dispute did 
not involve proliferation or missile technology concerns—although it 
perhaps did indirectly, at least for the United States, because much of 
 
370. See supra Part II.D.2. 
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the concern was about preventing Soviet access to hard currency that 
might benefit Soviet military development.  The argument made here, 
however, is that such instances would be better addressed on a case-by-
case basis and treated as exceptions to the general approach, rather than 
as instances that define jurisdictional reach as a general matter.  To treat 
such cases as exceptions would help keep the central focus on the areas 
of multilateral consensus—which are fairly well developed through the 
existing multilateral export control agreements and organizations 
discussed above—and in turn help define the boundaries of this 
multilateral consensus in an iterative fashion going forward.  That is, the 
justifications and needs for specific unilateral assertions of jurisdiction 
could be addressed on their own merits; and perhaps, in some cases, 
unilateral assertions of jurisdiction that exceeded the bounds of this 
consensus might lead to modifications of the accepted boundaries of 
prescriptive extraterritoriality.  In contrast, not to treat such cases as 
exceptions would keep the jurisdictional analysis centered on unilateral 
self-interest, which would prevent such clarification or evolution, and 
thus leave the boundaries of acceptable extraterritorial jurisdiction 
vague and ill-suited to clear consensus.  That is the current status quo—
the sadly unhelpful legacy of the 1982 Soviet pipeline dispute.  It is a 
legacy that should be put to rest. 
B. Greater Focus on Enforcement Considerations 
The second step, greater focus on enforcement considerations, 
would be an important step in the development of the existing 
transnational export control regime.  As previously discussed, the 
current multilateral regime is comprised of various agreements and 
organizations371 that serve largely as horizontal harmonization networks 
for national export control regimes, and also as information networks 
for the sharing of export licensing decisions.372  While there is some 
multilateral coordination of enforcement matters—such as via the 
United States’ current “License Exception APR” that permits reexports 
from certain countries, provided that those reexports are permissible 
under those foreign countries’ export control laws373—these exceptions 
are ad hoc carve-outs, not systemic adjustments.  Certainly from the 
 
371. See supra Part II.G. 
372. See supra text accompanying notes 325–36. 
373. See Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 740.16 (2013) (License 
Exception “APR”). 
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United States’ perspective, such enforcement coordination has not been 
used to address or define the jurisdictional reach of export controls. 
Changing from the current approach to one that places greater 
attention on harmonizing the relationship between export control 
enforcement and export control jurisdictional reach could result in a 
multilateral export control regime that is more robust and effective.  
Efforts to better define (consensually) what is and is not an acceptable 
extraterritorial application of national export control laws would help 
avoid controversy in future matters, and also would promote 
cooperation in terms of coordinated assistance in enforcement.  Greater 
U.S. confidence in the enforcement efforts of its trading partners would 
make forgoing extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction more feasible, 
which in turn would make it easier to achieve consensus on the 
acceptable prescriptive reach of national export control laws. 
Moreover, nothing in this approach would prevent the reassertion of 
prescriptive extraterritorial jurisdiction in the future if concern emerged 
about the effectiveness of coordinated enforcement efforts.  That is, a 
country’s consensual agreement to limits on its prescriptive export 
control jurisdiction would go hand in hand with confidence about its 
trading partners’ nonproliferation and missile technology export control 
enforcement efforts—and legitimate concerns about a trading partner’s 
enforcement efforts could justify renewed extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
order to address the underlying nonproliferation and missile technology 
goals. 
Finally, such assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction would have the 
strong advantage of being justified under the existing prescriptive 
jurisdictional principles of international law, in a way that the current 
U.S. item-based approach to jurisdiction is not.  There is potentially 
much upside, and little downside, in seeking to foster greater 
coordination and harmonization of enforcement efforts, and to do so in 
a way that helps define the acceptable scope of extraterritorial 
prescriptive jurisdiction.  In contrast, failure to achieve better definition 
would leave the boundaries of extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction 
grey, which would impair the ability to develop a stronger transnational 
export control enforcement network.  And it is clear that a central part 
of fostering greater multilateral consensus about extraterritorial 
prescriptive jurisdiction, and thus facilitating greater coordination and 
cooperation regarding enforcement efforts, is the United States’ 
abandonment of item-based export control jurisdiction. 
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C. A Willingness to Engage in a “Regional” Approach 
The revised approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction advocated here 
would not need to be implemented wholesale or all at once, in fully 
multilateral fashion.  Indeed, insistence on full multilateralism likely 
would guarantee little or no positive progress—much in the same way 
that the current Doha Round of WTO negotiations has ground to a 
halt.374  In many respects, the significant developments in supranational 
international trade regulation are taking place at the sub-global level.375 
Instead, the revised approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction 
advocated in this Article could be implemented at first on a bilateral 
basis or among a small number of countries, and subsequently be scaled 
up as circumstances permit.  The approach could proceed along the lines 
of the regional integration of Europe following World War II, by 
starting with a core of countries that can achieve consensus and 
broadening to include more over time. Implementation could be 
through the multilateral export control organizations and agreements 
that currently exist—either informally through their member states, or 
more formally as modifications to the organizations’ express goals or 
official agreements (for those such as the Wassenaar Arrangement that 
do have such agreements in place).  This non-multilateral approach also 
might be implemented through current and future preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) to which the United States is a party376—again, 
either as informal arrangements or as more official side agreements or 
 
374. See DAVID A. GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: LAW, POLICY AND 
PRACTICE 5 (2009) (describing preferential trade agreements as “the [current] darling of 
international trade negotiators” due in part to “frustration with the stalled Doha Round”); 
see also Amiti Sen, Year-End Doha Round Meeting in Bali Likely to Yield Results: Lamy, 
HINDU BUS. LINE (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/yearend-
doha-round-meeting-in-bali-likely-to-yield-results-lamy/%20article4361461.ece?homepage=tr 
ue&ref=wl_home (noting a lack of progress in the WTO Doha Round since 2001); 
Multilateralism Dying? China’s Rise Raises Questions for World Trade, BUS. STANDARD (Feb
., 17, 2013), http://www.business-standard.com/article/ opinion/multilateralism-dying-1130270 
0529_1.html (discussing the impact of China’s economic rise on multilateralism in 
international trade regulation). 
375. See Gantz, supra note 374, at 5. 
376. This Article uses the term “preferential trade agreement,” as opposed to “free 
trade agreement” or “regional trade agreement” because it more accurately describes the 
nature of these agreements as (a) not always being “free trade agreements” in the traditional 
sense, and (b) not always being focused on regional integration.  See Gregory W. Bowman, 
The Domestic and International Policy Implications of “Deep” Versus “Broad” Preferential Trade 
Agreements, 19 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 497 (2009). 
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modifications to PTAs (such as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement and the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement377). 
As David Gantz has noted in the context of regional trade 
liberalization, there is a growing sense that “it may be possible to 
accomplish a degree of trade liberalization on a sub-global level that is 
impossible or at least much more difficult to achieve globally.”378  The 
same observation holds true for the harmonization of export controls 
generally, and for coordination of export control extraterritorial 
jurisdictional reach specifically. 
D. Tolerance for Asymmetry 
Consensus regarding the proper scope of extraterritorial prescriptive 
jurisdiction would not have to lead to symmetry, either in terms of the 
breadth of extraterritoriality asserted by participating countries or the 
nature of export control laws that are applied extraterritorially.  With 
respect to the reach of prescriptive jurisdiction, it might well be that 
some of the United States’ trading partners would not have the same 
degree of interest in asserting extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction as 
the United States does.  That sort of waiver or self-limiting of 
jurisdiction is permissible—and the fact that such decisions might be 
influenced by other factors, such as power imbalances between countries 
or in return for other benefits gained through negotiations with other 
countries (such as, for example, favorable bilateral investment treaty 
provisions) would not render those decisions less permissible or 
legitimate.379  It is thus entirely likely, perhaps even probable, that the 
United States would assert broader extraterritorial prescriptive 
jurisdiction than many of its trading partners.  Moreover, with respect to 
the laws for which prescriptive jurisdiction would be asserted, it is 
entirely possible, and again probably likely, that there would be 
differences in national export control rules, even when there was not a 
difference in the breadth of reach.  That is to say, the underlying policies 
of these different national export control laws would need to be the 
same, but the mechanics of these laws and the decisions reached under 
them likely would be somewhat different.  This sort of MRA approach 
to export jurisdiction and export control decision-making would help to 
 
377. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Free Trade Agreements, USTR.GOV, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited Feb. 6, 2014). 
378. Gantz, supra note 374, at 5. 
379. See Berman, supra note 356, at 1183. 
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facilitate consensus about the appropriate scope of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, and also make cooperation more feasible by allowing for 
the coexistence of regimes that have similar goals but different 
regulatory mechanisms and which might sometimes reach different 
decisions regarding particular transactions. 
To posit one hypothetical example, the United Kingdom currently 
sees itself as more internationally interconnected than the United States 
but less directly threatened by external forces than the United States.380  
With respect to the reach of jurisdiction, one might reasonably predict 
that the United Kingdom might be more willing than the United States 
to forgo the assertion of extraterritorial export control jurisdiction over 
activities abroad—and in fact, it has not asserted extraterritorial export 
control jurisdiction as broadly as the United States.381  One also might 
posit that, to the extent the United Kingdom was interested in broader 
extraterritorial application of its export controls, it might be willing to 
forgo such assertions of jurisdiction in return for trade or investment 
concessions (or other concessions for that matter) from the United 
States.  We might posit further that the United States might be willing to 
give such concessions, both in order to ensure that its assertions of 
extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction within the United Kingdom 
were accepted by the United Kingdom, and to preclude similar U.K. 
assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction within the United States.  
Continuing with this same example, we could expect that, with 
respect to the nature of U.S. and U.K. export control laws themselves, 
 
380. Compare A STRONG BRITAIN IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY: THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY STRATEGY 3 (2010) (“Britain today is both more secure and more vulnerable than 
in most of her long history.  More secure, in the sense that we do not currently face, as we 
have so often in our past, a conventional threat of attack on our territory by a hostile power.  
But more vulnerable, because we are one of the most open societies, in a world that is more 
networked than ever before.”), with THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 20, at foreword (“For 
nearly a decade, our Nation has been at war with a far-reaching network of violence and 
hatred.”). 
381. The United Kingdom’s export control regime relies on export licenses and end-user 
statements (“undertaking forms”) as a means to prevent diversion at the front end, much in 
the same way that U.S. export controls did in the decades following World War II.  There is 
no general U.K. assertion of jurisdiction over items outside the United Kingdom.  See Dep't 
for Bus. Innovation & Skills, End-User and Stockist Undertakings for SIELs and Consignee 
Undertakings for OIELs, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/end-user-and-consignee-undertakings 
-for-siels-and-oiels (last updated Sept. 21, 2012); see also Dep’t for Business Innovation & 
Skills, Export Controls: An Introductory Guide, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/beginners-
guide-to-export-controls (last updated Sept. 19, 2013) (providing general guidance regarding 
U.K. export controls). 
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the transaction review and licensing mechanisms of the U.S. and U.K. 
export control regimes likely would be somewhat different, and it also is 
likely that the export licensing determinations of the U.S. and U.K. 
export control regimes might differ in some respects.  To the extent that 
both national export control regimes applied to a transaction, there 
would need to be coordination regarding which national export control 
regime would take priority, and how conflicting licensing determinations 
would be resolved.  It is common in international trade for the 
international trade laws of multiple countries to apply to a single 
transaction, so this is not an original or novel matter—and indeed 
overlapping prescriptive jurisdiction is a hallmark feature of modern 
international law generally.382  The point made here is that such overlaps 
are not per se problematic, are to be anticipated, and can be better 
managed if the boundaries of permissible export control jurisdiction are 
more clearly defined than they are today. 
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: THE MECHANICS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
The purpose of the changes recommended in this Article is to reduce 
the likelihood of future international trade disputes concerning export 
control jurisdiction, and to facilitate changes that ensure greater 
consistency of the U.S. export control regime with international law 
prescriptive jurisdictional principles.  This Article therefore has focused 
squarely on assessing the current state of doctrine and recommending 
practical steps for meaningful and successful change.  While the topic 
itself is complex and policy-laden, the resolution of the matter as a 
matter of U.S. law is in fact strikingly, indeed stunningly, simple and 
straightforward.   
First, alteration of the jurisdictional scope of U.S. export controls 
would not require statutory amendments or enactment of new federal 
legislation, because the current U.S. export control regime largely 
consists of agency regulations promulgated under broad statutory 
mandate.383  Regardless of one’s concerns about the antidemocratic 
nature of such implementation384 or the wisdom of broad congressional 
delegations to the executive under American constitutional law, such 
broad delegation clearly is permissible under current U.S. constitutional 
 
382. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 403 cmt. d. 
383. See supra text accompanying notes 40–50. 
384. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 22, at 184. 
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doctrine,385 and indeed represents the U.S. norm in matters of 
international trade regulation, due to the technical and policy-driven 
nature of the field.386 
Second, the regulatory changes required are modest in the extreme.  
The overall classification and licensing scheme of U.S. export controls 
could stay in place.  While the current classification and licensing 
scheme suffers from its own very serious problems, as discussed 
elsewhere,387 resolving the jurisdictional issues of the U.S. export control 
regime does not require tackling that thorny but separate issue.  In other 
words, jurisdiction can be fixed without requiring a full rebuild of the 
regulatory structure of U.S. export controls.388 
In fact, solving the vexing jurisdictional problem of U.S. export 
controls boils down, amazingly, to just a single regulatory definition—
namely the definition of “Items subject to the EAR.”  The current 
definition, which is set forth in its entirety below, clearly demonstrates 
the EAR’s reliance on item origin as the core basis for jurisdiction. 
 
§ 734.3 ITEMS SUBJECT TO THE EAR 
(a) Except for items excluded in paragraph (b) of this section 
[which pertains to items subject to the export jurisdiction of 
other U.S. government agencies; certain informational materials 
such as magazines and newspapers; and publicly available non-
encryption technology and software (which is generally non-
commercial)], the following items are subject to the EAR: 
(1) All items in the United States, including in a U.S. Foreign 
Trade Zone or moving intransit through the United States from 
one foreign country to another; 
(2) All U.S. origin items wherever located; 
 
385. See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 328–30 
(2002). 
386. Of course, statutory resolution is possible—Congress can and does involve itself 
directly in trade regulatory matters—and Abbott suggested congressional resolution of the 
matter in the 1980s.  See Abbott, supra note 112, at 113.  The point made here is that it is not 
necessary, due to existing broad delegations to the executive. 
387. For further discussion, see Bowman, supra note 9, at 340–43; Bowman, supra note 
64. 
388. The express language of the EAR in fact supports this bifurcated approach: Section 
734.2(a)(3) of the EAR admonishes that “[t]he term ‘subject to the EAR’ should not be 
confused with licensing or other requirements.”  Export Administration Regulations, 15 
C.F.R. § 734.2(a)(3) (2013). 
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(3) Foreign-made commodities that incorporate controlled U.S.-
origin commodities, foreign-made commodities that are 
‘bundled’ with controlled U.S.-origin software, foreign-made 
software that is commingled with controlled U.S.-origin software, 
and foreign-made technology that is commingled with controlled 
U.S.-origin technology: 
(i) In any quantity, as described in § 734.4(a) of this part; or 
(ii) In quantities exceeding the de minimis levels, as described in  
§ 734.4(c) or § 734.4(d) of this part; 
(4) Certain foreign-made direct products of U.S. origin 
technology or software, as described in § 736.2(b)(3) of the 
EAR.  The term “direct product” means the immediate product 
(including processes and services) produced directly by the use 
of technology or software; and 
NOTE TO PARAGRAPH (A)(4): Certain foreign-manufactured 
items developed or produced from U.S.-origin encryption items 
exported pursuant to License Exception ENC are subject to the 
EAR.  See sections 740.17(a) and 740.17(b)(4)(ii) of the EAR. 
(5) Certain commodities produced by any plant or major 
component of a plant located outside the United States that is a 
direct product of U.S.-origin technology or software, as 
described in § 736.2(b)(3) of the EAR.389 
If we were to delete subsections (2) through (5) of this provision, 
and tweak the existing language to focus on transactions rather than 
items, we would transform the jurisdictional reach of U.S. export 
controls from being item-based to being purpose-based.  A modified 
Section 734.3 could read as follows: 
 
§ 734.3 TRANSACTIONS SUBJECT TO THE EAR 
(a) Except for items excluded in paragraph (b) of this section 
[which pertains to items subject to the export jurisdiction of 
other U.S. government agencies; certain informational materials 
such as magazines and newspapers; and publicly available non-
encryption technology and software (which is generally non-
commercial)], transactions in the following items are subject to 
the EAR: 
 
389. Id. § 734.3. 
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(1) All items in the United States, including in a U.S. Foreign 
Trade Zone;  
(2) All items moving intransit through the United States from 
one foreign country to another. 
Jurisdiction over foreign activities that raise proliferation or missile 
technology concerns—that is, items for which section 734.3(a)’s 
territorial jurisdiction is not sufficient—are already captured by the 
current language of section 734.5(a) of the EAR, which does not rely on 
item origin for the assertion of jurisdiction.  That section, which would 
not need to be revised, reads as follows: 
 
§ 734.5 ACTIVITIES OF U.S. AND FOREIGN PERSONS 
SUBJECT TO THE EAR 
The following kinds of activities are subject to the EAR: 
(a) Certain activities of U.S. persons related to the proliferation 
of nuclear explosive devices, chemical or biological weapons, 
missile technology as described in § 744.6 of the EAR, and the 
proliferation of chemical weapons as described in part 745 of the 
EAR. 
(b) Activities of U.S. or foreign persons prohibited by any order 
issued under the EAR, including a Denial Order issued pursuant 
to part 766 of the EAR. 
By moving away from item-based jurisdiction and toward “purpose-
based” jurisdiction that centers jurisdiction on mutual (and serious) 
concerns, U.S. export controls could move away from the current 
problematic jurisdictional scheme, but still maintain sufficiently broad 
jurisdictional reach based on existing end-use and end-user concerns set 
forth in the EAR.  The core problem of the current approach would be 
eliminated, and future U.S. export control efforts would be placed in 
greater harmony with the approaches of the United States’ trading 
partners.  And the rest of the U.S. export control edifice could remain 
intact. 
This solution may seem anticlimactic, especially after 90-plus pages 
of build-up.  It is admittedly odd that resolving a three decades-old 
quandary could boil down to changes to a single regulatory definition.  
Or perhaps it is not odd at all.  Perhaps it is simply a matter of not 
having focused on the right issue, of not having asked the right question 
in recent years.  Current U.S. efforts at export control reform—with 
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their focus on simplifying the item classification scheme of U.S. export 
controls—suggest that this may indeed be so. 
Regardless of the reason, it is unfortunate that the expansive item-
based jurisdictional approach has remained in place for so very long.  
The 1982 expansion of U.S. export control jurisdiction was not an 
insignificant change, and it did not go unnoticed—and yet it is still with 
us.  The world has changed dramatically since then, in ways that make 
item-based jurisdiction increasingly awkward and insufficient—and yet 
this remains the basis for U.S. export control jurisdiction.  This approach 
simply has become a feature of the regulatory terrain to be navigated, 
and it has ceased to be questioned. 
This Article has sought to counter that implicit assumption by 
showing that item-based jurisdiction is not a foreordained necessity, and 
that it presents serious and unnecessary difficulties.  The benefits of 
resolution are great, and the administrative cost of resolution is low.  
Something should be done to fix it—and it is clear what that 
“something” is.  The change may be subtle, but it is far from merely 
semantic. 
In the final analysis, the will to act may be the greatest bar to fixing 
the jurisdictional inadequacy of U.S. export controls.  Will U.S. officials 
pay enough attention to this issue, for a brief moment at least, to 
appreciate the potential risks of inaction and the potential benefits (and 
lack of risk) involved in action?  Predicting the future can be difficult, so 
perhaps the best answer we can give is “Hopefully yes.”  Or more 
precisely, “Hopefully yes, and hopefully soon.”  It is quite possible that 
we are in a window of shrinking opportunity for the jurisdictional 
reform advocated for in this Article—both because sooner or later 
another large export trade dispute will emerge, and because the United 
States’ time as a global hegemon may be drawing to a close.390  Future 
U.S. success in international trade matters likely will be based on more 
multilateral approaches—and it is axiomatic that negotiating preferred 
outcomes multilaterally is easier when one’s power is greater.  The 
longer the United States waits to address the problematic nature of its 
item-based extraterritorial export control jurisdiction, the less leverage 
 
390. See N. INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL TRENDS 2030: ALTERNATIVE WORLDS, 
at ii, x (2012) (stating that “[t]here will not be any hegemonic power.  Power will shift to 
networks and coalitions in a multipolar world,” and that “[t]he U.S. most likely will remain 
‘first among equals.’”). 
BOWMAN FINAL (7-8-14) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/8/2014  6:30 PM 
2014] U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 693 
and maneuvering room it may have to achieve the (asymmetric) results 
that satisfy it. 
In cases such as this where the payoff is large, the risks are low, the 
action is simple, and delay is harmful, the answer to the question 
“Should we do this?” is almost always “Yes.”  What now remains to be 
seen is whether, in this matter of export jurisdiction, logic or inertia 
prevails. 
